Preamble

The House met at Half past Two o'Clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

AYCLIFFE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
(DISTRICT HEATING) BILL (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Wednesday next.

BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION BILL
(By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Tomorrow.

CARDIFF EXTENSION BILL (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Tuesday next.

ETON RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL
(By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Tomorrow.

ILFORD CORPORATION (DRAINAGE) BILL
(By Order)

Read a Second time, and committed.

LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (GENERAL
POWERS) BILL (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Wednesday next.

PORT OF LONDON BILL (By Order)

Read a Second time, and committed.

THAMES CONSERVANCY BILL (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Wednesday next.

WOLVERHAMPTON CORPORATION BILL
(By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Tuesday next.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL NAVY

Midshipmen (Training)

Air-Commodore Harvey: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty in what circumstances has the training with the Royal Navy of cadets for the Royal Canadian Navy been suspended.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. James Callaghan): I assume that the hon. and gallant Member is referring to the training of midshipmen, as it has not been the practice of the Royal Canadian Navy to send their cadets to the Royal Navy for training. The Canadian Navy has now decided that in so far as possible the training of junior executive officers should take place in Canada, except for technical training and certain specialist courses, which will continue to be given in Royal Naval establishments.

Air-Commodore Harvey: Does the Parliamentary Secretary not think it most unfortunate that this arrangement should cease when we are trying to bring about integration of the Forces within the British Empire? Will he represent to his right hon. Friend that he should look at this matter again, to see if something can be done to bring about co-ordination?

Mr. Callaghan: I will certainly bring that point to the notice of my right hon. Friend, but this is a decision of the Canadian Government.

Treasure Search, Tobermory

Mr. Emrys Hughes: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty what payment is to be made for the use of naval personnel in searching for possible treasure at Tobermory.

Mr. Callaghan: The contract arranged for this work provides for repayment in full of all Admiralty expenses, including the pay and allowances of the naval personnel.

Mr. Hughes: Can my hon. Friend give us some idea of the price the Duke of Argyll is being asked to pay for the services of the naval personnel? Further, will my hon. Friend consult with the


Lord Advocate as to whether, if any treasure is recovered, it belongs to the Crown and not to the Duke?

Mr. Callaghan: The Duke has undertaken to pay all the expenses involved in the operation. Perhaps we had better find the ducats before we claim them.

Court Martial Committee

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty whether consideration of the first report of the Naval Court Martial Committee has now been concluded.

Mr. Callaghan: No, Sir. As I informed the hon. Member on 15th March, this report is now under consideration. Its recommendations are being correlated with those of the Lewis Committee Report and the other Services are being consulted. The views of the Governments of Australia and New Zealand are also being sought as the Royal Australian and New Zealand Navies base their disciplinary code on that of the Royal Navy.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: While appreciating the difficulties of the Government in coming to a decision, may I ask the hon. Gentleman what is the objection to publishing this report, so that hon. Members may assist the Government in making up their mind?

Mr. Callaghan: I believe that it is usual for publication and the announcement of the Government's decision on these matters to take place at the same time.

Hospital, Port Edgar

Lieut.-Commander Clark Hutchison: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty what is the maximum number of patients who can be accommodated in the Royal Naval hospital at Port Edgar; and what was the highest number of patients in residence in this hospital at any time in 1949

The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Walter Edwards): The maximum number of patients who can be accommodated in the Royal Naval Hospital, Port Edgar. is 213. The highest number of patients in residence on one day in 1949 was 173

Lieut.-Commander Hutchison: Is the Civil Lord satisfied that there will be adequate accommodation in the local civilian hospitals for any Service patients from the port area?

Mr. Edwards: Yes, Sir.

Sea Cadets, Drafting

Mr. James Johnson: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty if he is aware that there is much dissatisfaction amongst former sea cadets, who are now being drafted to the Army instead of the Royal Navy; and how long this state of affairs is likely to last.

Mr. Callaghan: Yes, Sir. I am sorry that, owing to the reduced entry into the Navy it is only possible to accept National Service men who have completed their annual training in the R.N.V.R. or R.M.F.V.R., and some apprentices who are required for the technical branches. Sea cadets must, therefore, join the R.N.V.R. or R.M.F.V.R. if they wish to be accepted into the Navy for National Service.

Stores and Supplies (Losses)

Brigadier Clarke: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty what is the value of Government stores and supplies, the property of his Department, that have been lost in transit on the railways each year since the railways were nationalised.

Mr. W. J. Edwards: Losses of and damage to naval material in transit on the railways in the financial year 1st April, 1948, to 31 March, 1949, were valued at £13,737. Information relating to the current financial year is not immediately available, but I will communicate with the hon. Member as soon as it has been received.

Civilian Staffs (Cuts)

Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty what cuts he is intending to make in the civilian staffs of the Admiralty yards and establishments at Gosport, Fareham and Lee-on-Solent.

Mr. W. J. Edwards: The financial provision for salaries and wages proposed for 1950–51 will probably call for some reductions in Admiralty establishments in this area, as well as elsewhere, particularly


in numbers borne on Vote 4. It is, however, too early to give any precise forecast beyond saying that substantial discharges are unlikely to be called for in any one area at any time.

Surgeon Lieut.-Commander Bennett: Will the hon. Gentleman please bear in mind that in reaching this decision there are very few alternative industries in the area named in the Question? There is, therefore, little chance of people discharged from the dockyards being directed into other forms of employment.

Mr. Edwards: That is always borne in mind, but it cannot always be a governing factor. If the Vote 4 amount for that particular area is reduced correspondingly with other areas in the country they will have to bear their share.

Grid, Burnham-on-Crouch

Mr. Driberg: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty if he will make a statement on the future use of his Department's grid at Burnham-on-Crouch; and if he is aware of the importance to the people of Burnham of the maintenance of this grid.

Mr. W. J. Edwards: The Admiralty recently received from the owner of all but a small part of the site on which the ship repairing grid at Burnham-on-Crouch stands an offer for the part of the grid on his land of such an amount as to make it impossible for them to justify proceedings for compulsory purchase, in view of the terms of Section 10 of the Requisitioned Land and War Works Act, 1945. The possibility of compulsory purchase under Section 38 (2) of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, by the local authority had already been considered by the Minister of Town and Country Planning, but he had decided that it could not be justified as immediately necessary in the interests of the proper planning of the area. In these circumstances the Admiralty, whose responsibility is limited to securing the value of the grid on release of its site from requisition, had no alternative but to accept the offer. The future of the grid must now he a matter for the private interests concerned.

Mr. Driberg: Is my hon. Friend aware of the great anxiety felt by the Urban

District Council and other people locally about the future of this grid, because of its contribution towards full employment in the town? Could he look again, personally, at Section 10 of the Requisitioned Land and War Works Act, because its interpretation does not seem to be anything like so simple or definite as his answer would suggest?

Mr. Edwards: I regret that this matter cannot be looked at again, because we have made definite arrangements with the owner of the property. I feel we have a moral obligation to the owner of the property to restore the land to him as soon as we possibly can. With regard to employment prospects, I feel they have not been worsened as a result of return of this property to the owner. It is quite likely that private interests will make use of the property.

Sir Herbert Williams: Can the hon. Gentleman tell the House what the word "grid" means, because some of us do not know?

Mr. Edwards: I will show one to the hon. Member.

Civil Employees (Territorial Army)

Sir H. Williams: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty under what circumstances civil employees of his Department are granted permission to join the Territorial Army; in how many cases permission has been refused; and how many applications are now pending.

Mr. W. J. Edwards: Each application for permission to join the Territorial Army is considered on its merits, and permission is granted if it is clear that it will be possible, having regard to the Admiralty's own commitments, to release the applicant from his Admiralty duties immediately on the outbreak of war. Of a total of 138 applications, 91 have been granted, 38 refused, and 9 are under consideration.

Service Engagements

Commander Noble: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty how many ratings and other ranks of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines completed their first period of service during


the last 12 months; and how many of these have signed on to complete their time for pension.

Mr. Callaghan: Four thousand and eleven and 885 respectively.

Oral Answers to Questions — TELEVISION

Electro-magnetic Interference

Mr. Deedes: asked the Postmaster-General when the regulations now being prepared by his Department to prevent the radiation of electro-magnetic energy from interfering with wireless and television reception will be published; and when they will come into force.

The Postmaster-General (Mr. Ness Edwards): The Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1949, provides that, before making such regulations, I shall consult an advisory committee appointed from a panel nominated in accordance with the provisions of the Act. I expect the nominations to the panel to be made shortly and shall then appoint the advisory committee. Naturally, some time is bound to elapse after the advisory committee is appointed before any regulations can be made.

Transmitter Programme

Mr. Erroll: asked the Postmaster-General if he will now issue an up to date statement of the television transmitter programme taking into account the effect of capital cuts arising from devaluation

Mr. Ness Edwards: I would refer the hon. Member to my statement during the Debate on the Post Office and Telegraph (Money) Bill on Friday last, 17th March.

Mr. Erroll: As I listened carefully to that statement and observed that it coincided with the statement of his predecessor some months ago, may I ask the Minister whether the television transmitter programme has, in fact, escaped any form of capital out?

Mr. Ness Edwards: I think the hon. Gentleman has not read what was said last Friday. If he will read it, and compare it with what my predecessor said and what was said by the Lord President of the Council at Radiolympia, I think he will get all the information he requires

Oral Answers to Questions — TELEPHONE SERVICE

Wimbledon, Malden and Coombe

Mr. Black: asked the Postmaster-General how many persons in the boroughs of Wimbledon and Malden and Coombe, respectively, who have applied for telephones in their business premises and private houses are still waiting for telephones; and what further delay he anticipates.

Mr. Ness Edwards: In Wimbledon 315 business applicants and 1,390 residential applicants are waiting for telephones. In Malden and Coombe the corresponding figures are 73 and 817. There is a shortage of plant in these areas and, in view of the restrictions on capital expenditure, I regret that I cannot say when the outstanding applications will all be cleared.

Sheffield Area

The following Questions stood upon the Order Paper in the name of Mr. PETER ROBERTS.

21. To ask the Postmaster-General whether he will now authorise his Sheffield area officers to recruit more labour for the installation of necessary telephones.

22. To ask the Postmaster-General whether he is prepared to release further supplies of materials to the Sheffield area to provide more necessary telephones.

Mr. Ness Edwards: With permission, I will answer Questions Nos. 21 and 22 together.

Mr. Roberts: On a point of Order. These Questions are about two very different subjects. If the Minister intends to give a responsible reply I think that I should have one answer on labour and another on material.

Mr. Ness Edwards: The reply to both Questions is really combined in the one answer. This is only a matter of convenience.
The restrictions on Government expenditure have made it necessary for the Post Office to limit the number of its engineering workmen, and I regret that I could not agree to further recruitment in the Sheffield area, which has its proper share of the total Post Office engineering force. Sufficient supplies of


material are held to employ the labour available at Sheffield.

Mr. Roberts: Is the Minister aware that some time ago the allocation of labour in Sheffield was cut and that now more labour is available? Will he restore the cut?

Mr. Ness Edwards: I think that the content of that supplementary question is wholly wrong.

Mr. Roberts: No.

Mr. Ness Edwards: The labour force was not cut.

Mr. Roberts: Is not the Minister aware that what I have said is correct? The second question I should like to ask is whether the Minister is aware that in Sheffield a profit is made on the telephone service, so that the money is available? Further, is he not aware that materials are now available? Why does he not do something about it, because if he does not he will never get to the end of the waiting list?

Mr. Ness Edwards: I cannot take the civil engineering force away from housing, which is a very pressing problem.

Mr. Roberts: This has nothing to do with housing.

Huntingdonshire

Mr. David Renton: asked the Postmaster-General how many public kiosks are due to be allocated this year to the county of Huntingdon, which contains many small and remote villages which have no kiosks; and what steps he is taking to increase the supply of kiosks for small villages.

Mr. Ness Edwards: The arrangement agreed upon last year with the Rural District Councils' Association was specially designed to help the provision of kiosks in small and remote villages, by eliminating the monetary contribution previously required from the local authority in such cases. For the year ending 31st August, 1950, five kiosks have been allotted to the county of Huntingdon, and these will be installed in places recommended by the county branch of the Rural District

Councils' Association. Allocations for the following year are about to be considered, and while I recognise the desirability of increasing the supply of these rural kiosks, there are, unfortunately, limits to Government expenditure.

Mr. Renton: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there are no fewer than at least 15 remote villages in the county which have no kind of public telephone; will he bear in mind that there is great disappointment about the slow progress which is made in providing them; and will he say what is the limiting factor to which he refers?

Mr. Ness Edwards: I think that we have made very substantial progress in this matter. The present position, in some cases, is the same as it has been for generations, and is due entirely to the neglect of former Governments. With regard to two of the villages with which the hon. Gentleman is concerned, I think he will find that they will probably figure in the next programme.

Mr. Oliver Stanley: Will the right hon. Gentleman accept sincere apologies from the Conservative Party for the fact that during the 19th century we did not erect any telephone kiosks before the telephone had been invented?

Mr. Ness Edwards: If the Tory Party starts apologising it will have a full-time job.

Wembley

Wing-Commander Bullus: asked the Postmaster-General how many residents and business people in Wembley are waiting for the telephone service; what is the date of the longest outstanding application; and what progress is planned for the immediate future.

Mr. Ness Edwards: In those parts served by the Wembley, Corinthian and Arnold exchanges, 1,442 lines were provided in 1949. Four hundred and thirty-eight business and 1,178 residential applications are now outstanding. The longest outstanding application was made in 1940. Cabling work is in progress and the additional lines will enable service to be given this year to a large proportion of the waiting applicants.

Oral Answers to Questions — POST OFFICE

Sub-postmasters

Mr. George Thomas: asked the Postmaster-General if he will state the principles upon which he appoints sub-postmasters in cases where the sub-post office is situated in a shop.

Mr. Ness Edwards: A vacancy for a sub-postmaster is normally advertised locally, whether or not the existing sub-office is run in conjunction with a shop. The advertisement invites applications from suitable persons, who are able to provide adequate accommodation and the necessary assistance to carry on the Post Office business. All the applications received are considered on their merits, in the light of the qualifications of the applicants, and of the suitability of the premises they offer.

Mr. Thomas: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in a recent appointment in Cardiff a man was ruled out because he had no military service, although he received a personal commendation from the King for work in Civil Defence during the war? Does he justify that sort of conduct by his Department?

Mr. Ness Edwards: I can assure my hon. Friend that that was not the case. The man was not excluded on those grounds. His application was taken into consideration, and the fact that he had been commended by the King was not counted against him.

Mr. Thomas: In future, will my right hon. Friend read his letters before he sends them to me, because I have already been assured that the appointment was made on the ground that the other man was in one of the Services?

Mr. Ness Edwards: I think that is an unwarranted aspersion. My hon. Friend knows that I had the whole file of letters in the House, and that I went through them meticulously, in part with him. To say that I sent a letter out after that without reading it is quite wrong.

Mr. Vane: The right hon. Gentleman said that one of the factors was the provision of adequate accommodation by the applicant for the job of sub-postmaster. Where there is to be a development charge under the Town and Country Planning Act does his Department pay it?

Mr. Ness Edwards: No, that is the responsibility of the sub-postmaster.

Sub-Office, Cardiff

Mr. G. Thomas: asked the Postmaster-General if he will give the reasons for changing the venue of the sub-post office, Cowbridge Road, Cardiff, in view of the fact that a recent inspection report considered the present premises adequate and convenient.

Mr. Ness Edwards: As I have explained in recent correspondence with my hon. Friend, the vacancy for the sub-postmastership in this case was advertised according to normal Post Office practice, and the best qualified candidate appointed. Apart from the question of personal qualifications, the premises offered by the successful candidate, which are within 25 yards of the former sub-post office, provide slightly more accommodation for Post Office purposes.

Mr. Thomas: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there has had to be a substantial alteration to the new premises to make them suitable for Post Office purposes; and that since the available premises have been used as a post office for 50 years? Can he justify changing the site, especially in view of the public petition presented?

Mr. G. Thomas: asked the Postmaster-General if he will give the total cost involved in opening new premises for the sub-post office at Cowbridge Road, Cardiff.

Mr. Ness Edwards: The total cost to the Post Office is estimated at £25.

Sir H. Williams: Would not that £25 have been useful in providing telephones in Wimbledon?

Mr. Ness Edwards: I would say that the expenditure of £25 ought not to exclude an ex-Service man from his opportunity.

Poll Cards (Delivery)

Dr. Broughton: asked the Postmaster-General what action he proposes taking to prevent at future elections the postal delivery of returning officers' poll cards within envelopes containing political party literature.

Mr. Ness Edwards: I am sorry that this occurred in a few isolated instances. Definite instructions will be issued for future elections to ensure the proper delivery of official poll cards.

Dr. Broughton: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that answer, may I ask if he will use his best endeavours to prevent the repetition of a practice which caused inconvenience and misunderstanding to electors and caused concern to candidates in the recent General Election?

Mr. Ness Edwards: Yes, Sir.

Staff Associations

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: asked the Postmaster-General whether he is now in a position to make a statement as to the result of his consideration of the rules governing recognition of staff associations by his Department.

Mr. Ness Edwards: Consideration of the question of recognition of new staff associations in the Post Office involves problems of general policy which I am still examining. I can assure the hon. Member that I shall make my promised statement to the House as soon as possible.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: As the right hon. Gentleman assured the House a week ago that the statement would be made very shortly, and in view of the fact that he was not then further pressed to grant recognition to associations which, under the old rules, have had a claim outstanding for some months, can he now assure the House that the statement will be made, at the latest, next week?

Mr. Ness Edwards: I am sorry I cannot give that assurance, but I hope to be in a position to answer within a fortnight.

Mr. J. Langford-Holt: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that in this country it is not customary to change the rules in the middle of the game without the consent of both sides?

Mr. Ness Edwards: There is no intention of changing any rules.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: asked the Postmaster-General what percentage of the organised workers in the appropriate grade are members of the Engineering

Officers (Telecommunications) Association; and how long that figure has been in excess of 40 per cent.

Mr. Ness Edwards: It would be wrong to provide information which would disclose staff association membership figures given to the Department in confidence.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that that statement indicates a change of policy from that of his predecessor who, on 2nd November last, confirmed that this Association had the requisite 40 per cent.? Can the right hon. Gentleman say what has caused the change of policy?

Mr. Ness Edwards: The figures given by my predecessor were figures which had been published by the Association. In this case the figures have not been published, and I have no authority to give to the House figures given to us in confidence.

Sub-Office, Elland

Mr. Douglas Houghton: asked the Postmaster-General whether he will now provide the facilities of a sub-office for the inhabitants of Jagger Green and Old Lindley, in the urban district of Elland Yorkshire.

Mr. Ness Edwards: I regret that the circumstances at Jagger Green and Old Lindley are not such as to warrant the provision of a sub-post office in the immediate neighbourhood, but I am seeing whether anything can be done to improve the position.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL AIR FORCE

Trades (Employment)

Mr. Renton: asked the Secretary of State for Air how many men in the Royal Air Force were misemployed at the latest date for which figures are available; and what percentage of the total number of men that figure represents.

The Under-Secretary of State for Air (Mr. Crawley): The employment of airmen on duties other than those for which they are mustered is closely controlled by air officers commanding, and is restricted to temporary arrangements where full employment cannot otherwise


be assured for the personnel concerned. Formations are not required to report statistics of such cases.

Mr. Renton: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that a large number of men in the Royal Air Force are technically described as misemployed? Would he agree that men so described are wasting their time and skill, and will he say what is being done to reduce the number of men misemployed?

Mr. Crawley: As the hon. Member has inferred "misemployment" is a technical word. It simply means that where we have shortages in certain trades we have to fill them with men who are in trades where there is a surplus. We do our best to keep this movement to the lowest possible figure and to use men in trades which are closely analogous to the ones in which they were employed previously.

Stores and Supplies (Losses)

Brigadier Clarke: asked the Secretary of State for Air what is the value of Government stores and supplies, the property of his Department, that have been lost in transit on the railways each year since the railways were nationalised.

Mr. Crawley: A complete record of Air Ministry stores lost in transit on the railways is not maintained centrally and to obtain the information from all R.A.F. units would require considerable time and effort.

Brigadier Clarke: May I have an assurance that the losses are credited to the Air Estimates and are not hidden in any way? If that is so, why is it that these losses cannot be stated, as the losses incurred last year must be known if they have been credited to the Air Force and debited to the railways?

Mr. Crawley: Our practice is a little different from that of other Ministries. We allow units to make their own claims. We find that it pays quite well. We get back a considerable proportion of stores and supplies which are credited.

Election Meetings

Mrs. Eirene White: asked the Secretary of State for Air if he will consider the case, of which particulars have been

sent to him, where an officer commanding at a Royal Air Force station refused permission to a Parliamentary candidate, during an election, to address the wives of serving men living in married quarters; and what steps he proposes to take to see that this does not happen again.

Mr. Crawley: Permission was refused as it is contrary to long established practice to allow political meetings or canvassing within Service establishments.

Mrs. White: Will my hon. Friend ask his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Air to reconsider this matter before the next election, and to bear in mind that these women are not Service personnel but ordinary civilian electors, living in their own homes? Will he remember that many of them have domestic responsibilities which make it difficult for them to go to public meetings, particularly as in the case mentioned the married quarters are at a considerable distance from the nearest school or public hall?

Mr. Crawley: I am sure that we all sympathise with the hon. Lady in wanting to get every possible vote, but this is a case where security must be considered. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] That really is so. It would be impossible to allow a lot of people on whom one could keep no possible check, to have free access to a Service station.

Mrs. White: Is my hon. Friend aware that other visitors are allowed to go to married quarters? There is no reason, to my simple mind, why a candidate should not be allowed in during an election?

Mr. Crawley: The occupants of married quarters are held responsible for people allowed in to visit them. That would not be the case here.

Miss Horsbrugh: Were these people allowed to come out of their married quarters, or were they incarcerated during the time of the election?

Heligoland (Cemetery)

Professor Savory: asked the Secretary of State for Air whether he has considered the protest sent to him by nine fishermen of Heligoland against the bombardment of their cemetery; and whether he will give instructions that the bombing of this cemetery shall cease.

Mr. Crawley: My right hon. Friend has just received this petition. He is looking into the question of whether it is possible to exclude the cemetery from the bombing area.

Professor Savory: Is there any precedent for a Christian nation bombing a cemetery, the most sacred spot in that island, in a time of profound peace—1949?

Oral Answers to Questions — CIVIL AVIATION

Street Lighting, Wilmslow

Lieut.-Colonel Bromley-Davenport: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation whether he is aware that the Wilmslow Urban District Council will be obliged to spend an additional sum, amounting to approximately £.1,000, in order to adapt its proposed new street lighting system to the requirements of his Department; and whether, in view of the fact that the benefit resulting therefrom will accrue solely to aviation interests and not to the local inhabitants or road transport interests, steps will be taken either to modify the requirements or to provide some financial assistance towards the cost.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation (Mr. Beswick): Yes, Sir. My noble Friend is satisfied that the adaptations to the proposed system are essential to the safety not only of the aircraft using the aerodrome but also of persons and property on the ground in its vicinity. Where existing lights need to be modified to meet air navigation requirements my noble Friend will consider an ex gratia contribution, but he has no authority to contribute towards the cost of adaptations to new lighting systems. He is, however, having the whole matter examined further, and will communicate with the hon. and gallant Member in due course.

Ringway Aerodrome, Manchester

Lieut.-Colonel Sir Walter Smiles: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation, what reports have been made to his Department that the beam on the approach to Ringway Aerodrome, Manchester. is sometimes distorted or bent.

Mr. Beswick: Since publication of a notice to airmen, on 3rd January, notifying a slight bend in the Ringway Standard Beam Approach over Stockport, there have been five reports of some departure from normal performance. None referred to any bend on the actual approach beam. This S.B.A., like all others, is flight-checked monthly, and at the last check, on 10th March, it was found to be functioning correctly.

Sir W. Smiles: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether the conditions which caused the fatal accident at Ringway in August, 1949 have been eliminated?

Mr. Beswick: If the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that the fatal accident was caused by this Beam Approach, my reply is that it is very unwise to make such a statement before the report on the accident is published.

Sir W. Smiles: Can the hon. Gentleman say when that report will be made public?

Mr. Beswick: It is now being printed.

Sir W. Smiles: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation what percentage of pilots approaching Ringway Aerodrome, Manchester, now report that the Ground Control Approach is satisfactory.

Mr. Beswick: There is no Ground Controlled Approach equipment at Ringway.

Sir W. Smiles: Can the hon. Gentleman say if the approach aid will be put in, and this aerodrome made as up-to-date as other aerodromes in the United Kingdom?

Mr. Beswick: As soon as possible another system of approach aid will be installed, but it is impossible to say exactly when.

Southampton Marine Airport

Mr. Morley: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation when he estimates that the Princess flying-boats will be using the Southampton Marine Airport; and what interim uses will be found for the airport in the interval.

Mr. Beswick: British Overseas Airways Corporation do not expect delivery of the first Princess flying-boat until early in


1953 for proving and training flights, and it will, no doubt, be somewhat later before these aircraft operate from Southampton Marine Airport. It is too early yet to say what interim use may be found for Southampton Marine Airport.

Sir Peter Macdonald: Will the Minister give an assurance that this excellent base, on which so much money has been spent, will not be dismantled but kept available on a care and maintenance basis ready for when it is needed?

Mr. Beswick: It would be rather difficult to dismantle the larger part of the base, because it is composed of water. As I said last week, it will be on some sort of care and maintenance basis.

Mr. Morley: Can the Minister say what it is proposed to do with the Solent flying-boats?

Mr. Beswkk: We propose to sell them.

Mr. Morley: Is the Minister aware that the Solent flying-boats cost the taxpayers £4½ million, and does he think he will get as much for them when they are sold? If not, where is the economy in closing down the Airport?

Mr. Beswick: All these matters were discussed with my hon. Friend at a meeting which he and others had with the Department, and I have nothing to add to that.

Mr. Morley: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation what measures will be taken to secure employment for the personnel of the Southampton Airport whose services will no longer be required at the port owing to the decision to withdraw flying boats from service.

Mr. Beswick: Most of the staff at Southampton Marine Airport are employed by British Overseas Airways Corporation and the possibility of providing alternative employment for them is a matter for the Corporation. The Department employs a few persons on air traffic control and telecommunications duties and most of these will be offered alternative employment at other State airports.

Mr. Morley: Is my hon. Friend making any arrangements to secure housing

accommodation for these men when they are transferred to other sites?

Mr. Beswick: That is one of the problems which we are discussing at the moment.

Southend-Ostend Service (Fares)

Mr. McAdden: asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation whether he is aware that an application from East Anglian Flying Services Limited to provide a mid-week day excursion service between Southend and Ostend at a fare of £2 15s. 0d. for the return journey has been refused unless the fare is increased to £5 5s. 0d.; and if he will take steps to have this decision reversed.

Mr. Beswick: The fares charged on international scheduled services are subject to international agreement. There was no possibility of such agreement to the excursion fare originally proposed.

Mr. McAdden: Is the hon. Gentleman ready to use his influence to see that the operation of such monopoly practices in connection with airline services in this country is discontinued?

Mr. Beswick: There is no question of monopoly practices on this route. The difficulty was to get international agreement to this particular fare. I am sure the hon. Gentleman would agree that it is rather difficult to encourage undercutting in this particular field.

Air-Commodore Harvey: Will the hon. Gentleman say why his Department did not apply that principle when B.O.A.C. under-cut the charter companies flying the personnel out to the groundnut scheme?

Mr. Speaker: That is another question, and has nothing to do with this one.

Oral Answers to Questions — ATOMIC ENERGY (CONTROL)

Mr. Blackburn: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what proposals he has received from the Government of the United States of America in relation to atomic energy and the hydrogen bomb project; and what arrangements he has made for consultation with President Truman.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Bevin): I have received no new proposals from the United States Government in relation to atomic energy and the hydrogen bomb project. The second part of the Question does not therefore arise. The United States proposals for the international control of atomic energy have, of course, been made to the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations.

Mr. Blackburn: In view of the fact that my right hon. Friend and the Prime Minister have rejected any idea of a direct approach between President Truman, the Prime Minister and Stalin, what steps are now being taken to bring this matter immediately to the attention of the United Nations, which has done nothing for at least two years upon the most important issue before the world today?

Mr. Bevin: I do not agree that it has done nothing. It has been trying to get an agreement and it has failed. It is not the first time in the international field that agreement has not been possible. It is not the intention of this Government to make a direct approach. We do not think it would be a success, but would land us into difficulties. We prefer to adhere to the proper machinery that has been laid down in the United Nations.

Mr. Blackburn: While accepting entirely the fact that my right hon. Friend does not agree with the direct approach, although I disagree with him, may I beg him to take steps to see that the United Nations considers it in the immediate future, because it is a matter which exercises the minds of men of good will in all parts of the world?

Mr. Bevin: I cannot accept the view that the mere solution of the atomic energy problem means absolute peace in the world. There are the conventional armaments and a whole range of problems to be dealt with in this connection. We have set up—indeed, on behalf of His Majesty's Government I proposed it at the first meeting of the United Nations, in London—appropriate bodies for this purpose. If a country will not open its doors for inspection what is the use of entering into an agreement when it is not known whether it is being kept or not?

Oral Answers to Questions — GERMANY

Dismantling Policy

Mr. Emrys Hughes: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will instruct our dismantling authorities in Germany to refrain in future from dynamiting the foundations of works which, in the view of leaders of German trade unions, are suitable for being adapted for peaceful purposes and would lead to the reduction of unemployment.

Mr. Bevin: It is not our policy to destroy buildings or foundations which are suitable for conversion to peaceful purposes.

Mr. Hughes: Does the Foreign Secretary agree with what has been done at Salzgitter, and does he not consider this place could have been used for peaceful purposes? Will he consult the Minister of Works before issuing any further instructions of this kind?

Mr. Bevin: I agree, on behalf of the Government, with the action at Salzgitter, but one has to bear in mind when Salzgitter was built, how it was built, the forced labour that was used from France and other countries, and how deeply it burns into the souls of other people in Europe to see that place facing them as a result of German action.

Mr. Hughes: Does the Foreign Secretary extend his indignation to the blowing up of the foundations of buildings?

Dock Demolition, Hamburg

Mr. Emrys Hughes: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what is the nature of the protest from Herr Brauer, the Senior Burgomaster of Hamburg, to the Regional Commission about the proposed demolition of the dry dock known as Elbe 17.

Mr. Bevin: Herr Brauer has made several representations to the British authorities in Germany about our plans for the demilitarisation of this dock. His protests are based mainly on the alleged danger to the nearby tunnel under the Elbe from earth tremors. He also maintains that the destruction of the dock five years after the end of the war is politically unwise and that the cost of the work will be excessive.

Mr. Hughes: Is the Foreign Secretary not aware that Herr Brauer is a well-known trade unionist and Socialist leader in Hamburg, and that he is expressing the point of view of many people that in carrying out this action the Foreign Secretary is only creating Communists in Germany?

Oral Answers to Questions — BURMA

British Assets

Mr. Erroll: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what steps he is taking to safeguard British assets in Burma.

Mr. Bevin: His Majesty's Government's policy of aid to Burma aims at securing the fundamental prerequisites to the safeguarding of British assets, that is to say, the independence of Burma, friendly Burma-British relations, and ate restoration of internal law and order. An undertaking by the Government of Burma to give fair treatment to United Kingdom interests was embodied in the exchange of letters annexed to the AngloBurmese Treaty of 1947, and was extended by an exchange of notes made in Rangoon on 24th December, 1949.

Mr. Erroll: As this laudable object has so far met with comparatively little success, do the Government contemplate more effective steps?

Mr. Bevin: It is unfortunate that there is a civil war going on in Burma—

Sir H. Williams: Who started it?

Mr. Bevin: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman has more information about that than I have. I cannot promise success, but we are doing our best to restore a stable Government in Burma. Tomorrow, I understand, there is to be a Debate on Burma and some hon. Members have given me notice that they intend to raise this question. A more adequate answer can be given then probably than in answer to a Question now.

Mr. Brain: Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that the reason for the civil war in Burma is because its priceless assets—

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is asking for an opinion. Questions should ask for facts, not opinions.

Financial Aid

Mr. Erroll: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the total financial aid in all forms received from Britain by Burma since the end of the war.

Mr. Bevin: Approximately £72 million. Of this, the repayment of some £36 million was waived under the terms of the 1947 Treaty and about £1 million has been repaid.

Mr. Erroll: What steps have been taken to publicise this very considerable figure in Burma itself?

Mr. Bevin: I must have notice of that.

Oral Answers to Questions — COUNCIL OF EUROPE

Mr. H. Hynd: asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what action has been taken by His Majesty's Government since the issue of Command Paper No. 7838 last November to implement the recommendations of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Mr. Bevin: Recommendations of the Consultative Assembly are addressed to the Committee of Ministers, and individual Governments are not called upon to consider action except as the result of recommendations transmitted to them by the Committee of Ministers. At their meeting of November last, the Committee of Ministers requested Governments to take certain action in respect of the Assembly's recommendations regarding social security, human rights and the question of a European passport. His Majesty's Government complied with the Committee's request that they should nominate an expert to the Committee for drafting a human rights convention, and their replies to the Ministers' other requests will be forwarded shortly.

Oral Answers to Questions — MALAYA

Petrol Rationing (Abolition)

Mr. Gammans: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what additional dollar expenditure, or loss of dollar earnings, is involved in the abolition of petrol rationing in Malaya.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. James Griffiths): It is the opinion of the Malayan Governments that the


ending of petrol rationing in Malaya will not lead to any appreciable increase in the petrol requirements of the territories; firstly, because supplies to essential users under the rationing system were adequate, and secondly, because under present conditions opportunities for pleasure motoring especially in the Federation are extremely limited. The Government of the two territories have stated that if, contrary to expectation, there should prove to be any considerable increase in petrol consumption following derationing, consideration would have to be given to reintroducing restrictions on the sale of petrol.

Mr. Gammans: Is the right hon. Gentleman suggesting that there will be no increase in the use of petrol as a result of the abolition of rationing, and will he explain why one part of the sterling area can apparently abolish rationing without detriment while we in this country cannot?

Mr. Griffiths: I did not say that there will be no increase. If there were a considerable increase the situation would have to be reconsidered.

Sir H. Williams: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that there is plenty of petrol in Burma, next door?

Terrorists

Mr. Thomas Reid: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how far it has been possible to prevent the recruitment of Communist terrorists in Malaya from within or from without that country.

Mr. J. Griffiths: In addition to the regular armed gangs, there has been, since the outbreak of the emergency, a reserve of part-time bandits and supporters, who have been recruited for active service to replace casualties. There has also probably been some recruitment by press gang methods. This is extremely difficult to prevent, but the police are continually on the watch for it. There is no evidence that there has been any infiltration of men or material from outside Malaya to help the bandits on anything but a negligible scale.

Sir Ralph Glyn: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider publishing a White Paper on the proceedings in Malaya during the last six months?

Mr. Griffiths: I should like notice of that question.

Mr. Pickthorn: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what he means by "regular armed bands," and also what he means by saying that there have probably been some "press gang methods"? Has he any evidence on this point?

Mr. Griffiths: It appears from the information we have, that there are a certain number of bandits who are engaged continuously in these activities. There are others who are engaged part-time. There is a regular force, and at times other people join up at week-ends.

Mr. Walter Fletcher: Would the right hon. Gentleman not agree that there is a great danger to recruiting arising from his inability to send out of Malaya the large number of Communists who have already been captured and who might escape? Will he not take steps to see that they are sent out of the country?

Mr. Griffiths: I must have notice of that question.

Oral Answers to Questions — SERVICE PERSONNEL, WEST GERMANY (VOTING)

Mr. Renton: asked the Minister of Defence whether he is aware that British Service personnel in the Western Zone of Germany were, in many cases, prevented from exercising their votes in the recent General Election owing to the inefficiency of the machinery for the recording of their votes by proxy; what inquiries he has made into this matter and with what result; and whether he will make a statement.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Shinwell): I am not aware of any general defect in the arrangements, but the hon. Member, since putting down the Question, has sent me particulars of one case in which it would seem the man concerned was late in making his application.

Mr. Renton: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that what happened was that in my absence my secretary was approached for this information, and that I have had information about other and similar cases as well? It appears that although the formalities were completed in good time the proxies were not appointed until three weeks after the


General Election? Would he not agree that it is very irksome to people who are serving their country to be frustrated in the exercise of their democratic rights, and will he make quite sure that the system is completely efficient in good time before the next General Election?

Mr. Shinwell: If the hon. Gentleman has knowledge of a series of cases, perhaps he will be good enough to let me have them. Most elaborate arrangements were made to see that the registration proceedings were made known to the men in the Services. Nevertheless, the numbers of those who completed the declarations—and all were made aware of the position in time to be included in the autumn register—amounted only to 331 per cent. of those eligible. Even for the spring, 1950, register, on which any election in the next 12 months may be held, the figure still appears to be less than 50 per cent. We have done everything possible, but we cannot compel them to take the appropriate action.

Oral Answers to Questions — FOOD SUPPLIES

Polish Frozen Egg

Mr. Osborne: asked the Minister of Food why Polish frozen egg which was not fit for human consumption was sent to the North Lincolnshire bakery traders just before Christmas 1949.

The Minister of Food (Mr. Maurice Webb): We made our usual laboratory tests of this Polish frozen egg and they showed it was quite fit for human consumption. We are investigating the cause of the complaints about the flavour of some consignments and have replaced them from other stocks. I will write to the hon. Member when I have more information.

Mr. Osborne: Can the right hon. Gentleman say why, if this Polish frozen egg is now found to be fit for human consumption, it was withdrawn? Is he aware that it has been in stock so long that traders told his officials it was unfit for human consumption? Will he also say why his Department insisted on its being issued to the public?

Mr. Webb: This particular egg is a very awkward thing. I have learned that defrosted Polish egg is less viscous than frozen egg from any other part of the

world; it has been suggested that Polish egg has an undue moisture content. Obviously, these are grave matters, and we shall look into them very seriously indeed.

Professor Savory: Will the right hon. Gentleman say why he cannot leave the Polish eggs to the Polish people, who are starving under their Communist regime?

White Fish

Captain Duncan: asked the Minister of Food whether he is aware that owing to the high costs of gear, fuel and freight rates many inshore fishermen may have to lay up their boats with the consequent reduction in the supply of fresh white fish for consumption; and what steps is he taking to see that this will not happen.

Mr. Webb: For some time past inshore fishermen have pressed the Ministry of Food to remove the price and other controls, on the ground that this would assist the marketing of the better quality fish such as they usually catch. This will be done on 15th April.

Captain Duncan: Will the right hon. Gentleman look into this question of high costs of gear, fuel and other things which, when the free market arrives, may put up the price of fish to such an extent that it will be unsaleable and boats may have to be laid up?

Mr. Webb: There was a meeting this morning with representative fishermen between myself and other Ministers, and that is one of the problems we have promised to look into.

Sugar

Mrs. Jean Mann: asked the Minister of Food whether he will consider allowing those who find the sweet ration in excess of their requirements, to exchange some points for sugar up to the same sugar content.

Mr. Webb: I am going into the suggestion during my general review of our sugar supplies, and will announce my decision in due course.

Mrs. Mann: Will my right hon. Friend keep in mind, when he is considering the position, that the housewife is at present deprived of the value of the additional milk in the form of milk dishes because of lack of sugar? For instance, if she fancies home baking, she cannot have a


little of what she fancies because there is no sugar, and—

Mr. Sydney Silverman: On a point of Order. I do not know whether you, Mr. Speaker, can assist the House in any way, but a great many of us who are anxious to hear what my hon. Friend has to say are prevented from doing so by a constant series of mutterings from the other side, apparently designed to this end?

Mr. Webb: The idea put forward by my hon. Friend is an attractive one, but I regret it is not one we can put into operation. However, we are looking into that problem and many others in a week or two, and perhaps in a month's time I shall announce the result of our general review of the sugar supply problem.

Eggs

Mr. Crouch: asked the Minister of Food, in view of the increase in egg production by the British farmer, what steps he is taking with regard to the importation of eggs from European countries and China.

Mr. Webb: We can still make good use of all the eggs we can get, and I intend to continue importing them until consumers' needs are fully met. The home producer has a guaranteed price for all he can produce.

Rabbits

Captain John Crowder: asked the Minister of Food how many Australian and New Zealand rabbits there are in stock in this country; what further quantity is to be imported under existing contracts; and whether he is satisfied that all these rabbits will be sold without any financial loss to his Department.

Mr. Webb: Since the middle of September, 1949, retailers have been offered all the rabbits they want, but because other foods have been more plentiful, demand has fallen off this spring and stocks have accumulated. I am not prepared to give figures of stocks or of expected arrivals. As prices have been reduced to encourage sales, I expect there will be some financial loss, how much, I cannot say until stocks are cleared.

Captain Crowder: Is the Minister aware that he has already had 600,000 cases of these rabbits, that there are 200,000 more to come under contract, and

that the result of reducing the price by 40 per cent. will involve his Department in a loss which is likely to be in the neighbourhood of £1 million? Will he try to get rid of these rabbits and thus release storage accommodation?

Mr. Webb: I want to get rid of them. If there is any way of doing that, I am all in favour of it.

Mr. Thornton-Kemsley: Does not the Minister agree that all these stocks could have been sold without loss to the country had the advice of the trade been taken and they had been unloaded at the time when the meat ration was down to 10d. and bacon was in short supply?

Mr. Webb: I cannot agree with that.

Ration Changes

Mr. John E. Haire: asked the Minister of Food if he will list the items of food removed from rationing during the past year and those still rationed, stating the amount per head in each case.

Mr. Webb: With permission, I will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT details of the changes in the rations, and in the foods on the points ration. But I might just say this now: the most important change since last year, apart from the fact that a number of rations have been increased, is the lifting of the restrictions on the sale of liquid milk. In addition, retailers may sell freely any eggs which they may have over and above their customers' entitlement and I hope that this, concession will last for a longer period than in 1949. A considerable number of foods have been released from points. rationing since March, 1949, but the list of foods subject to individual weekly rations remains the same as it was a year ago, although the amount of the ration has changed in certain cases. The butter, cheese, meat, bacon and tea rations have been increased. The sugar ration has been reduced. Other changes are under review.

Mr. Haire: Can my right hon. Friend say whether there is any hope of any further derationing in the immediate future?

Following is the statement:

Foods removed from the points rationing scheme since 26th March, 1949:

All unsweetened biscuits;

rusks;

blue and soft cheeses;

canned sweet puddings;

dried peas, green split peas, yellow split peas, lentils and dried beans;

canned peaches in water, imported canned plums, prunes, damsons and greengages;

dried figs, prunes and all stoned dates;

imported honey and imitation honey;

barracouta, snoek and canned mackerel;

canned pork brawn, canned pork, canned boneless chicken or turkey, canned sausage meat, canned sausages in brine, canned Vienna sausages, canned meat puddings, canned meat hash, canned Irish stew, canned rabbit, spaghetti and sausages in tomato sauce, vegetable and macaroni casserole, ready or prepared meals and quick frozen pre-cooked meat meals;

canned tomatoes.

Foods still included in the points rationing scheme:

Canned tongues, briskets, pressed beet, luncheon meat, all kinds of meat loaf or galatine, pressed or jellied veal or pork, stewed steak, Mexican meat and gravy, canned bacon, canned sausages;

canned salmon, crab, crawfish, sardines, pilchards, brisling, sil, tunny;

canned grapefruit, peaches, apricots, pears, fruit cocktail, two-fruits, fruit salad, pineapple and mandarin oranges;

canned beans;

canned milk;

currants, sultanas, raisins, dried apples, apricots and peaches;

syrup and treacle;

sweet and semi-sweet biscuits and chocolate biscuits;

rice;

shredded suet;

table jellies;

dried egg;

mincemeat.

Points rationed foods are not distributed on a per capita basis.

Increases in rations:

With the exception of sugar, margarine and cooking fat the weekly rations of straight rationed foods show an increase on those obtaining a year ago:


—
Four weeks ended 27th March, 1949
Four weeks ending 26th March. 1950


Butter
3 oz.
4 oz.


Cheese
1½ oz.
2 oz.


Bacon
2 oz.
5 oz.


Tea
2 oz.
2½ oz.


Meat
1s. 1d.
1s. 6d.



(approximate value at today's prices)

Decrease in sugar ration:

The sugar ration is now 8 oz. per week as compared with 10 oz. a year ago.

No change.—Margarine and cooking fat remain at 4 oz. and 2 oz. respectively.

Controlled foods.—As in 1949 milk and eggs are being removed from controlled distribution during their flush season periods this year.

Sweets.—Sweets were derationed from the 24th April, 1949, to the 13th August, 1949 (four ration periods) but personal points rationing was reimposed from 14th August. The ration is now 5 oz. a week, against 4 oz. a year ago.

Oral Answers to Questions — NIGERIA (MINERAL ROYALTIES)

Mr. Rankin: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will make a statement on the agreement concluded between the Nigerian Government and the United Africa Company on mineral royalties.

Mr. J. Griffiths: An agreement was reached in January of this year between the Nigerian Government and the United Africa Company whereby the Company's right to receive a half share of mineral royalties from a large area of Northern Nigeria was bought by the Government for £1 million sterling. The agreement was approved by the Finance Committee of the Nigerian Legislative Council, and payment has been made.

Mr. Rankin: Is my right hon. Friend aware that this agreement will be warmly welcomed by everyone who has the interest and the welfare of the African at heart?

Oral Answers to Questions — COLONIAL EMPIRE

Development Schemes

Mr. Rankin: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what is the total sum of money Which has now been allocated for Colonial development out of the £120 million under the Act; how much of the money allocated has actually been expended; and what have been the figures of expenditure over the last five years.

Mr. J. Griffiths: As the answer to the Question is rather long, I will, with my hon. Friend's permission, include it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Following is the statement:

There are three stages in the process of administering funds made available under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act: (a) allocating the £120 million to

Colonial Governments and central services; (b) approving schemes within the allocations so made; (c) issuing money in accordance with the terms of approval of the schemes.

(a) £117½ million out of the £120 million has been allocated to date to Colonial Governments and central services such as research, surveys, training, etc.: the balance of £2½ million remains as an unallocated reserve.
(b) The total sum approved for schemes counting against the £120 million is about £64 million.
(c) Issues made to date from the Colonial Development and Welfare Vote since the Act came into force on 1st April, 1946, amount to nearly £29 million. Issues made in each of the last four years are, in round figures, as follows:

£


1946–47
3,545,000


1947–48
5,340,000


1948–49
6,355,000


1949–50 (estimate)
13,710,000

I would refer my hon. Friend to House of Commons Paper No. 211 of 7th July, 1949, for further detailed information on the matter.

Students (Assistance)

Mr. Sorensen: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies to what extent the British Council is now exercising responsibility for meeting the needs of Colonial students in this country; what funds have been put at the disposal of the Council for this purpose; and whether other recognised organisations such as the West African Students' Union will receive grants either directly from the Government or through the British Council.

Mr. J. Griffiths: The Council is now responsible, on behalf of the Colonial Office, for the reception and accommodation of Colonial students and for arrangements for social and other amenities. Four hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds have been earmarked under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act to cover the Council's work for Colonial students up to March, 1954. The West African Students' Union, and certain other organisations concerned with Colonial students' welfare, already receive grants from Colonial Governments paid through the Colonial Office.

Mr. Sorensen: Is my right hon. Friend aware that although that may be true they receive next to nothing while in this country? Is it not possible to reconsider this matter, in view of the very fine work that bodies like the West African Students' Union are doing?

Mr. Griffiths: I know my hon. Friend's very keen interest in the matter, and I would like to discuss it with him.

Mr. Peter Smithers: Will the right hon. Gentleman say what arrangements have been made for the student bodies to make their wishes known to the Council and whether, if a student council has been set up, it is elected by the students or whether the students are appointed on it?

Mr. Griffiths: I think the arrangements are very well known. Perhaps the hon. Member will put a question down about the second part of his supplementary question.

Oral Answers to Questions — SARAWAK (CONSPIRACY)

Mr. T. Reid: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what steps have been taken to suppress the secret society known as "Rukun Tigabelas," which was responsible for the murder of the Governor of Sarawak.

Mr. J. Griffiths: "Rukun Tigabelas" was the name by which the conspirators directly concerned with the murder were known among themselves. All these people, with the exception of three who turned King's evidence and one who was acquitted, have been convicted and sentenced. The society to which they belonged has been proscribed.

Oral Answers to Questions — GOLD COAST (VOLTA RIVER SURVEY)

Mr. John Grimston: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies when he hopes to be able to report on the suitability of the Volta river project in the Gold Coast as a sterling area source of aluminium.

Mr. J. Griffiths: A survey of the potentialities of the Volta river is at present in progress; this covers not only the possibility of developing hydro-electric


power, but also the requirements of irrigation and navigation. I do not expect the report of the survey for several months, and until it has been received and considered I can make no statement.

Mr. Grimston: While thanking die right hon. Gentleman for his reply, may I ask if he is aware that this project has been under survey by a very reputable firm for three years? Is it not time that he hurried his new survey up, so as to get some result?

Mr. Griffiths: Yes; I am looking into the matter to see if it can be expedited.

Oral Answers to Questions — SIERRA LEONE (DISPUTES)

Mr. Sorensen: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what further action has been taken in respect of the Rotawa Forest, Sierra Leone, dispute; what restrictions on farm clearing exist; and to what extent hardship is increasing among the people in that area.

Mr. J. Griffiths: The matter is still under close investigation locally, and I will communicate with my hon. Friend when I have the Governor's report on the investigations.

Mr. Sorensen: Could my right hon. Friend say, meanwhile, what is the extent of the hardship and what action is being taken to relieve it?

Mr. Griffiths: I am investigating the matter to see whether it can be speeded up.

Mr. Sorensen: asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies the nature of the Baoma dispute in Sierra Leone; to what extent Chief Demby was considered guilty; and whether it is intended to reinstate him.

Mr. J. Griffiths: The Governor is at present considering the report of the Commissioner appointed by him last September to inquire into this matter. I should prefer to make no statement until I have received the report and the Governor's comments on it.

Mr. Sorensen: Can my right hon. Friend say when it is likely to be received?

Mr. Griffiths: I am not absolutely certain.

BILL PRESENTED

DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRY BILL

"to make further provision for the acquisition of land, creation of easements and carrying out of work in development areas; to authorise the Board of Trade to make grants in exceptional cases in connection with the establishment in, or transfer to, development areas of industrial undertakings, and to make grants or loans to housing associations for the provision of dwellings in development areas; and to extend section five of the Employment and Training Act, 1948, in relation to persons transferred for employment in industrial undertakings established in, or transferred to, development areas," presented by Mr. Harold Wilson; supported by Mr. McNeil, Mr. Dalton, Mr. Isaacs, Mr. Jay and Mr. Bottomley; read the First time; to be read a second time tomorrow, and to be printed. [Bill 6.]

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)

Ordered:
That this day, the Business of Supply may be taken after Ten o'clock and shall be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House)."—[Mr. Whiteley.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[6th ALLOTTED DAY]

Orders of the Day — NAVY ESTIMATES, 1950–51; NAVY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1949–50

MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN'S STATEMENT

Order for Committee read.

3.32 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. James Callaghan): I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
I am presenting two Estimates to the House, first, the net Navy Estimates for 1950–51 for £193 million, and, second, a Supplementary Estimate for 1949–50 for.a token sum of £10. Hon. Members who have the Navy Estimates before them will see that if they compare the net cost of the Navy this year with the net cost last year, it is increased by £3,750,000. That is the burden on the taxpayer. But the real national effort that is put into the Navy is, of course, measured by the size of the gross Estimates. Hon. Members who refer to pages four and five of the Estimates will see that, under the heading Gross Estimates, the cost of the Navy—that is the amount of effort that is being put into the Navy—has increased from £209 million to £216 million. Those are the figures contained in the Estimates, but those are not quite right by virtue of the Supplementary Estimate that I am presenting.
The reason for this Supplementary Estimate lies largely in the strengthening of the Far East Fleet, for reasons that have been Debated in this House and are well known. There have also been some increases in pay, and higher costs have added to the total increase of £4.7 million, which is the gross addition to last year's Estimates. The £4.7 million is not the total amount. Administrative and other economies have enabled the Admiralty to reduce that gross figure of £4.7 million by £2.7 million, so that the net additional burden is of the order of £2 million. That means that the gross cost of the Navy last year was £211 million, as against a figure of £209 million shown in the Estimates, compared with the gross cost this year of £216 million.
Therefore, the national effort put into the Navy is of the order of £5 million more than last year. On the other hand, the taxpayer will probably be more concerned with the burden of the net increase of £3,750,000.
The difference between the £5 million and the £3,750,000 is represented by Appropriations in Aid. They are likely to be as large as £8 million more than we bargained for when these Estimates were presented a year ago. This is accounted for by a number of items. There has been a substantial amount of work done for Commonwealth and foreign navies that has accounted for an increase in Appropriations in Aid to a greater extent than we have bargained for.
The net result is that the taxpayer will get substantial benefit from the Appropriations in Aid that are brought in every year to reduce the gross Estimate. As is well known to the House, they are in the nature of uncovenanted windfalls. No one can be certain, within a comparatively accurate figure, what they are going to bring in from year to year. We have provision this year for a substantial amount to accrue from the Appropriations in Aid.
I am sure it will not be the wish of the House that I should review in detail events in which I have played no part during the last 12 months, and for which I can claim neither credit nor discredit, except as a member of the Government. I think the explanatory statement which the First Lord has presented to the House does sum up the main events of Naval activities during the last 12 months. It is significant that news has come in from the Far East Squadron, from the Mediterranean Fleet, from H.M.S. "Sparrow," which escaped from the grip of the Southern ice, from the party that is now engaged on endurance tests in the Arctic, and from the West Indies station. News of the Royal Navy has come in from all parts of the world. It is indeed an indication of the way in which in peace-time the Royal Navy is strung out round the globe, protecting our interests and securing the safety of commerce. If I had to put this explanatory statement briefly, I should say simply that the Royal Navy has during the past 12 months continued the peacetime function that it has carried out so succesfully for many years.
The Far East Squadron has, of course, been particularly in the news. It has been strengthened substantially by the addition of one of our most modern post-war aircraft carriers, H.M.S. "Triumph," and also by one cruiser and several small ships. They are performing an arduous duty, maintaining a constant patrol at the mouth of the Yangtse-Kiang, and I am bound to say the situation continues to be extremely unsatisfactory.
The Home Fleet and the Mediterranean Fleet have joined together in exercises. There is an exercise going on in the Mediterranean at the present time. The Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, Admiral Vian, is flying his flag in the aircraft carrier "Implacable." That is in itself a sign of the times. I understand from signals this morning that in the great test that is going on there both sides claim the victory, and the umpire is going to have a difficult time in deciding who has won. The nature of the exercise has been to get a convoy through to port against a fierce submarine and aircraft attack. That seems to sum up in a sentence the nature of the war-time task which will confront the Royal Navy if such an event came.
There have been exercises in home waters with the ships of other Western Union powers. There have been some very interesting exercises indeed. One thing which interested me very much was to hear that last year there was embarked aboard H.M.S. "Theseus," one of our light Fleet carriers, for the summer exercises a squadron of Fireflies of the Royal Netherlands Navy. That is indeed bringing co-operation to a fine pitch. I am also told that on one occasion during those exercises a British aircraft and a Dutch aircraft were both engaged on anti-submarine patrol, both under the control of a French ship—another example of co-operation in practice—and it is a splendid thing to find on going to the Admiralty that these theories are really being translated into practice in the way that they obviously have been. There is also standardisation being achieved in such matters as ammunition, radar equipment, explosives and precision instruments.
I should like to turn from that very brief summary of last year's events to the present position and the intention of the Admiralty for the coming year.

Like everybody else, the Navy are working under a limited budget. They have been given the figure, as it were; they know what they have to work to, and the consequence is that they have to "comb" themselves. They therefore find their own economies, and that seems to me to be a very desirable thing because they know what they have to do without and what they can best do without.
The main economy, as hon. Members will notice from Vote A, is achieved by a reduction in the manpower of the Royal Navy from something like 153,000 to 143,000. We expect, in fact, that the number of men in the Navy will be reduced to something like 127,000 by the end of the current Estimates year. I ought to say that that has been achieved not in any way at the expense of the seagoing Fleet. It is a reduction of shore personnel, taking it by and large. A number of shore establishments have been closed down and are, in fact, mentioned in the First Lord's Explanatory Note. H.M.S. "Royal Arthur," "Wildfire" and "Kestrel" have all gone. Those ate familiar names to those who were serving in the Royal Navy during the war.
I have to announce further economies in the composition of our shore establishments. One is comparatively small. The post of Commodore-Superintendent at Malta is to be given up, and his duties will be amalgamated with those of another officer serving there, the Flag Officer, Malta. More important is the decision to abolish H.M.S. "Cochrane," the ship of the Flag Officer Scotland and Northern Ireland, which is at the moment based at Rosyth. His duties will, in fact, be taken over by the Admiral Superintendent, Rosyth. I know how interested all Scottish Members are in the position of Rosyth Dockyard, and I hasten to reassure them by saying that the decision in connection with H.M.S. "Cochran" is quite independent of and unrelated to the position of Rosyth Dockyard. It is an entirely separate matter.
The third economy that I must announce today is one that I do with no particular pleasure. It is to tell the House that in order to keep within the Navy's budget it has become necessary to close down the headquarters of the Royal Marines at Chatham. That is a long tie that is going to be broken. The Royal Marines first went to Chatham in the


18th century. The town has been hospitable over since, and it is a matter of great regret to the Admiralty that training conditions are now such that it is better that the functions of the Royal Marines, which have been exercised hitherto at Chatham, should be carried out at Portsmouth and Devonport.
The accounts section of the Royal Marines will still be maintained at Chatham, so that there will still be a link remaining, but it is with very great regret that we have to take this step. The Marine establishment that is being closed down will be replaced in due course by a naval establishment, H.M.S. "Ceres," which is the Training Establishment of the Supply and Secretariat Branch of the Navy at present stationed in another part of the country.
I now come to the question of Bermuda. My predecessor led a delegation to Bermuda some short while ago when he discussed the question of the closing of the dockyard there. That has supported the American and West Indies squadron for a very long time, but conditions change. At the moment we are waiting for a deputation to arrive from Bermuda in order to make certain representations to the First Lord, and therefore I can announce no decision on that today; but I am bound to point out that this dockyard has become uneconomical in many ways. It is not really in a position to supply our ships in as economic a way as we would like, and it would need a great deal of modernisation if it was to be put into that position. We must relieve the anxieties of those who are serving there. I have already had a letter from a friend of mine to that effect. I should make it clear that a decision on this matter will be announced at the earliest possible moment.
We have now almost reached the stage where this post-war process of living on one's own fat has come to an end. Stores on which we have been living are now dwindling. In consequence, as hon. Members will see in Vote 8, II and III, the provision for materiel and contract work is increasing to the extent of something like £7 million. That cost is bound to go up as the run-down of war stocks continues. I ought to say that the First Lord has taken the decision that before building up these new stocks again, we

should review the basis of the provision and maintenance of the Fleet. A very powerful and high-powered committee has been set up with the job of reviewing this matter. They are presenting interim reports, and indeed the first interim report has already appeared.
One difference from last year when my predecessor introduced these Estimates is that all the battleships have now been placed to reserve with the exception of H.M.S. "Vanguard." H.M.S. "Duke of York," "Anson," "Howe" and "King George V" are all now in reserve. I asked what was the cost of keeping a battleship in reserve, because there are very mixed views as to whether it is worth while keeping these giant ships at all. The House will be interested to hear the answer. Excluding the cost of the men who are required to keep the ships in good condition in order that they will be fit for service again if required, I was pleasantly surprised to hear that the cost of keeping a battleship in reserve and in proper state of maintenance is £62,000 a year. When the House considers the vast amount of money, materials and skill locked up in these monsters, I think it will be agreed that it would be folly to cast them away for the expenditure of £62,000 a year, whatever one's views may be about the possibility of their employment if trouble were to come.
I have had, I fear, but one day with the Navy since I came into office, and on that day I was with the Reserve Fleet. We are all applying ourselves to our Parliamentary duties with so much assiduity that it is not easy to get away. I found it most interesting to go and see the Reserve Fleet and the work that is being done there, because it is one of the most important pieces of treasure that we have got in the Navy today. I was lucky enough to go down to the Nore to see the work of preservation that is being done to keep in trim these ships that are in reserve.
Broadly the process is that first of all, having been paid off for some time, they are refitted in the dockyard. When they have been refitted they have a process applied to them which I am sorry to say is called "de-humidification." I felt that I ought to give the current jargon, but if I may use a better term, it is a dried air process, and that in fact is exactly what is done. The ships are sealed. All


the exits and entrances are sealed, the hatches are opened, and the water-tight doors are thrown open. Then on the upper dock is stationed a small box-like equipment from which the normal humid air inside the ship is sucked dry and pumped back again at something under half the humidity with which it came out. The consequence is that metal and wood do not rot—at any rate that is the expectation and hope—and that the ships will be in a fit condition at the earliest possible moment if they are required again to be fitted and taken into service.
I was tremendously impressed with the spirit of everybody engaged on this task in the Reserve Fleet and, indeed, they are doing an extremely important job. Successive generations of seamen have had this trouble. Samuel Pepys naturally wrote about it, and I have here a very interesting quotation from what he said about his Reserve Fleet in 1684. Having referred to the "general rot of the new ships," he said:
I cannot see it chargeable on anything but their being ill-looked after since they were built. The decay is due to the"—
and I have forgotten whether that was under a Tory Government—
plain omission of the necessary and ordinary cautions used for the preserving of new-built ships; want of graving and bringing into dock; neglect to clean and air the holds till I have with my own hands gathered toadstools in the most considerable of them as big as my fists.
I hope this new process will mean that when our ships are required again they will come back in a better state than that in which poor Samuel Pepys found them when he had to bring them out of Reserve in his days.
Moving on, I have to say that we propose to scrap three of the eight-inch gun county class cruisers—the "Norfolk," the "Sussex" and the "London." I regret their passing; in many ways they were, I suppose, the most habitable ships that have ever been in the tropics, from the angle of living quarters, but times move on and I fear that these ships have now reached the stage where it would not be profitable to retain them any longer.
On the other side of the balance sheet, H.M.S. "Eagle" and H.M.S. "Ark Royal," two of the most modern and powerful fleet carriers, are now moving on. H.M.S. "Ark Royal" will be launched very shortly. H.M.S. "Eagle"

is now in the process of being fitted out and should be ready next year. When they are both ready to rejoin the Fleet two famous names will return to the Navy. H.M.S. "Victorious," which had a hard war, is about to be modernised and is to be taken in hand almost immediately.
I was very depressed to find the cost of the equipment of these ships nowadays. I think the House may be interested, and at any rate I was interested, to find out the cost of radio and radar equipment nowadays by comparison with what it was pre-war. In fact, radar and radio equipment in a cruiser costs nine times what it cost before the war in an aircraft carrier the figure is 25 times and in a destroyer 24 times so far as the cost of fitting out in radio and radar equipment is concerned. Part of this increase is due, of course, to the fact that radar was in its immature stage at the outbreak of the war. That, of course, accounts for a tremendous part of the increase.
It is not perhaps quite germane to the Estimates, but I think it would be wrong not to mention the part which the Commonwealth and Colonies are playing in the naval strength of the world. Between them, Australia and New Zealand dispose of a light fleet carrier, five cruisers and several destroyers and frigates and, as I suppose hon. Members know, the Australian Government are proposing to acquire a second aircraft carrier when H.M.S. "Majestic" is completed later on. In the Canadian Navy the light fleet carrier H.M.S. "Magnificent" and others, I am glad to say, have been invited to visit Londonderry this autumn to take part in anti-submarine exercises. I am sure hon. and gallant Members opposite will be delighted to hear that. This process of exchanging ideas, technique, training and ships is going on. For example, two frigates from the Royal New Zealand Navy are exchanging with two frigates of the Mediterranean fleet later on this year. They will interchange, so there will be this continued change of ideas going on.
I feel I should say a word about the Navy's war-time tasks, and yet it involves Members of the Government of the day who speak from this box in uttering platitudes which are so old, and yet still so true, that I hardly venture to intrude them on the House. But it is, of course, true


and it is worth repeating that the Navy's war-time tasks have not changed. The technique is changing and changing rapidly, but the role remains the same. The keeping open of our lines of communication and the denying to the enemy of the use of the sea is absolutely vital to this country. It always has been and it always will be.
The difference between ourselves and the continental powers who can draw their foodstuffs for their industrial populations from their own territories must always be clear to us. We depend upon the sea—depend upon the prairies of Canada and the granaries of Australia from which to bring food for our industrial population to our shores. If those cargoes are not available we starve. That is all there is to it. The position has not changed; it is still the same and the Navy, I think, has really secured no rest from its role by the disappearance of the large surface fleets to which the Leader of the Opposition referred the other day, because their disappearance has been countered by the menace, the threat, of large forces of submarines being built by other countries.
To us the possession of large forces of submarines by any country must always constitute a potential menace to our lines of communication. We just cannot exist unless these lines of communication are kept open and, in consequence, Admiralty policy is directed on all fronts towards countering the submarine menace. It is perhaps the biggest modern task that we have to undertake and it is being tackled in three directions—namely, through our research and development, through research into the design of naval vessels and by means of naval aviation.
The nature of the menace is threefold. There are three main types of submarine today. The first is what I might call the conventional type which existed during the last war and which was broken by our escort vessels in the battle of the Atlantic and later. Here I would perhaps join issue with the Leader of the Opposition, who said our escort ships were largely obsolete. That is not true against the major number of submarines completed in the world today. Our existing escort ships, which beat the submarine menace last time, will be competent to deal with the current conven-

tional type of submarine, which still exists today. It would constitute a menace and there would be a very great threat, but still they are competent to deal with it because neither side has especially moved ahead in that field.
The major developments in this field are, of course, in what is called fast battery drive and new forms of propulsion. Fast battery drive, as I understand it, is the system under which the ordinary comparatively slow speeds of submarines can be boosted for a limited period in order to enable them to get in under the sails of a convoy, fire their torpedoes and get away again. This is going to be a constant menace and I should not like it to be thought that the Admiralty regard the current fleet of frigates and escort vessel which we have as being competent to deal with that development if it appeared in large numbers. Certainly the First Lord is very much on the watch about that particular development.
As to the third type, which is capable of sustained high speeds under water, as far as the best information the Government have goes, no nation is yet beyond the experimental stage with it. No nation, so far as the Government are aware, has progressed further than we have in research into this particular matter. The danger that we should have immediately to meet at sea would be at the moment that of the conventional type of submarine, which, heaven knows, is bad enough—I do not want to underrate it; and secondly, the type of submarine, on which development is starting, that has a fast battery drive for getting ahead quickly for a limited period at a substantially increased speed.
It is the Admiralty's plan that all antisubmarine ships in due course should be able to hunt submarines of this new fast type. It is proposed to achieve that intention by building new frigates and by converting existing vessels. Of course the rate at which this is done depends upon the money which is available, and that is why, I think, it is important that, in fact, the Admiralty has been able to divert, through the administrative economies that I outlined earlier, a substantial sum of money to production and research that was not available before.
The first new anti-submarine frigate is already under way. The materials have


been ordered for machinery, and a contract has been placed for it. The order for the ship itself will be placed this year. The Admiralty also now has under consideration the possibility of a simpler design for an anti-submarine frigate, cheaper and easier to build in large numbers. That matter is still in the experimental stage, and I cannot go further than to say that important ways of countering the submarine menace are now being tried out. Two fleet destroyers have been taken in hand for conversion during the last 12 months, and three more will be taken in hand this year.
As to the research development work of the Admiralty, there is no need for me to say after the outline I have just given that the highest priority is being given to developing anti-submarine weapons for use by ships and by aircraft. As far as I can make out, we have really travelled a long way since the days when we dropped depth charges over the stern and scuttled away quickly before they blew up. The ahead form of weapon which fires ahead so as not to give the enemy submarine an indication that the ship has passed over the top of it—which was one of the weaknesses of firing astern—has been developed to a considerable extent.
In the experimental stage are a number of new types of homing torpedoes that may be launched from the surface or from aircraft or from under the water. These will nose out an enemy submarine and will set their own course and will "home" on the submarine in due course. These are types of weapons which at the moment are being worked out. We are also converting a number of submarines to the fast battery type, not because we expect them to be useful operationally—that is not the principal reason—but so that they may be used in anti-submarine exercises by our own flotillas.
In naval aviation researches are at the moment being largely brought to bear on a probable submarine threat. A new "single packet" anti-submarine aircraft, whose initials at the moment are GR17, is now being developed for carrier operation. I say "single packet" because it includes in the same machine powers of detection and powers of destruction. This has deck landed successfully already. In addition, as hon. Members will have seen from the Estimates, six

carriers are under construction and will join the Fleet by 1954.
A word about Admiralty organisation. Separate divisions of the Naval Staff are concerned exclusively with improving torpedo, submarine, and air warfare, and there is also a separate department under the Comptroller of the Navy, the Third Sea Lord, exclusively concerned with the development of under water weapons.
So far, I have to report to the House, no Carrier Air groups have been re-armed with jet aircraft, though a flight of Vampire fighters was embarked in H.M.S. "Implacable" during the last Autumn exercise. I gather they had a rough trip, but it was very good exercise for them indeed, and a number of successful landings on the moving flight deck of the carrier were made in rough weather. It is the intention to embark Vampire aircraft again with the Home Fleet this summer. Also the House will be interested to know that it is proposed to bring in the Attacker aircraft, a single-jet with a maximum speed which approaches 600 miles per hour. There are also other developments coming along.
I am told—and I think even as a layman I can see this, and I am sure it will be readily appreciated by other Members of the House—the development of aircraft, with increasing weight and higher stalling speeds and longer take off requiring the maximum space, are difficult to operate from a flight deck. On the other hand, when landing a jet aircraft the pilot has not to cock his head over the side to see, when coming out of a turn, whether he is going down properly or not. That is because of the improved vision. When these aircraft are coming in in larger numbers we ought to find that we can get an improvement in the accident rate, though I am glad to say it has been better than it was during the earlier years. The House will be interested to know that in the development of the system of putting down really fast and heavy planes on to a flight deck experiments were carried out in H.M.S. "Warrior" some months ago, when trials were made with aircraft landings on a special flexible deck without the use of undercarriages. Very successful experiments were undertaken.
A major part of our researches is being devoted to anti-submarine warfare. I should like to mention how valuable these


trials with target ships have been found to be. The target ships have been bombed from the air and shelled from the surface, and they have suffered the shock of underwater explosions, and at comparatively trivial cost; and the result has been that the Admiralty research scientists and other staff have been able to get very valuable data indeed on which to base the construction of new vessels in due course. The effects of radiation have already been tried out during the last few months against a ship.
What industry calls "productivity"—I have not come across that term in the Admiralty yet, but I am quite sure it will be found somewhere—is being investigated. Although it is not called productivity, I was amused to hear of a development that I think is a very fine one, and one I wish we had had when I was in the Navy—for paint spraying machines are now being introduced into cruisers and larger ships. I asked what the comparative productivity figures were. The answer was, that four ratings could paint a battleship's side in four days; whereas in the old days four ratings would have taken 21 days. I am sure that it would gladden the heart of the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he could find productivity similarly speeded up in industry. It reminds me—perhaps I had better not go into details in my personal reminiscences—but it reminds me of the time when I had a paint brush taken out of my hand because I was so inept and so inefficient in its use.
A good deal of research is going on into conditions in extreme temperatures—research the House will have seen reported upon elsewhere. I was glad to see when I asked for the figures of comparative expenditure on research in the 1930s and today what a substantial increase is now necessary. I am told that the average research expenditure in the 1930s varied between £500,000 and £1½ million. Today the Navy is finding it necessary to devote as much as £11 million a year to research and development. Even taking into account the difference in the price level, that still represents a very substantial increase in effort, and is something which, I think, they are right to do. One of their overwhelming problems is that they have so many tasks to try to solve, that if they were to try to engage all their resources

the national reserve of our scientists would be overstrained, and there is, therefore, a very sensible scheme of priorities on research which is determined by what is called the Defence Research Priority Committee which decides what matter should be investigated and at what particular stage.
I come to the question of manpower. Recruitment generally is satisfactory—satisfactory to the point that National Service entries are to be restricted during the current year to 2,000. I hasten to say that any National Service entrant will still be eligible for a commission. The policy of recruitment is to get one continuous Service rating, that is a man who does 12 years' service, for one special service rating, that is the man who does seven years plus five years. That ought to give a proper balance of reserves, and it seems that the Navy can now command sufficient men to enable them to carry out that policy. With regard to air crews and in one or two technical branches the situation is not so good. There is a growing shortage of air crews which has been partially met by granting 220 permanent commissions to extended service officers; but we are going to be up against a very real problem here, and I should like to announce that the Admiralty is considering changes and improvement in the conditions of service of air crews.
The major problem is that of re-engagement of the long-service man who is now reaching the end of his time—the man who signed on for 12 years. They are the men who volunteered at the time of Munich; the men who came in in 1938 and 1939, and who served as tough a period of 12 years as any one could have. They saw the Navy through the early part of the war and, indeed, through the latter part, and they had to serve it when all hostility-only people had departed. I think that they have had an extremely tough time. Their wives have passed through difficult times, too, and they naturally want their husbands at home. Who, indeed, can deny them that? This is presenting the Admiralty with a very formidable problem in that not nearly sufficient experienced ratings, petty officers and chief petty officers are signing on to enable the Fleet to be kept in the condition of efficiency in which we would like to see it.
The Admiralty, therefore, is reviewing as a matter of urgency the trade and career structure of these long-service men. The minds of the First Lord and of the Board of Admiralty will not be closed to any particular solution that may commend itself, although we are clearly going to be bound by limitations of finance in these matters. We recognise that this is a matter of urgency, and I can only say to all those long-service men who have put in perhaps the hardest 12 years that any one has had to put in in recent times, that their services are still needed. We do want and we do ask them, if they can and will, to sign on again for a further period so that the Navy shall not be deficient of those experienced ratings, petty officers and chief petty officers who are still needed.
As to living conditions, I was able to visit Chatham Barracks on my one day with the Fleet, and I am bound to say that I was very impressed with the changes that have taken place since I last walked out of a naval barracks five years ago. Indeed, some of us will be getting out-of-date unless we go back and look at some of the improvements which have taken place. One of the things which I noticed particularly was that the large mess decks are being broken up by the more imaginative dispersal of the lockers into a number of small rooms. Many of these changes have been easy to make with only one-fifth the number of men in barracks that we had in time of war.
They are not slinging any longer; they are sleeping in bunks. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu) is sentimentally inclined to the hammock, but I suspect that this is because he did not have to sling it or lash it up afterwards. I think that bunks are preferable. There is also a new type of locker with hanging space so that the men do not have to get their "number ones" creased. Then there is the cafeteria messing system instead of the old system we knew so well.
All these are substantial improvements which have been effected during the last five years. It makes me wonder whether speeches in this House are not sometimes of some value. I was also interested to see how popular television has become. It seems to be as much a drug there as in their homes, and many men are not going ashore at night because they want to

look in at television. That is not provided by a beneficent Admiralty but by barrack canteen funds. Married quarters show, I think a very good record, too. One million pounds is being allocated this year for the provision of married quarters. The figures show that 1,136 married quarters have been built since 1945. During this year 1,200 will be under construction and 450 will be completed during the course of the current year.
Afloat, there is this constant competition between men and machinery. Many of us used to think that the idea was to build a ship and put in all the machinery needed and the men got in where they could in the spaces. This, I am glad to say, is a libel. There is what is called a Ship Design Policy Committee charged with the special task of undertaking positive research to see how the space on board ship can best be divided. One improvement which I think is of very great importance is that oil-fired galleys are going out of commission and where possible electrically heated galleys are coming in. Refrigerator space is also being increased.
May I say a word about lower deck promotion? Up to 25 per cent. of the commissions in the Royal Navy are now awarded to the lower deck. They are called "upper yardmen." I am glad to say that nine out of 16 of the last batch of recruits were awarded their commission. They came from many different types of homes and backgrounds, and I think that it is a first-rate scheme.
The Royal Naval College at Dartmouth is also a matter on which I should like to say something. The House will know that my noble Friend the First Lord introduced a change in the admission scheme for Dartmouth only a short while ago. Instead of recruiting these candidates at the age of 13 plus, they are now recruited at the age of 16, and competition is open to any one who fulfils the educational test, has the leadership qualities necessary, and, of course, passes the physical tests. I think that the House will be interested to hear the results of the entry that went into Dartmouth in January. Forty-six candidates came from independent schools, 29 from direct-grant schools and 108 from secondary, grammar, technical and modern schools. Of the successful candidates, 10 are from independent
schools, three from direct-grant schools and nine from secondary or grammar schools.
This is by the way of being a bit of a revolution, and I am glad that this should be so. I gather that in places where they always start a conversation by saying, "The Navy is not what it was in my day," there is a certain amount of tooth-sucking about the change. There is no justification for that at this juncture. The recruits who are coming forward are up to the standard of those who have been hitherto recruited, and I cannot for a moment accept the view that candidates who are now coming from all types of schools should be any less efficient or any less fitted to do the job of a Royal Naval officer than those who were recruited to Dartmouth hitherto. Indeed, if it could be shown—which it cannot, because none of these boys have yet been passed out of Dartmouth—that we are not getting sufficient of the right type of chaps who could fulfil the qualifications, that would merely show that we were not advertising this scheme well enough, because recruitment shows that being a Naval officer is still a pretty popular occupation. A cadetship at the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, is a pretty tremendous prize.

Commander Maitland: Have all the vacancies available at Dartmouth been filled? I think that is very important.

Mr. Callaghan: gather that some were not filled because the candidates did not come up to the physical standard required. I have not got the exact figures, and I gather that my hon. Friend the Civil Lord will deal with this in reply. I regret that I have not all the figures at my disposal. I gather that all of them came up to the necessary educational and leadership qualifications. That is my understanding.
Finally, just a word about the Reserve. We need more men in the Royal Naval Reserve and the R.N.V.R. Recruiting has been started and is now going ahead. The 12 main divisions of the R.N.V.R. have all got sea-going tenders, and, I think especially interesting, in the R.N.V.R. there are air squadrons which have completed 7,000 flying hours during

the last 12 months. I should like to make one special reference to one of these R.N.V.R. air squadrons. The Boyd Trophy, which is awarded annually for the finest feat of aviation in the Royal Navy, has been presented for last year to No. 183 R.N.V.R. Air Squadron based at Abbotsinch, near Glasgow. Equipped with "Firefly" aircraft the squadron completed 205 deck landings with only one minor accident. They embarked for the first deck landing in H.M.S. "Illustrious" last August; the 18 pilots and 10 observers were mostly wartime personnel, and when they embarked for flying training at sea most of them had not done deck landings for five years. That seems to me to be an excellent sample of the standard that can be secured. I am glad to say that R.N.V.R. "Firefly" squadrons will fly to Malta this year to operate with the Mediterranean Fleet. This is training in earnest.
That concludes my review. I hope that I have satisfied the House that the money we are asking should be granted to the Royal Navy this year will be well spent; and that the task they are being called upon to undertake is being undertaken efficiently, with imagination, and with foresight. I believe that the Royal Navy, not only has a fine tradition, and is not only a fine Service, but is also a modern Service with modern ideas, ready to face the new rôles that may come to it and the new undertakings that it may have to take part in whenever it is called upon to do so.

4.24 p.m.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: I am sure the House would wish that it should be my first duty wholeheartedly to congratulate the Parliamentary Secretary, first on having the opportunity which did not fall to all of us in our time of introducing the Estimates, and secondly on the extraordinary ability with which he has done so. I must say that we on this side of the House were not surprised by that ability, because we had become accustomed to a most competent performance whenever he spoke in the past as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport. Thirdly, I should like to congratulate him, as my successor in that office, with a short intervening period, on reaching the Board of Admiralty. That must
cause particular pleasure to him after his years of service in the Royal Navy, and to his family, as his late father had a distinguished and varied career in that same Service. It has been a long time since the two junior Ministers at the Admiralty have had so much practical experience of the Service. We join fully in the tribute paid to the Royal Navy by the Parliamentary Secretary in his very able speech. We also welcome wholeheartedly the account he gave to us of the spirit of the Fleet.
I would say that it is the most encouraging speech we have had presenting the Estimates on the five or six occasions upon which I have had to answer the Government spokesman at this Box. Nevertheless, I am still worried about the balance of policy. In the Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty explanatory of the Navy Estimates it is stated:
Policy … will be directed to achieving the proper balance of expenditure in present circumstances between personnel on the one hand and production, including research and development, on the other.
We on this side would be much more prepared to give that statement a warmer welcome if we knew a little more of what that policy was. The Parliamentary Secretary filled up a certain number of the gaps but I am afraid I must warn the Civil Lord that there are still a good many gaps which we shall expect him to fill when he replies to the Debate. In the absence of anything more specific, we are anxious about the meaning of the words "in present circumstances." It sounds to us as if naval policy is still on a very short-term basis, as it has been since the end of the war. I will explain to the House what I mean. In the initial period after the war it was decided that the run-down of naval manpower should be less rapid than that of the other two Services. In August, 1947, the Prime Minister said:
It is very difficult without creating chaos to accelerate this run-down more than within a limited amount at one time."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th August, 1947; Vol. 441, c. 1504.]
But that is exactly what happened after the House had arisen for the Summer Recess that year. Naval demobilisation accelerated from 4,000 to 31,000 in the short period of six months. The result was the chaos about which the Prime Minister had warned the House, and the

Home Fleet was immobilised for a considerable period.
So far as the Royal Navy is concerned, there seems to us to be another example of changing policy with regard to National Service. In the First Lord's statement accompanying the 1948 Estimates it was stated that it would not be possible to admit to the Royal Navy more than 2,000 National Service men. Last year that figure was increased to 10,000. This year the figure is back to 2,000. Let me say at once that we do not quarrel with that figure, but I do ask the Civil Lord: Is this a final decision for the naval element of National Service?—because any more of this jumping up and down will make long-term planning of personnel almost impossible.
Then there is the question of the small ships. In July last year, before the present Parliamentary Secretary was at the Admiralty, there was an Admiralty announcement that four battleships had been laid up in reserve in order that a larger number of smaller ships could be put into commission. If we compare the tables—and I do not think he said anything today about this—on page five of this year's statement with those on page six of last year's statement, showing the strength of the Fleet, we see that although the four battleships—the "Anson," the "Howe," the "Duke of York" and the "King George V"—are in reserve, there are apparently not more but fewer smaller vessels in commission than there were last year. The figures are: only 14 cruisers in full commission compared with 15 last year; only 10 minesweepers compared with 14 last year in the Active Fleet. True, there are slight increases in the Active Fleet of destroyers, frigates and submarines, but these increases have all been achieved by larger reductions in the training squadrons. For instance, while two frigates have been added to the Active Fleet, four have been withdrawn from the training squadrons. The same is the case with submarines. Has there been another shift of policy? All these changes lead us to believe that there is no long-term policy for the strength of the peace-time Navy.
The First Lord's statement poses the problem of balancing expenditure on manpower with expenditure 6n production, research and development so that. as the Parliamentary Secretary said, we
may have the most efficient Navy that the money at present available can buy. I will first deal with the manpower problem. I was very relieved indeed to hear the statement by the Parliamentary Secretary this afternoon that a Committee of Inquiry had been set up to go into the most important question of re-engagements, but I ask why it was not done before, because on both sides of the House we have referred frequently in the past to the unsatisfactory position about re-engagements. Although in the statement by the First Lord accompanying the Estimates this is also mentioned, there is not a word about the Committee, which is fresh news to us this afternoon.
The delay over this problem, which is a vital one, has been extraordinarily damaging. If we look at the Estimates this year, we get a much clearer picture of the disastrous effects which the reduced rate of re-engagements is having on the whole structure of the Navy. While the reduction in the number of officers and chief petty officers is, I admit, more or less in proportion to the smaller total numbers, there are no less than 4,000 fewer petty officers than last year. Have we to wait until one-fifth of our petty officer strength has been lost before a committee is set up? In view of all we have said during past years, this question should have been dealt with sooner. Nevertheless, we are delighted to know that the Committee is now in being.
There are difficulties, of course, and I referred to some of them in the Debate last year. At that time my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Chelsea (Commander Noble) drew attention to the anomaly of giving a bounty to men who did not re-engage, and nothing to those who did. I hope that this is one of the matters which the Committee will take into account. In the Debate on the Navy Estimates last year I suggested that there should be a shorter period of re-engagement, which I thought might be more effective. I also drew attention to the new pay code, which I felt had the effect of reducing the reward for the extra responsibility which promotion carries with it.
We also stressed the need for married quarters in the home ports, as the Civil Lord knows. I was shocked by the

answer he gave to a Parliamentary Question last week, that none of the new married quarters for which much greater provision is now made under the Armed Forces (Housing Loans) Act are to be built in the home ports. I hope that the Committee which is going into the question of re-engagements will take the problem of married quarters, one of the most important problems, very much into account.

The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Walter Edwards): May I ask the hon. Gentleman to read the whole of the reply? He will find that after "married quarters" it said "at present."

Mr. Thomas: "At present"? I am very glad to hear that, but I admit that I hoped we were going to make progress straight away. I apologise if I have not quoted the Civil Lord's answer fairly. I did hope that it would have been possible to make progress right away with this problem of the married quarters, which I think is one of the most powerful factors in causing our present distressing position over re-engagements.
I hope and believe—I understood the Parliamentary Secretary to say so—that the re-engagements Committee will report at full speed. I am certain that unless something drastic is done, and done soon, it may be impossible to man those ships which comprise the Active Fleet, quite apart from those with reduced complements which are used for training. Apart from the manning problem. surely one of the most serious aspects of the re-engagements trouble is that it is so enormously expensive. If the average length of service is no more than half what it was before the war—and I have seen it calculated that the average length of service before the war was 16 years and that it is now only eight years—we must be spending twice as much time and employing twice as many men on training as we were before the war and spending far more than twice as much money. From the point of view of expenditure, this is well worth while looking into.
There is, then, the other question connected with manpower, the administrative tail. This was referred to in the Defence Debate by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Defence. It was said that the teeth would be
sharpened and the tails combed. We are very glad to hear that news, but could it not have been done before now? The Parliamentary Secretary talked about the different Departments combing themselves. I am not awfully impressed with the expected results of the combing of the tail of the administrative side of the Admiralty, I hope that the administrative side will go in for a small tooth-comb. I have a very shrewd suspicion at the moment that all they are doing is raking through their tail with Neptune's trident. I trust and believe that they will pay proper attention to this serious subject because the number employed in the Admiralty Office under Vote 12 is still more than 10,000. I know that it is 1,100 fewer than last year, but it is still two and a half times the number employed in the Admiralty before the war. Surely more economies could have been made.
In the First Lord's Statement which is attached to the Estimates, we are told that a Committee has been appointed to hold a comprehensive review of Admiralty organisation. Again, I cannot make out why this Committee was not set up three or four years ago. I think it is possible that the Committee may find, now that the strategic rôle of the Navy has changed, that Departments in the Admiralty establishment can be telescoped to produce a cut of 10 or 20 per cent., saving £500,000 or £1 million a year. If that had been put into force three or four years ago, a saving of £2 million to £4 million could have been made available for research in modern weapons and sea warfare. Surely there is more sense in seeing what we can do about careful administration than by withholding reasonable scales of pay from such bodies as the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors or Naval Ordnance Inspectors, or by cutting the training of officers by half.
Let us look at the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors. In his speech in the Debate upon the last Navy Estimates, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch (Mr. Bracken) described this Corps as one of the most underpaid of all persons with scientific knowledge who served the State. It is now three years since the Eastham Committee reported. Since then we have put many questions in this House to the Admiralty, and the vital urgency of the matter has been stressed once more

from a very powerful quarter. Only last month two former First Sea Lords, Lord Chatfield and Lord Cunningham, wrote to "The Times" about the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors. They based their case on two grounds, as we do. First, that those members of the Corps at present serving are receiving salaries which are barely half what they could command in industry; and, secondly, that if we are unable to recruit sufficient numbers of men of the very highest quality, which the Navy rightly demands, the fighting efficiency of our future Fleets must be impaired.
In a written answer to a Question on 19th October, the late Parliamentary Secretary stressed that the Eastham Committee had been set up to advise the Board of Admiralty and that it was not therefore to be expected that the recommendations would automatically be put into effect. He said that a scheme had been devised which, in the view of the Board, should attract sufficient recruits of the necessary high standard from the Universities and the Royal Dockyards. I ask the Civil Lord to tell us whether that is still the view of the Board. Can he assure us that sufficient numbers are coming forward with first-class honours degrees on the new and very meagre scales upon which the Admiralty recently decided?
We do not deny the right of the Admiralty to refuse to disclose the East-ham Report, which came from an admittedly advisory body, but there is evidence that the Corps are not receiving a fair reward for their skill. Has not the time arrived when the Admiralty might seek some further help in their battle with the Treasury and set up a Select Committee to go into the whole matter as quickly as possible, so that the House may see their report and put right the grievances of this Corps, which is so vital to the future efficiency of the Navy?
Before I turn to the question of production, there is one other question which I should like to ask the Civil Lord. On page four of the White Paper, the first Lord refers to the Corfu Channel incident and reminds us that the International Court of Justice gave judgment in our favour and against Albania for the sum of nearly £844,000—the full amount of the British claim. How much of that money is due to the dependants of the
men who lost their lives in H.M.S. "Saumarez"? What is the extent of the appropriation in aid that the Admiralty will in due course receive, and when will it be possible to make a payment to the dependants? Must they wait until the cash is received, if ever, from Albania, or is it possible for them to receive payment now out of Exchequer funds?
Let me now turn to production. I said at the beginning of my speech that if we are to achieve a true balance between manpower and production, it is surely necessary to establish a clear policy for the conduct of these two departments. I have tried to show, with regard to manpower, that there appears to be no clear policy. Everything that has been done in the last five years has been either too little or too late. Pay scales, re-engagements and training commitments have been mishandled at almost all stages. I do not see anything much more hopeful in the First Lord's statement of a policy on production, research and development, although I was much more encouraged by the Parliamentary Secretary, this afternoon.
Every year since the war when we have had Debates on Navy Estimates, it has been from this side of the House, or from my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition in defence Debates, that the principles of naval strategy have really come, and not from the Government benches.

Commander Pursey: Nonsense.

Mr. Thomas: If the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite looks back on past Debates, he will find that I am not far wrong. This year there is only one short paragraph in the First Lord's statement about the protection of shipping against attack by high-speed submarines. No mention was made in the White Paper of the future strategic role of the Navy in an integrated North Atlantic defence policy. The Parliamentary Secretary added something, but not much, though I was most relieved to hear what he said about the anti-submarine measures and the steps that were being taken. When we put forward our arguments on the Navy Estimates last year and mentioned this submarine menace, the Government received what we said with very great reserve.
In another place, where the same point was put, the First Lord seemed anxious to play down the danger. He said that he knew of no submarine which could make a submerged speed of 20 knots. He cannot make such a disclaimer today. I agree with the Parliamentary Secretary. We on this side of the House regard the high-speed submarine as of almost supreme importance. My hon. Friend the Member for Londonderry (Sir R. Ross) will move an Amendment today in which submarines figure very largely. So I shall say nothing more about it at this part of the Debate, except to give the House one example which may emphasise the magnitude of the problem.
Let us suppose that an S.O.S. is received from a ship attacked by one of the pre-Snorkel types of submarines. Within half an hour the attacker must be somewhere within an area of only 64 square miles. If the submarine were to be a contemporary modern vessel with an underwater speed of 20 knots, the area to be searched half an hour after the attack has increased nearly fivefold to over 300 square miles. At 25 knots, the area to be searched is still further increased by 190 square miles, making it nearly 10 times as large as the area to be searched for submarines of the last war which had a maximum underwater speed of nine knots.

Commander Pursey: Is not the answer to find the submarine and sink it before it attacks the ship?

Mr. Thomas: The hon. Gentleman is entitled to make that suggestion. I refer to the methods and plans which were pot forward by the Parliamentary Secretary this afternoon.
Apart from our inescapable naval obligations—to keep open our channels of trade while denying them to an enemy—we have recently accepted the leading role in Eastern Atlantic waters of Western Union defence at sea. It is against the acceptance of these strategic functions that we have first to judge our programme for the maintenance of the Fleet in being, and of the Reserve Fleet, and our new construction programme and research. It is only in the light of long-term strategy that it will be possible for the House to judge whether the balance between expenditure on manpower and on production has been truly struck. We on these benches are far from satisfied, in the light
of our appreciation of the strategic position, that that balance has been struck at all.
I have attempted to show that, in our view, too much money is being wastefully spent on manpower and too little usefully allocated to production. The First Lord's statement indicates that £10,260,000 more is to be allocated to production. Of this, only £1,750,000 more is to go on the scientific services; stores are to account for a further £5 million above what was spent last year; contract work will get a little less than £3 minim more, and new construction is limited to two new escort vessels. The strategic requirements do not seem to justify the continued suspension of work on the three aircraft carriers of the "Majestic" class—"Powerful," "Leviathan" and "Hercules." I was sorry that the Parliamentary Secretary was not able to mention this point.
We are particularly weak in our naval aviation, as we pointed out last year. Of our 13 existing carriers, only one Fleet carrier and four light Fleet carriers are in active commission. Three are used for training, and the remainder are all in reserve. We have only nine under construction and, as I have said, construction on three of these is still suspended. When one appreciates the many hundreds of thousands of square miles which will have to be patrolled for submarines, the number of aircraft that these ships can carry will be far below our tactical needs. There is a substantial Fleet in reserve, including the carriers I have mentioned, four battleships, ten cruisers, 59 destroyers and 123 frigates. To man all these ships, would not 50,000 men be required? The question is whether they could be found quickly enough to enable the Reserve Fleet to put to sea at short notice.

Mr. Callaghan: I asked that question myself yesterday. I was told that the answer is "Yes."

Mr. Thomas: I am delighted but astonished to hear that. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his quick answer. I am very relieved to hear it because, from what we know of the manpower position, it seemed to me that it was not likely to be the case.
The introduction of National Service. which we support, does raise difficulties in our building up a Volunteer Reserve.
The Navy's intake of National Service men is to be only 2,000. We do not disagree with that figure, but it means that, with all the other National Service men going to the Army and the Air Force, the field from which we can expect to man the R.N.V.R. is very limited. The Royal Fleet Reserve, of course, has its contribution to make and, to a more limited extent, so has the Royal Naval Reserve.
We should like to hear more at the end of the Debate about the plans of the Admiralty for meeting our necessarily heavy demands for manpower reserves. Particularly are we anxious about the reserves of aircrew for naval aviation. We have four squadrons in the R.N.V.R. which are fully operational and which recently carried out successful exercises from aircraft carriers. But are not the pilots in those four squadrons of wartime vintage and insufficient in number? What steps are the Admiralty taking to replace them with newly-trained officers? The R.N.V.R. squadrons are comparable to the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, but the Navy has no reserves, as I said from this Box last year, comparable to the R.A.F. Volunteer Reserve, who train at weekends and in their spare time in large numbers. So I repeat last year's request and ask that consideration be given to the building up of a similar flying reserve for the Navy.
In conclusion, I return to the First Lord's explanation of the White Paper which I quoted earlier about the proper balance of expenditure between personnel and production. It is because, on the information given to us, we think that balance has not been struck and because policy appears to be lacking, that most of my speech this afternoon has been devoted to putting probing questions to the Civil Lord. Before the Debate closes, I hope that the Civil Lord will have answered those questions and will have reassured us that the balance is a truer one than at present it appears to be.

4.52 p.m.

Mr. Michael Foot: The hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas) began his speech by paying a proper and, if I may be permitted to say so, a most graceful tribute to the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty on his new appointment and on the speech he
delivered this afternoon. I am sure that everyone on this side of the House would like to join with the hon. Gentleman in that tribute and say how much we appreciated the speech from the Government Front Bench today. Perhaps I can reveal to the House why the hon. Gentleman acquits himself so well in his new office. The reason is that he has some good Devonshire blood in his veins, and that is the best qualification for a position at the Admiralty. My hon. Friend made a first-class speech today which fascinated the House and which everyone appreciated who listened to it. I have said that good Devonshire blood is the best qualification for an appointment at the Admiralty. In fact that is about the only defect we can find in the Civil Lord—apart from a few others I shall mention later.
The hon. Member for Hereford raised a few controversial matters in the latter part of his speech. I would hate to introduce any controversial questions into this House, particularly on the Navy Estimates, for I am sure that would be regarded as bad form. However, the hon. Gentleman obviously felt that he must do so, and I think it is perfectly proper for us on this side to recognise what a different temperature there is in this Debate from the one we had on these Estimates two years ago. Then we had a broadside from the Leader of the Opposition. It is quite true that the Leader of the Opposition chose to make his speech on the Navy Estimates this year in the Defence Debate, and that may account for the fact that we are having such a smooth passage today.
The truth is, of course, that the Opposition for four years have had no real case against the way in which affairs at the Admiralty have been conducted. Though they have tried to pick up a few small points. They have not been able to decide amongst themselves what they wanted to attack. Two years ago the Leader of the Opposition attacked the Government for not demobilising faster and a little later the hon. Member for Hereford attacked the Admiralty for demobilising too fast. Now they have patched it up, and all they can say after four years is that they are still worried. That is a very different story from what we heard two years ago.
When it is remembered how difficult it has been to demobilise such a vast number of men, to rearrange the affairs of the Admiralty, and to carry through the vast transformation that has had to be made in this period, it is a tribute to the way in which affairs there have been run under this Government that all the Opposition can say after four years is that they are still worried on a few minor points. Whereas we had votes of censure from the Opposition on Admiralty matters two years ago, which proved to be mares' nests, today we have had a quiet speech from the hon. Gentleman. In fact we have not even had the right hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch (Mr. Bracken) turn up here today—

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: I am sorry to inform the House that the right hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch (Mr. Bracken) is suffering from influenza and is therefore unable to appear. I know the House will regret that.

Mr. Foot: I join with the hon. Gentleman in regretting that, and we hope that the right hon. Member will be back in form soon. We are glad to know that there is no political significance in his absence from the Debate today.
The fact is that the Opposition have no consistent case to make against the Admiralty, and that should be known to all those throughout the country who are interested in the conduct of affairs at the Admiralty. All we had from the Leader of the Opposition the other day, when he delivered his speech on the Navy Estimates in the defence Debate, was another mare's nest about some instrument for dealing with submarine warfare which he had just discovered from an American newspaper, but which had been fully examined by the Admiralty a considerable time ago, and which he raised as if it were some great new alarm which should be the concern of the House.
Therefore it is a little unfair for the hon. Member for Hereford to pretend at the end of his speech that there were great attacks which he wished to make upon the Government, when he knew as well as we know that the attacks made by his party two years ago fell completely flat and that, on the main structure of the Admiralty service, and on the main way in which the Government have run
affairs at the Admiralty, the Government have a good case to make to this House and to the country.
My hon. Friend was able to give a fine account to the House today of some of the changes that have taken place in the naval barracks and in the conditions of service during the past four and a half years. In fact, I am waiting anxiously to hear the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu) because I am not quite sure what he will say. He cannot make the same speech again because the speeches he made when he came back from his service in the Navy at the end of the war have played their part in bringing about some of those improvements I have mentioned. It is only right for us to pay tribute to the Admiralty for the way in which they have put through many of those improvements.
I am also glad to know the detailed figures which the Financial Secretary was able to give about the provision of married quarters. We asked in the Debate last year to have a more detailed account this year of the progress that had been made. We have now received that account from the Admiralty, to whom credit should be given. Those of us who have been interested in this matter were grateful for the account which was given of the way in which the Dartmouth scheme has been working in these first few months of its operation. We who advocated the scheme are very glad that the Admiralty are pleased with the way in which it is progressing.
The hon. Member for Hereford spoke on what was admitted by the Parliamentary Secretary to be one of the main problems concerning the Admiralty: that is, what are to be the numbers engaged in the Admiralty service and the failure of people to re-sign after their 12 years' service. We were told that there was to be a complete review by the Admiralty of the trade and career structure of the Navy in order to meet this most serious manpower problem which they have to face. I should like to make a suggestion on one side of that problem, which was not mentioned by the Parliamentary Secretary but which has been mentioned in every Navy Estimates Debate we have had in this House, and which concerns the period of foreign service.
From my experience in talking with constituents of mine who work in, or are connected with, the Navy, I should say that the biggest grievance, or, at any rate, the biggest source of complaint, amongst naval families is the period of foreign service. When we first raised this matter in the House three or four years ago the Civil Lord, in reply to the Debate, said that the Admiralty would keep this matter under review and that they had at that time a committee which was examining the problem to see what could be done. I recognise that it is a very difficult matter, because it involves the whole disposition of naval manpower. It is a particularly difficult matter with which to deal in the abnormal circumstances with which the Admiralty have had to grapple in the past four years, but I ask the Civil Lord to give us in his reply some indication of the views of the Admiralty about this matter.
We were told three or four years ago that it might be possible in some way or other to reduce the period of foreign service, and I should be grateful to know the general ideas of the Admiralty and what progress they think can be made. because this is still one of the big deterrents to people signing up after the long period of 12 years' foreign service which many men in the Navy still have to serve. I hope that not only will the Civil Lord refer to this matter when he replies, but even more important, that it will be further considered by the Admiralty, and that as soon as they are able to make their long-term plans about manpower, they should consider this issue as a very high priority for consideration in improving the conditions of those in the Service.
I want now to refer to some of the matters affecting particularly the Royal Dockyards. Here, again, the Government have a very good record. Many of us who represent dockyard constituencies have in the past criticised the Government on various dockyard matters; we will do so again, and we may even do so today. It would be most ungenerous, however, if we did not give credit to the Government for the great changes which have taken place during the past four and a half years in the conditions of employment in the Royal Dockyards. During that time there has been a bigger effort to change and improve conditions of employment in the
Royal Dockyards than was made, I should say, in the previous 40 years.
The establishment change was by far the biggest reform which has been introduced into the dockyard service for many years, but many other reforms also have been put through and we must thank the Civil Lord for his courtesy, energy and diligence in dealing with these problems. I assure him that Royal Dockyard workers have a very real feeling of respect towards him for his efforts, and that, therefore, when we criticise in other directions, we are not disregarding the fact that in the past four and a half years a much bigger effort has been made in Royal Dockyards than ever before.
In the Estimates now before the House we have not, I think, very much for immediate complaint. The Civil Lord will recognise, however, that those of us representing dockyard constituencies must always be anxious for the future, partly because we remember what happened after the First World War, and partly because it is in the nature of things that the whole or a great part of the prosperity of our cities is dependent upon what happens as a result of an Estimate which is passed through the Treasury and presented each year to this House. We cannot be content, therefore, merely to live from year to year and to see that there is to be roughly a maintenance of the level of employment in the dockyards.
We must be concerned also about more deep-rooted problems, and it is for this reason that in the past three or four years, even though we have had nothing about which to be immediately alarmed, even though there was no immediate threat of heavy unemployment as there was after the First World War, even though we have not had the prospect of 3,000 or 4,000 people being sacked, as happened after 1918, we have still been concerned about the future. My reason for concern is because I believe that in the long run the House will only be prepared to vote sufficient money to maintain full employment in the Royal Dockyards if hon. Members know and find that that money is being properly used, and used for the very best benefit of the nation.
The reason why on a number of occasions we have told the Civil Lord that we did not think all was well in the

Royal Dockyards, even though we could be content with the situation in the immediate future, was because we could foresee that in, perhaps, two or three years' time there might be heavy cuts in the Defence Estimates, which, from the national point of view, and from the international aspect also, if it would be possible, we would all like to see; but it is because we have foreseen that situation that we have tried to persuade the Admiralty to recognise that they should have a long-term policy for the Royal Dockyards.
We have never yet succeeded in persuading the Admiralty to accept that point of view, and I cannot understand why. It is natural that the admirals should be chiefly concerned with their naval repair work. No one has ever suggested that the main work of the Royal Dockyards should not be naval repair work, but what we have suggested—it is a very simple proposition; anybody can understand it—is this: that in war-time, of course, and in times of emergency the Royal Dockyards need more people than they are likely to need in time of peace; that, therefore, there should be a policy of maintaining the complement of people who will be needed in time of war, and that they could be maintained on other kinds of work.
That is not a plea for the scrapping of naval repair work in order to do various forms of commercial work or repayment work, as it may be called. It is a plea that if in a year or two's time there should be a decline in the amount of naval repair work which has to be done, we should not be faced, a few weeks before the presentation of the Navy Estimates, with the situation where the Admiralty come to this House and say to the Royal Dockyards, "We have less money in the Estimates and, therefore, another few hundred or, perhaps, a thousand people have to be thrown out of their jobs," in either Devonport, Portsmouth or wherever else the dockyard may be. That is why those of us representing dockyard constituencies have always said that there should be a much more planned and coherent policy for building up this kind of commercial work when the opportunity arises.
We are supported in this kind of claim by the only independent inquiry that has ever been made into the working of the dockyards, that held by the Select Com-
mittee on Estimates. In the last Debate on the Estimates, the Civil Lord referred in some slighting terms—I do not blame him—to the inquiries made by the Select Committee and said that they were superficial inquiries. But, if the inquiries made by the Select Committee on Estimates were superficial, he can put that right by holding a proper inquiry, a real inquiry, which can report to the nation on the question of the way in which the Royal Dockyards could do this commercial work when the need came and also on the way in which the Royal Dockyards are working today.
It is a remarkable fact that at a time when, as far as we can see and, we hope, for two or three years ahead, there will be no danger of big unemployment in the Royal Dockyards and when the men concerned need have no great worries about their own jobs, it is significant that at a time like that the workers in the yards should say, through their unions, almost unanimously that they think there should be a proper inquiry into the work of the Royal Dockyards, to see if they are doing all the work they could do for the nation.
Once again I ask the Civil Lord to agree to a proposal we have made several times, that we should have a working party to hold an independent inquiry into the conduct of the Royal Dockyards. It will not do any harm to anyone and may do a lot of good. If the case of the Admiralty is as good as the Civil Lord has said on so many occasions, he should welcome such an inquiry as much as we should. I confess that one of the candidates for such a job I have always had in mind is my right hon. Friend the Minister of Works. I thought he was a good kind of fellow to put on this type of inquiry and it might have caused quite a stir in some of the dockyards. I think that even now he might transfer some of his attention from the Royal Parks to the Royal Dockyards. It would be a good thing if he, or some person with qualifications of that kind, could be put on such an inquiry.
In case the Civil Lord might think he is committing some indiscretion, or breach of policy by doing this, I will read to him something written by G. M. Trevelyan in his "English Social History," which describes some of the background story of how the British people gained their great successes across the Seven Seas. He

will see that it was not only a question of Devon seamen going all over the world doing whatever they liked, but that the origins of the story rested in a kind of working party established to deal with the Royal Dockyards. Trevelyan wrote:
Henry VIII had founded the royal navy.' Under Edward VI and Mary it had been permitted to decay.
Obviously a couple of Tory monarchs.
Under Elizabeth it was revived. Yet during the first twenty years of her reign improvement in the royal dockyards was slow. Elizabeth inherited a bankrupt State, and she dared not lay heavy taxes on her impatient and obstinate subjects. Her proverbial parsimony, though sometimes applied in the wrong place, was as a general rule necessary to the bare survival of her government. Moreover, what money she was able to squeeze out for the navy was much of it grossly ill spent. Cecil and the vigilant Privy Council lacked not the will but the technical knowledge to detect and reform the traditional corruption of the shipyards. Then, in a fortunate hour (1578), Elizabeth put John Hawkins"—
a man from Plymouth—
in charge of the building and upkeep of her ships. During the decade before the coming of open war, which the Queen had so long and so wisely postponed, Hawkins did as great a work in the dockyards as Drake on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts.
In other words, all that Elizabeth did was to listen to some back benchers of the day and appoint a working party for the Royal Dockyards. I say to the Civil Lord that what Queen Elizabeth could do he can do—in some particulars at least. When he has finished with that matter there are one or two other matters for his attention—

Miss Irene Ward: Before the hon. Member leaves the question of the Royal Dockyards, will he explain if, when he refers to "other commercial work," he intends to imply that other forms of shipbuilding should be taken from private shipyards and put into the Naval Dockyards?

Mr. Foot: I am saying that the people in Devonport, Portsmouth and Chatham, have as much right to full employment as those in other shipyards.

Miss Ward: Will the hon. Member answer the point I made?

Mr. Foot: I am in favour of full employment in those shipyards, and if there is a danger of failure of full employment in private shipyards I am in favour of a development council for the shipbuilding


industry, as will be seen in the Labour Party's programme and, if necessary, of further measures to maintain full production in those yards as well. Cities like Portsmouth, where they have a considerable amount of unemployment, or Plymouth, where we have a certain amount of unemployment, have a special claim on the Admiralty, on this House and this country. Our city is one which has almost only one industry and that industry is devoted to the security and safety of this country.
I say that the Admiralty, Parliament and this country owe a special debt to such cities which devote almost the whole of their livelihood to the defence of this country, particularly when these cities have been subjected, as my city was subjected, to bombing and blitz on a worse scale than almost any other in the country. I say we have a special claim on the Admiralty and on this House. More bombs fell on Plymouth than on most of the private shipyard areas. Therefore, representatives of those private shipyard areas have no business, when I make my appeal to the Admiralty on behalf of my city, to say that it is in any way an improper appeal.
Not merely do we have a city in which there is one industry on which we are chiefly dependent, but in Plymouth many properties are owned or requisitioned by the Admiralty and there is a perpetual controversy about the release of some of them. I hope that the Admiralty will recognise that they owe a special obligation to cities such as Plymouth and Portsmouth and dockyard cities where they have taken over great areas, especially in my city, where they propose to take over a much greater area. The whole future of the Navy depends on Plymouth Corporation agreeing to their proposals. We have a claim on the Admiralty which other cities have not.
Therefore, the Admiralty ought to have a special regard for the release as quickly as possible of some of the properties which we want. I have taken up individual cases with the Civil Lord. We want them de-requisitioned and handed back to us for housing purposes. I have mentioned to him camps and other places but also—and I do not think he will dissent from this—we want

a full declaration by the Admiralty as to their intentions about the area they want to take over. We think their intentions are honourable; we have not seen anything to persuade us that they are not honourable. But when something like half my constituency is to be taken over by the Admiralty in order to maintain the safety of this country, I say that the citizens of that place have a right to stand up in the House of Commons, through their representative, and say that the Admiralty owes in return a special obligation to such a city, especially when we remember that if it had not been for the city of Plymouth this country would probably never have heard of the British Navy at all.

5.20 p.m.

Squadron-Leader Burden: The House may be surprised that I should venture to address it for the first time on the Navy Estimates as my own period of service was with the R.A.F. But in asking the indulgence of the House I would remind hon. Members that I have been sent here by an electorate which contains a large number of dockyard workers. In that I am on common ground with the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot), but I cannot help wondering how much more common ground I shall find with him in this House. I am also fortunate in having spent a good deal of my time in the R.A.F. working alongside officers of the Royal Navy. From them I learned that naval strength will always be the linchpin of British strategy.
The first object of the Navy must be so to control the world sea lanes that we can use them for the vital purpose of maintaining our supply links with the outside world and deploying our strength wherever strategy may demand. While each Service is to a greater or lesser degree involved in establishing this control over sea communications, by far the greater part of the responsibility must fall on the Royal Navy. That is so because on our control of the trade routes depends our ability to sustain the life of our people, obtain the raw materials essential in war and peace, retain contact with our friends and contain our enemies in war. The Estimates presented to this House each year are designed to ensure that the Royal Navy is capable of carrying out those obligations.
It is therefore gratifying to observe that the present Navy Estimates provide for the setting aside of a considerable sum to be spent on the scientific services. These, I am glad to see, include scientific research and development. During the latter part of the last war there were considerable advances in submarine construction by the Germans The full effect of these technical advances was minimised by our intensive bombing and yard destruction, which denied quantity production of the new type submarines in the latter stages of the war. We should be wise to assume that the Russians have taken full advantage o; the scientific information which they have undoubtedly obtained from the Germans, and in peacetime they are unhampered in the construction of large numbers of the "Snort" and other new type submarines. These submarines, in quantity, offer a tar greater threat to our security and naval strategy than the submarine menace of the past, great though that was.
We should be wise to assume that we may become engaged in the future against some enemy or enemies whose constructions yards are so inaccessible to our aircraft that a policy of attrition by bombing would not pay adequate dividends. In the last war sinkings by U-boats were possibly greatest in 1942, but then, despite our enormous losses, the Germans probably possessed no more submarines than do the Russians today, and the Russians have the advantage of possessing numbers of the new type submarines and also a measure of immunity from attack on her construction yards which was happily denied to the Germans.
I have no doubt that the Estimates contain provision for the greatest possible concentration of scientific knowledge on the development of anti-submarine weapons. I suggest that despite all that may be accomplished in this field the probable pre-hostility deployment of enemy submarines in the case of any future war is likely to be such that heavy losses would seem to be inevitable in the early stages. Indeed it might well be that submarine attacks would result in heavy casualties to our Naval Forces over an extended period. We should be wise to assume that to be the case.
Both sides of the House will accept the need for the rapid repair of naval vessels. This is absolutely vital to the

success of our naval strategy, and means that our naval dockyards must remain fully manned although they may not be fully employed on Admiralty work even in times of peace. Last week I put a Question to the Civil Lord of the Admiralty about future employment at Sheerness Dockyard. I was somewhat concerned at his reply. He said:
The only reductions at present planned at Sheerness Dockyard will amount to approximately 130 industrials and 30 non-industrials in the Naval Store Department."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th March. 1950; Vol. 472; c. 1066.]
I am rather worried about the implication contained in this reply. His statement that "The only reduction at present planned… "suggests that further reductions may be under consideration. As he said this afternoon when he interposed during the Debate in regard to housing his use of the words" at present "in regard to the non-supply of houses probably meant that more houses would be built later. I suggest that in his reply to my Question he left wide open the possibility of reducing the number of personnel at Sheerness Dockyard. In view of the circumstances and the need for the complete manning of our dockyards, I would ask him to make himself clear on the point that no further reductions are envisaged at Sheerness Dockyard. Indeed, we should face up to the position that the dockyard facilities now available in this country and the Commonwealth may be insufficient to deal with the probable repair requirements of our naval forces in the circumstances we may be called upon to face.
In any future war the great American dockyards would no doubt be made available to us as far as possible, but we might well find that even with these our repair facilities will still be inadequate. I submit that our position will be much strengthened if the Government will arrange for the construction of a number of repair ships, which, although costly, will, because of their ability, up-to-date machinery and comparative lack of vulnerability, be far more valuable than the continued maintenance of obsolete yards overseas like the one in Bermuda, which we heard this afternoon is to be discontinued. Serious consideration should be given to this question of repair ships.
My next point concerns the danger to our home dockyards from enemy air attack. While it is obvious that we must be in a position to repair damaged vessels with the utmost speed, it is clear that the enemy will endeavour to deny to us this essential "Fleet service" by carrying out sustained and intensive air attacks on our dockyard establishments. I trust, therefore, that the Minister will be able to assure this House and the men and women working and living in the dockyard towns that the provision of adequate anti-aircraft protection is in the forefront of Government intentions.
I now turn to the vexed question of accommodation. It is not my intention to harass the Government. Their discomfiture at the lack of success in this field was plain for all to see during the Debate last week. Their position on this issue was not improved in the country by the irrelevancies of the Minister of Health in the course of that Debate. I ask the Civil Lord to bear constantly in mind the fact that Service personnel have as much right to a decent home life as have the rest of the population of this country.
In my own constituency of Gillingham there is a chronic shortage of homes for Service families, and if my information is correct, as I believe it to be, the shortage is aggravated by married quarters being used as offices. These have been used by the Marines who, I am sorry to hear, are now to break a long and traditional association with the Medway towns. I ask whether it is a fact that married quarters have been used as offices by the Marines, and whether we can be assured that when the take-over by more Naval Forces is accomplished those homes at present being used as offices will revert to their proper use as married quarters. I assure the Minister that any measures he may take to provide homes for the families of Service men in the Medway towns will be greatly appreciated.
This brings me to my final point. The public conscience is occasionally shocked by disasters to naval craft but it is the spectacular loss of life which alone stirs the imagination. When "Thetis" and, more recently, "Truculent" were lost, a public subscription was raised to provide for the dependants of the men who lost

their lives. I want to make it plain that I have no quarrel with the public-spirited men and women who responded so generously. But it is a fact that Service men frequently lose their lives under conditions that do not stir the imagination, but their dependants are no less deserving. I feel sure that the right hon. Gentleman opposite, who served so gallantly in Russian convoys during the war, feels far from happy al their plight. I therefore invite the attention of the Minister to what I believe to be a possible way of alleviating the hardship of dependants and relatives of personnel who lose their lives by accident or Service incident.
The practice has grown and is expanding in industry whereby the lives of employees are insured under group schemes, and I understand that at the moment the miners are negotiating such a scheme. I would submit that consideration be given to the question of insuring all Service personnel—and civilians necessarily serving with them, as was the case in "Truculent"—for a reasonable sum against death on duty in peace-time. Such insurance would be quite apart from the allowances now paid to dependent relatives. As in industry, it would be a protection for the bereaved family. Many cases occur, especially when young lives are lost, where the deceased, merely because he is on the threshold of life, has not been called upon to contribute to the support of a relative, but who, as his position improves, would undoubtedly ease the financial stringency of ageing relatives. But in these cases no pension is paid, despite the fact that families have been bereaved of their source of support for the future.
The serving man has disadvantages, and the fact that he is aware of them is indicated by his reluctance to remain in the Navy. This one might be removed at a very slight increase in the over-all cost per head. I suggest that if the increases were worked out, it would not cost more each year than the cost of the humidification of, say, three battleships. I suggest that serious thought should be given to it, and I believe it might go a long way towards solving some of the difficulties of recruiting. It would certainly ease very considerably the lot of a great many of the dependants for whom at the moment we are so concerned.

5.34 p.m.

Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu: The hon. and gallant Member for Gillingham (Squadron-Leader Burden), who has just addressed this House for the first time, is at this moment experiencing the few moments of pure bliss that ever comes to a Member of Parliament. He has got his maiden speech off his chest very successfully. We listened to him today with great interest, an interest heightened by the fact that his experience comes from another Service. I hope he will not think that, because my experience of this great House is not much greater than his own, my congratulations are not worth much. I can assure him that they come, not only from me, but from the whole House.
Nothing I have heard, either from the hon. and gallant Gentleman or from any other speaker in this House today, has led me to change my mind about Admiralty. I have always believed that in the matter of securing equipment Admiralty was supreme, at any rate in Government Departments. I feel that they have always had the intelligence to foresee a menace, even when it is beyond the horizon. They have had the brains to design and acquire the answers to that menace; and almost, above all, they have had the adaptability and flexibility to beat the Treasury every time, so that they can always get the money that they need to pay for the answers. When it comes to the question of equipment, I say Admiralty is wholly trustworthy and I am delighted that their Lordships are now paying attention to some minor matters of equipment. I am glad to hear that they have at last discovered that the sides of a battle wagon can be painted with a paint spray instead of a brush. If the Parliamentary Secretary really wants to increase productivity, he might direct their Lordships' attention to the problem of getting some machine which will scrub the iron deck.
But when it comes to the matter of men, the handling and the welfare of seamen, I think that Admiralty are less trustworthy. They seem sometimes to forget that the value of even their best equipment is diminished if the conditions of the men working that equipment are not such as to provide the maximum efficiency. I feel that too great a proportion of the attention of their Lordships is paid to

equipment, and too little to personnel. I am thinking in part of the design of ships. I was interested to hear the Parliamentary Secretary say that there was in existence a high-powered committee dealing with the design of ships.
From the little experience of ships which I had in the war, I should imagine that that committee is of comparatively recent origin. I do not know whether that is true or not, but it was my experience that a ship was designed and the equipment fitted into it, and it was then considered complete. The men were just poured in and lodged wherever they happened to fall. As this committee is now in being, I ask the Parliamentary Secretary to direct the attention of its members to a number of points. I realise that, particularly in small ships, the room for the crew must necessarily be confined, but would he ask the committee this: is it really necessary, in the confined space of a battleship, that space should be further restricted by having a gun support running through it? Would he ask this committee—who have now discovered that in certain parts of the world it is desirable for ships to have refrigerators—whether it is absolutely essential for the refrigerator to be put in No. 1 boiler room?
Could he please do something about the guns in destroyers and the design of them? It really is a scandalous thing that destroyers going on the run up to the Arctic should have open gun shields without any shelter or protection. The fingers of the men freeze up at once, and what is almost worse, the gun freezes up; so that the whole lot is useless. Will the Parliamentary Secretary see that these little points are brought to the notice of the committee about which he speaks?
That brings me with no great jump to the question of Royal Naval Barracks. I was delighted to hear the Parliamentary Secretary talk about improvements at Chatham. Chatham happens to be a barracks of which I have no experience whatsoever. I used to hear ugly rumours about it during the war, that it was even worse than the Royal Naval Barracks at Portsmouth. But I never believed that. I always suspected that those rumours were spread by the enemy to cause alarm and despondency. I was delighted to hear that some improvements have been
taking place and particularly the improvement about canteen messing. It is an admirable improvement.
One of the things from which he and I suffered in other establishments was this business of having to do our "dhobying," eating, sweating and smoking and sleeping all on the same mess deck. The food, as the Parliamentary Secretary will remember, used to be brought from the galleys to the mess deck. By the time it got to us it was cold. While the heat of the food disappeared, the smell of it endured, with the result that we used to have our sleep at night spoiled by the stench of the same fish known as "the yellow peril"—which had spoiled our breakfast. The smell of that fish was refreshed—if that is the right word—by the smell of pig swill coming up from immediately below. Those conditions were intolerable. Changes may have been made at Chatham but, I am given to understand, they have not been made at Portsmouth. I doubt whether they have been made at Devonport.
Much as I want to hear of improvements in these barracks, I hope that the Admiralty will not consider they are doing enough merely by improving the barracks. I know that that has to be done as a temporary job but, on a long-term view of the matter, I say that no amount of improvement will remedy the situation. The Royal Naval Barracks, barren and dusty places, will never again be habitable, however good the commodore or the commander may be, however good the Ministers, and however much whitewash is splashed about them. I do not want to hear of these places being improved. I want to hear of their being destroyed. I know that that cannot be done at once, but there is an overwhelming case in favour of the destruction of these barracks, from the point of view of the welfare of the "inmates" and of security.
On the question of dispersal, if by any chance their Lordships are still thinking that in any future war it will do to have our main manning depots concentrated in big port towns, with anything up to 15,000 people in any one of the barracks, let me say that I think they will be proved desperately wrong in the first few weeks of the war. These barracks could be destroyed in an attack lasting only an

hour or two and all the men in them could be destroyed, too. For future planning it is essential that the Admiralty should begin to think in terms of dispersal of the men in very small units. I am sorry to hear of outlying establishments being closed down, and I am horrified to hear that trainees are to be trained in these barrack cesspools. Any trainee arriving in them will get a rotten impression of the Navy. He will pick up habits there which will give a bad impression of the Navy wherever he goes. It would be much better to keep the training away from the barracks and, at the earliest possible minute, to start splitting up the barracks into small units not necessarily all over the country but all over an area, to guard against being wiped out entirely by a few bombs
That is really all I have to say. I am concerned, as we all are, that the attitude of the nation towards the treatment of the Service man should seem to go In regular cycles. The first phase is when a war is on. All the people in the Services are then considered, somewhat sentimentally, to be heroes. They must have the best. Large numbers of civilians, people like myself, go into the Services and send back reports to our homes in every street throughout the country, telling how vile the conditions are. A body of public opinion is built up in this way, and everybody says: "We must improve the lot of the Service man." This answer is always given: "Yes, that's all very fine, but don't you know there's a war on?"
The next stage is when the war is over and we come into something like peace. The impetus which was given by the people who came out from the Services and by others carries forward the Government of the day towards making some improvements of the type about which we have heard today. Steadily, that impetus begins to die away. After we have come out of the Service we begin to forget, as the years pass by, the realities of our experience and we look back rather sentimentally and say: "It really couldn't have been quite as bad as all that." We begin to see the good side of it. When the run-down of National Service men takes place in the Navy, far fewer people are sending back reports to civil life about the conditions. Though people still say: "We must do
something to improve the conditions of the serving men," they are told: "We can't do anything just now because, don't you know, it is necessary to economise." That stage lasts a long time until we get to the third stage, which is when another war is imminent.
People get frightened then, and begin to build up the Forces again, and they concentrate upon equipment. They say: "The men must have the best equipment possible. They must not be armed with pikes, but they can't expect to be mollycoddled. We must leave that sort of thing until after the war." That is how it has happened through the centuries. The conditions of the serving man improve, but never as far as they ought to improve.
The best safeguard that this House has today against a repetition of that cycle is the fact that the Ministers responsible for naval affairs have recent lower-deck experience. I would beg them to keep their experience continually alive in their minds in all they do. With the Parliamentary Secretary I go further than beg. I threaten. If at any time there is a danger of his making the men the second charge instead of the first upon the resources of the Admiralty, I shall at once reveal to the House conversations I had with him some six years ago when, for a few months, we were serving our King and country drinking cups of tea in a seamanship hut. Our conversations were picturesque and sometimes vitriolic about the way in which the country treats its seamen. But that is joking. I know that both the Ministers will remember that seamen are human beings with ability, courage and great loyalty. I know they will remember that that loyalty is not something upon which the nation can indefinitely impose.

5.49 p.m.

Lieut.-Commander Clark Hutchison: I desire to intervene in this Debate for a few minutes in order to put forward three points, two of which were mentioned in passing by the Parliamentary Secretary in his very interesting opening speech. Both the White Paper on Defence which was discussed last week and the White Paper which accompanies the present Naval Estimates place emphasis upon reduction of manpower in the Navy without in any way impairing the striking power of the active Fleet.
That point was reinforced by what the Parliamentary Secretary said this afternoon. I do not dissent in any way from the policy of making better use of the uniformed strength of the Navy. That is right and proper, but the point which disturbs me—and it has not so far been commented upon by anybody—is the ever widening gap which is appearing between the uniformed strength of the Navy and the civilian element, which is borne on the Navy Vote.
I wonder whether hon. Members realise the tremendous difference which has taken place in the balance or ratio between the uniformed or sailor element and the civilian element over the past 10 years. It is rather disturbing, and, though I am loth to inflict a lot of figures upon the House, I want to read out three sets to illustrate the change which has taken place since the year 1939. I ought to explain to the Civil Lord, who I understand is to reply to the Debate, that these figures have been obtained from the appropriate Navy Estimates, and from answers which I have had in reply to Questions put in this House in the last few years.
In 1939 the uniformed or sailor strength was 133,000 and in that year the civilian element—that is, the industrial and non-industrial employees borne on the Navy Vote—was 107,000. In other words, there were 26,000 more sailors than civilians in the Navy. Last year the sailor element was 153,000, and the civilian element 177,000. In other words, there were 24,000 more civilians than sailors. This year the disparity is even greater. According to Vote A, there are at the moment 143,000 sailors in the Navy, and I understand from what the Parliamentary Secretary said that there is to be a run down during the year to about 127,000. According to the answers to Questions I got on Monday, the civilian element is just under 171,000. In other words, there are now 28,000 more civilians than sailors on the Admiralty Vote. This state of affair requires some explanation.
I appreciate that there have been great developments in equipment since the year 1939, and that there must be larger civilian maintenance staffs than existed pre-war in order that machinery and weapons can be kept in proper order. At the same time I feel that this ever-widening gap between the uniformed element
and the civilian element is something which ought to be looked into, and if, as is apparent, the Admiralty are making economies and reductions in the fighting strength of the Navy. I believe it is very necessary that they should look to this civilian element to see if there is not room for making economies there as well. I hope the Civil Lord will devote part of his speech tonight to this problem. It is not the first time that I have raised it in the Debate on the Navy Estimates, and, with all respect, I have never yet had a satisfactory answer why there should be so many more civilians in the Service of the Admiralty as compared with sailors than was the case in pre-war days.
My second point concerns the statement which was made by the Parliamentary Secretary in his opening speech today, when he referred to a number of economies which are to be made in the current year, amongst which was the abolition of the post of the Flag Officer, H.M.S. "Cochrane." The Parliamentary Secretary, who is a skilled politician, sought to disarm any Scottish complainers by saying that it had nothing to do with Rosyth Dockyard. Nevertheless, I feel bound to probe this matter more deeply.
Do I understand from what the Parliamentary Secretary said that it is intended to abolish the office of Commanding Officer, Coast of Scotland, or is it a subordinate appointment to that of Commanding Officer, Coast of Scotland? I should like that point made clear. If it is intended to abolish this office of Commanding Officer, Coast of Scotland, who is going to be in command of Naval Services in the Scottish area? So far as I can recollect, there has always been a Flag Officer stationed in the Forth area in peace-time, and we would be very loth indeed to see any alteration from this practice. After all, the General Officer Commanding in Scotland is in Edinburgh, as is also the Air Officer Commanding, and it would be lamentable if there were nobody to represent the Navy in the vicinity of the capital of Scotland.
I want to say one word on the subject of Rosyth. As the Civil Lord is aware, I have been putting one or two questions to him lately in connection with the closing down of the naval hospital at Port Edgar. I understand that that has no

bearing at all on the future of Rosyth. Nevertheless, there is a feeling up in Edinburgh and in that part of the country that this is by way of being what is colloquially known as "the thin end of the wedge." There is some apprehension that it may be intended to reduce Rosyth in status. I hope, therefore, that the Civil Lord in his reply tonight will make it clear that it is the intention of the Government to regard Rosyth as being a main dockyard and to keep it in being. It is a matter about which I have spoken on many occasions in this House, and I am not going to recapitulate all the excellent reasons why it should be retained, but anybody who has any notion about strategy or defence must see that it is necessary that we should have a dockyard in the North Sea.
Finally, I return to that other subject about which I have also spoken and written "acres" of correspondence during the time I have been a Member of this House, and on which my hon. Friend the Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas) touched in passing—the position of the officers of the Inspection Department. The Civil Lord will recollect that in the course of the last Parliament I had no fewer than two Adjournment Debates on that subject, which must be somewhat unusual, and in the second of those, as recently as 12th July last, the Civil Lord made certain pronouncements, which will be found in col. 402 of HANSARD. He outlined a number of improved salary scales for these officers, and at first sight I must admit that I and my hon. Friends who have taken an interest in this matter believed that they were reasonable. Unfortunately, as too often happens in this life, things which look all right at first do not appear so when probed into more deeply, and so it was in this case.
I am informed that so far from getting a rise, a small number of officers are finding that their pay now is less than before the improvements were announced, and in an appreciable number of cases there has been no substantial improvement whatsoever. I feel that these inspection officers have been treated in a very poor way indeed. There are just three points in connection with this subject which I wish to bring to the notice of the Civil Lord. The first is that I would urge him to get back to the basis of this whole matter, which is Admiralty Fleet


Order 2078, published in the year 1931, and I propose to read him the relevant paragraph from that Order, because it is the key to the whole situation. That Order states quite definitely:
The above rates of pay will be comparable to the standard (1919) rates of pay of officers on the active list and will be subject to similar variations as the latter rates.
All through this correspondence and throughout the Debates which we have had upon this subject, I have sought to make it clear that the chief complaint of the inspection officers is that there has been a departure from the spirit of that Order, and that, in fact, their pay has never conformed to the pay of active service officers, as was mentioned in the Admiralty Fleet Order.
The second point I wish to make is to recall to the Civil Lord the findings of the Madden Committee. The Report of the Committee is a confidential document, and I do not know exactly what is in it, but it would be interesting if the hon. Gentleman could say if that Committee was in favour of the Instruction Department being made an active service branch of the Navy, or if it should become a civilian branch of the Navy, or if these officers should continue their present hybrid existence, which is the least satisfactory development which one can conceive. Personally, I think it would be a very good idea if the whole Inspection Department were to be made an active service branch, just as are the gunnery and torpedo schools and the department of the director of Naval Ordnance.
The third point to which I would invite the attention of the Civil Lord concerns a matter which rankles very much with the naval inspection officers. Something like 60 per cent. of them are serving in inter-Service establishments under the authority of the Ministry of Supply at the present time. In these establishments, they have as colleagues officers of the Army inspection service and also of the R.A.F. inspection service. The Army and Air Force officers draw full Service pay and allowances, whereas the Naval officers get the very much reduced scales appropriate to the naval ordnance rates. This matter is a source of very great irritation and natural annoyance to the people concerned, and I therefore urge that something should be done to remove

this anomaly. I suggest that the proper way in which to sweep away all these difficulties and irritations and get the department on a proper basis is to make it a full active service uniformed branch of the Royal Navy. I commend that solution very strongly to the Civil Lord, and I hope he will deal with it in his reply.

6.4 p.m.

Commander Pursey: I hope the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh, West (Lieut.-Commander Hutchison) will forgive me if I do not follow him—he knows that I am always prepared to take on the previous speaker—except to say that the Port Edgar Hospital was closed after the First World War. I served there for some time, and I say that there is no justification for it now being kept on by the Navy when it can serve a much better use under the National Health Service. Naval officers and ratings will be better off, as I was myself, under the national scheme, and I thought it was up to me to say that.
I congratulate the Parliamentary Secretary on attaining his new post. I would have said a word or two about the speech of the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas) if he had been here, but I will simply confine my remarks about it to saying that, having prepared his speech before he had heard that of the Parliamentary Secretary's speech if he will now read the two tomorrow he will find that he did not say very much that was not said by the Parliamentary Secretary. If the hon. Gentleman takes out of his speech what was already covered by the Parliamentary Secretary there will not be much left.
Before passing on to my main remarks, I would like to deal with the interjection by the hon. Lady the Member for Tyne-mouth (Miss Ward) when my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot) was putting forward the claims of the dockyard towns. The hon. Lady just does not understand what my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport was talking about, just as she does not understand a lot of other things. Repayment work for the dockyards has nothing to do with shipbuilding work in the private yards; her interjection, therefore, was quite wide of the mark.
wish to pose a couple of questions before I come to my main theme. First, I would ask the hon. Gentleman who is to wind up for the Opposition tonight—unless someone with naval experience deals with that point earlier in the Debate—a question on anti-submarine measures. I would like him to deal with his Leader's suggestion, which was put forward in the recent Defence Debate. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) advocated light carriers, a suggestion of which everyone is aware and which would be supported, so that there is nothing new in that. The right hon. Gentleman also advocated large aircraft, in particular, an American type. My question to the Opposition is this: could the light carriers carry these large aircraft, because, if not, the suggested combination—as carrier-borne aircraft—put forward by the Leader of the Opposition is worthless, like a good many other remarks that he makes.
My second question is to the Civil Lord. I would like to know what information is given to time-expired ratings when they leave the Royal Navy about organisations for ex-Service men, particularly ex-naval men's organisations. The problem of resettlement in civilian life is an important one, and I dealt with that point very fully in my speech last year and do not propose to repeat the arguments now. The public and the ex-Service man are now aware that, with its £100,000 Pall Mall headquarters, its salaries of £1,750 a year, and its unnecessary and immoral street corner tin can rattling, the British Legion is the greatest charitable scandal of the century.
I will leave it at that and pass on, because there are other institutions, like the Regular Forces Employment Association, the Royal Naval Benevolent Trust, which has never appealed to the public for a penny, the Royal Naval Old Comrades' Association and similar organisations, which are available for comradeship and mutual help. Between them, they provide practically all the requirements of the Naval ex-Service man, as do the similar organisations for the Army and the Royal Air Force. Every step should be taken by the Admiralty to inform the men about these organisations before they leave the Service. I suggest that the principle for the Services should be one

national fund only for each of the three Services, which should be self-supporting, and that we should have no more of this obsolete and disgraceful tin can rattling from the public on behalf of ex-Service men, the larger number of whom greatly resent being exploited by so-called charity organisations which have simply become big business "rackets," with "jobs for the boys."
The chief subject with which I wish to deal tonight is that of shipbuilding and ship repairing, both Naval and mercantile marine. For that reason, I am particularly interested, as are several other hon. Members on this side of the House who represent shipbuilding constituencies, in the paragraph in the Statement of the Navy Estimates, which reads:
The Admiralty is closely concerned in the maintenance of a healthy strategic and economic level of work and employment in the shipbuilding and ship repairing industries, and now that the merchant fleet tonnage has been virtually restored to its pre-war level, and the heavy arrears of repair work have been largely overtaken, a comprehensive investigation is being made into this problem.
This is the first occasion during the last five years on which the House has had an opportunity to discuss this important problem. We should like to hear more from the Civil Lord, when he winds up the Debate, about this comprehensive investigation, the constitution of the committee or working party, and its terms of reference. It is essential that, in addition to naval yards, there should be a sufficient building and repairing potential in private yards for warships as well as merchant vessels in peace-time, and one capable of expansion, should war occur, to ensure the safety of the realm. But before developing this important naval theme, I wish to deal with certain points raised on the subject of shipbuilding and repairing by the hon. Lady the Member for Tynemouth in her speech a fortnight ago, during the Debate on the Address, HANSARD, 8th March, 1950, Volume 472. column 412. [Laughter.] I am glad to know that for once I have the unanimous support of the House. Naturally, I informed the hon. Lady that I intended to do so, and I am glad to see that she is in her place.
In her speech the hon. Lady referred to the unregulated import of foreign fish. This subject would, of course, be out of order in a Debate on Navy Estimates,
and I will not attempt to pursue it. but I must make this brief reference so as to give a clue to some whimsy of the hon. Lady about trawler building. She said:
In my part of the world, there has been considerable comment on the fact that the Socialist Government negotiated a loan with Iceland."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1950: Vol. 472, c. 412.]
Later, she referred to the countries which are menacing the future of those engaged in our fishing industry. Although the hon. Lady did not say so specifically, I think she will agree that this refers to the story, put out by the Tories during the election, that the Socialist Government had negotiated a loan with Iceland to build trawlers in this country, which would be in competition with our own and would add to the dumping here of foreign fish. That is the point of the story, I believe, but I would ask the hon. Lady to confirm or deny that it is.

Miss Ward: Would the hon. and gallant Gentleman like me to deal with that point now, or would he rather that I endeavoured to catch Mr. Deputy-Speaker's eye at the end of his comments?

Commander Pursey: That is for the hon. Lady to decide; I am prepared to give way to her on this point now.

Miss Ward: May I say how very polite and delightful it is of the hon. and gallant Gentleman, but I asked my question in that way because it might take me some little time to disabuse his mind of the fact that the statement he has just made emanated from Tory sources. In fact, it might be of interest to him, and perhaps save him a lot of trouble in developing his speech if I were to point out that the statement about the loan to Iceland came from the British Trawler Owners' Federation. Contrary to the view that the hon. and gallant Gentleman holds about my mental approach to these problems, may I point out that, at any rate, I take note of the advice of experts on these matters and do not make observations in the House just because I happen to be a supporter of the
Conservative Party. Perhaps the hon. and gallant Gentleman would just note that the information did come from the British Trawler Owners' Federation.

Commander Pursey: I am very grateful to the hon. Lady because she has

fallen into the trap right up to the neck and has disclosed to a greater extent than before that she does not know the first thing about the subject. Now I will start to give her the facts of life, and "the works." Actually, the statement that the Socialist Government negotiated a loan is a completely typical Tory falsehood.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): How does this come in on the Navy Estimates?

Commander Pursey: With all due respect, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I did try to develop my point that this loan ties up with the question of the building of trawlers. I read the paragraph from the First Lord's statement about this comprehensive inquiry into the question of shipbuilding and repairs, and the question of merchant ships and trawlers being built in this country both for our own services and for foreign Powers, as a matter of considerable importance to the Admiralty from the point of view of the war potential of merchant ships and trawlers. Therefore, with the greatest humility and quite appreciating the question you have asked me, I hope I have satisfactorily justified my dealing with this point of the loan for the building of trawlers.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I do not think that the hon. and gallant Member has. No doubt it is very important, but I do not see how it is linked up with the Navy Estimates.

Commander Pursey: I do not wish to repeat the paragraph which I quoted from the First Lord's statement. As I said, it is the first time that we have been able to deal with these matters. The Admiralty is the Government Department which is responsible to any extent at all for merchant shipbuilding and repairs. There is no other Department that can be dealt with in the matter, and I submit that this question of trawlers relates directly to the Admiralty und to the First Lord's statement because of its being tied up with the question of ships that would be required as mine-sweepers during a war.
I hope, with all due respect and humility, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that I have, even if not directly, completely justified my raising this matter during this Debate on the Navy Estimates. I should


not have attempted to raise it on another occasion because there would have been no leg upon which one could stand, but I do suggest that on these Estimates we are covered by virtue of the First Lord's Statement. I have no intention of devoting any great length of time to this particular point, but I want to clear it up because of the fact that it was raised in my constituency during the election. Therefore, if I may have your permission to proceed, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I shall do so quite quickly.

Miss Ward: Further to your intervention, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, if the hon. and gallant Gentleman would give way for just one moment I would like to say that I have referred to my speech in relation to his intervention, and find that I did not raise the question of the building of fishing trawlers at all.

Mr. Keenan: On a point of Order. May I point out that Vote No. 14 of the Estimates is devoted to merchant shipbuilding, and as the Admiralty are responsible for both ship repairing and shipbuilding in the country, both those branches of industry are really still under the control of the Admiralty. Any reference to the particular services which we may raise from time to time has to be directed to the Admiralty. Therefore, I submit that it is in order to raise this question of trawlers, which is so closely associated with the naval services and shipbuilding itself.

Commander Pursey: If I may be allowed to continue, the point I raised on the hon. Lady's speech—and I have HANSARD here—is the question that the Socialist Government negotiated a loan with Iceland. Although the hon. Lady did not say so, the purpose of that loan is for the building of trawlers in this country. If, with the support of my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Kirk-dale (Mr. Keenan), I may continue, I hope to clear the matter up quite quickly. The plain fact is that the Icelandic Government floated an ordinary loan of £1,250,000 sterling in the City of London to raise money to build trawlers in Britain for the use of Iceland.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That does not come within the Navy Estimates.

Commander Pursey: I naturally defer to your Ruling, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, but the point is that it was not a loan negotiated by the Socialist Government. It was a loan taken up by the Icelandic Government.

Lord John Hope: Am I right in suggesting that if the hon. and gallant Member cannot make a speech without infringing the Rules of order there is nothing whatever to prevent his sitting down.

Commander Pursey: I will now pass on to the question of shipbuilding and repairing, in which I hope I shall be in order. The hon. Lady the Member for Tynemouth also referred to:
A great deal of our heavy unemployment dating, in particular, from 1929 to 1931.
This, naturally, excited derisive laughter from hon. Members on these benches, who know the facts. She interposed:
It is no use Members opposite laughing because I was there.
—as if that clinched the argument. Later. with premeditation, she said:
The Socialist Government of 1929, in cutting our naval shipbuilding, produced an immense amount of unemployment on the Tyne."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1950; Vol. 472, c. 412.]
This is absolute nonsense.

Mr. John Hay: What about Jarrow?

Commander Pursey: It the hon. Gentleman will contain himself, I will deal with Jarrow in my own way. I say to hon. Members opposite that the hon. Lady's statement is absolute nonsense, and I will confirm that from the facts. The reduction of naval building was the result of the international disarmament conferences, rightly started by the Tory Government long before the Labour Government of 1929 came into power. In fact, during the Debate on the Navy Estimates in 1929—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: We are now dealing with the Navy Estimates of 1950–51, and I would ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman to confine his remarks to them.

Commander Pursey: I submit, with great respect, that the question of shipbuilding and ship repairing today has some relation to what happened previously. The Labour Government, in 1930


and 1931 provided for one more cruiser than did the Tory Government of 1928. The reason for mass unemployment and discharge of workers from shipyards on the Tyne, and in my constituency, was not because the Admiralty cut naval orders but because 1929 produced the best harvest of modern times, with a result that there were no crops to be carried. Seven hundred and fifty British ships were laid up. It was orders for merchant ships that were cut. These cuts were responsible for the mass unemployment on the Tyne and not the cutting of naval orders at that time.
To turn now to the shipbuilding industry as a whole, and to consider the grounds for a comprehensive investigation by the Admiralty—

Dr. Morgan: On a point of Order. Your Ruling, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, is rather important, from the point of view of subsequent speakers. Page 231 of the Navy Estimates tor 1950–51 refers to the building programme of the Admiralty, which, no doubt, includes trawlers. I submit that hon. Members are entitled, in this Debate on the Navy Estimates, to refer to the question of trawlers.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Certainly, I take no exception to that, but Iceland has nothing to do with this; that is my point.

Dr. Morgan: The Admiralty has certain responsibilities subsequent to the actual building of the ships.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I did not say that they had not.

Dr. Morgan: Surely, part of that responsibility relates to the disposal of the ships. If a loan has been given to Iceland surely it is in order to discuss into whose possession these trawlers would come. I submit that up to that point my hon. and gallant Friend's remarks are in order.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: No, I thought not.

Commander Pursey: I was dealing with the question of shipbuilding as a whole, the grounds for a comprehensive investigation by the Admiralty and some possible steps that might be taken to ensure the best use of shipbuilding and ship repair yards to secure the full employ-

ment of manual workers upon whom depends the success of those two industries. Those workers are often the victims of casualisation. The golden honeymoon of the war is over. Today, owners are already asking for subsidies to build their new ships. Shipbuilders are in much the same position as the owners.

Mr. Speaker: The Estimates do not deal with merchant shipbuilding as such.

Commander Pursey: When your predecessor was in the Chair, Sir, and I started my speech I read a paragraph from the First Lord's statement explanatory of the Navy Estimates, where it refers to a comprehensive investigation which is being made into:
… the maintenance of a healthy strategic and economic level of work and employment in the shipbuilding and ship repairing industries.
I submit that the Admiralty is the only Department which is concerned with shipyards and ship repairing yards and that this is the occasion to refer to this matter. Shipbuilders are already complaining of lack of orders and are making statements on subsidies—

Mr. Maclay: Has the hon. and gallant Gentleman any substantiation of his statement that owners are already asking for subsidies for shipbuilding?

Commander Pursey: Representatives of the Ship Owners' Association have already referred to foreign countries subsiding new building—

Mr. Maclay: That is a very different matter.

Commander Pursey: —and are making a case for subsidies in this country.

Mr. Maclay: That does not follow at all.

Mr. Speaker: That comes under the Treasury, not under the Admiralty.

Dr. Morgan: May I ask for a Ruling on this, Mr. Speaker? The explanatory notes on page 231 of the Navy Estimates for 1950–51 state quite definitely:
On completion the vessels constructed on Government account were transferred to the Ministry of Transport and included in the schemes for the disposal of Government-owned tonnage receipts for which are credited to
Ministry of Transport Votes. To enable the industry to meet the increased demand for new construction and repair work, additional plant and facilities were supplied with Government financial assistance.
If those words are read in conjunction with the subsequent paragraph, surely they mean that any remarks about trawlers, their subsequent disposal and liquidation, whether to the Government or private owners in this country, come within the terms of this Debate.

Mr. Speaker: The position is quite clear from the paragraph which the hon. Member has just read. The account was transferred to the Ministry of Transport. Therefore, it comes under the Ministry of Transport and not under the Admiralty.

Dr. Morgan: I submit that the paragraph from which I have just quoted should be read in conjunction with the subsequent paragraph:
This Vote provides for (a) the liquidation of the outstanding liabilities arising from the Government building programme and the special war-time facilities. …
If the two paragraphs are read together I submit, with respect, that any reference to the building of trawlers and their subsequent disposal comes within the terms of the explanatory note.

Mr. Speaker: No, I think not. In my view, this is only a liquidating Vote. Everything is transferred to the Ministry of Transport.

Dr. Morgan: Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Commander Pursey: I should like to make it clear that my argument for including those remarks in my speech is not the same as my hon. Friend's argument. As he has already intervened twice, I would ask him to wait to make any further interventions until he is called. My reason for including these remarks about ship owners, shipbuilding and ship repairing is that ships built by private owners in peace-time are the ships that are taken over by the Admiralty as armed merchant cruisers, and so forth. Therefore, as is shown by that paragraph of the First Lord's statement, the question of ship owners, shipbuilders and ship repairers does arise.
Shipbuilders have been accepting more orders than they could execute in proper time. Consequently, there has been long

delay and high cost. The answer is to cut down the time and so reduce the cost. Then there is the question of manpower redundancy. Manpower is referred to in the Statement. Even if that problem were solved there would still remain the decasualisation of labour problem. The position where employers secure profits and yearly salaries at the expense of the employees who are stood off is quite iniquitous. The solution here is alternative and complementary work from outside the shipping industry to ensure continuous employment for the manual workers as well as the office staff and the employers. One good example of an attempt to decasualise is that of Messrs. Harland and Wolff, who have launched out to take on work previously done in America, which is now an advantage to them from the point of view of devaluation.
When one turns to the question of the repairers, one finds that this industry is also, unfortunately, largely a private monopoly. So again, few firms are free to cut profits and go out for orders.

Mr. Maclay: I know that the hon. and gallant Member wants to make his speech as quickly as possible, but he must stop making unsubstantiated statements. Ship repairing is not, by the wildest stretch of the imagination, a monopoly.

Commander Pursey: If the hon. Member would make his own speech if he is called, or if he would confine his remarks to ship owning, of which he has some knowledge, and leave me to deal with ship repairing, we should not lose so much time. It is obviously a subject which hon. Members opposite do not want ventilated in the House—for the first time in five years. I happen to represent the third largest port in the country, and my constituency includes the main docks of Hull. That is the reason why I am constrained to raise this matter tonight at the first available opportunity. I ask hon. Members opposite to apply a certain amount of commonsense to their interruptions.
Then there is the question of ship repairing in foreign yards, for which the Admiralty is the Department responsible for answering Questions in this House. That point was also raised by the hon. Lady the Member for Tynemouth. I would draw attention to the fact that there is a two-way traffic here. On 12th December,


1949, in column 222 of the OFFICIAL REPORT the Minister of Transport gave the figures for the previous nine months. Only nine British ships had been repaired in foreign yards, whereas 29 foreign ships had been repaired in British yards, which was obviously to the advantage of the ship repairers in this country.

Miss Ward: rose—

Commander Pursey: I cannot give way again to the hon. Lady. I have already given way several times. Her arguments may jeopardise negotiations at present going on for more work to be brought to this country from foreign shipyards. The question of major repairs being done abroad largely depends on British repairers, and whether they genuinely want work and will tender properly for it. There are owners who prefer to repair their ships in this country, even if they are sailing to foreign ports. But the repairers must offer an attractive price and time of completion, particularly in competition with foreign yards. There are continental ports from which, overnight, a ship can reach the Tyne or the Humber, and it is up to the repairers there and elsewhere to go full out and get this work.
Repair work is of more importance to Hull than any other large port in the country. In my constituency which, as I say, covers the main docks area, it is a major industry, and it is for that reason that I have raised this subject. Yet we find in Hull repairers turning work away when their employees are stood off. Admittedly, there are difficulties about berths, equipment and war damage to be made good, and I ask the Civil Lord to consult with the Minister of Transport with a view to taking steps to improve the facilities for ship repairers in Hull.
As on the building side, there are redundancy and decasualisation problems in the repairing industry, and practically every criticism that could be made of one could be made of the other. The solution is the same, namely, alternative and complementary work. Some firms have already taken steps to this end. Naval repair work has recently gone to private yards on an exceptional scale for peacetime. I ask the Civil Lord to say whether this is done on the pernicious "cost-plus" basis by which employers are able to say to their workmen "Go slow on this job:

it is 'cost-plus'," thereby increasing the cost to the National Exchequer.
To sum up, a sufficient shipbuilding and repairing potential is required in peace both for merchant ships and for war vessels, with the means of expansion in war. The main support, however, must be the shipowners, and it is necessary that owners and builders should work out a long-term building programme to solve their problems and smooth out the booms and the slumps. Builders should also go full out to obtain not only British merchant ship and warship contracts, but also foreign merchant ship and warship contracts, when available. Naval shipbuilding orders must always be rather in the nature of a supplement to private yards because of the demands of naval yards, but large orders, such as aircraft carriers, and the sepcial types of small craft usually go to private yards.
It is, therefore, necessary that owners, instead of failing to give orders when yards are slack, should then give orders, and the Admiralty should also help by placing their orders during any threat of serious unemployment. This means combined planning in which Government action, without subsidy, may be necessary to ensure that never again shall there be mass unemployment in the two important industries. In addition, there is the necessity for builders and repairers to solve both the redundancy and the decasualisation problems.
I suggest to the Admiralty that these are some of the main problems and some of the possible solutions which should be investigated to ensure sufficient and healthy British shipbuilding and repairing industries and, in particular, proper conditions of employment for the workers. I am sure that hon. Members on both sides of the House who are interested in this important national problem, as all of them should be, will look forward to seeing the results of the investigation. On this side of the House we shall also await with confidence the action which, if necessary, the Government will take for the first time to deal with these erratic industries so as to ensure that more satisfactory results are obtained, particularly from the point of view of the national requirements rather than from those of vested private interests, and also to ensure the full employment of the workers.

ANTI-SUBMARINE DEFENCE

6.42 p.m.

Sir Ronald Ross: I beg to move, to leave out from "That" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
this House considers it essential that there should be a sufficient force of vessels capable of dealing with modern submarines; that it should be suitably supported from the air, and possess an efficient minesweeping organisation and that research should be prosecuted diligently in order to improve and develop these forces.
This is the most serious question with which the Navy is faced today and I think that in the Parliamentary Secretary I shall have, for once, a very sympathetic listener, because he himself described it as the biggest modern task of the Navy when he made the speech which we all enjoyed on a previous occasion, on the Motion that you, Sir, should leave the Chair. It is perhaps not unfitting that my Amendment should be moved by one of the comparatively few Members who have to cross the sea in coming from their constituencies to Parliament. I have put in a lot of sea time in cross-channel boats but I cannot say that I have been subjected to many serious risks, even during the war. If there was a risk, although I agree a slight one, it was at the beginning of the war and, most significantly, at the very end of the war.
It has been said officially that had the U-boat war continued for an appreciable period, it would have imposed an increased and severe strain upon allied resources. The U-boat fleet would have increased both in numbers and power and new and improved types of U-boats were also coming into operation. That is said in the official account of the Battle of the Atlantic. Our dependence on seaborne traffic is indisputable because if we cannot get petrol in through the sea routes our aircraft cannot fly; if we cannot get our raw materials paralysis is produced in industry; and if we cannot get food we starve.
Against what should we measure our defensive resources? We know that our relations with Russia are technically friendly, but I think many of us, and perhaps all of us, would say that they are not very friendly, and so I make no apology for using Russia as the yardstick against which to measure our resources. It is perfectly clear that great

efforts are being made by that country to increase her submarine fleet. It is difficult to appraise and to measure the exact extent of those efforts. We do not now receive the assistance which we used to receive from the Admiralty through the publication of the Fleet returns.
I have, however, consulted the books which deal with this matter and Brassey's "Naval Annual" states that there are about 250 Russian submarines. Jane's "Fighting Ships" puts the figure up to 360 and says that there are 120, mostly post-war, in the Baltic. In the French equivalent "Flottes de Combat," it is added that there are 30 to 100 submarines on the stocks in Russia, and the Russians are given credit for possessing at least a dozen of the German type 21 which have very great underwater speed. I suggest that we should remember that at the beginning of the last war Germany possessed only 57 operational U-boats of modern design, and so it would appear that our task, in the very unhappy event of there being a war with Russia, would be more severe.
In submarine warfare the most marked feature is the sudden development and change. The official account of the Battle of the Atlantic divides the war into eight different phases, each clearly distinguishable from the other. Every thrust was parried by the Navy and the Air Force, but some of them were not parried by very much; there was not a very wide margin. There was more change in those five years in naval affairs than there used to be in over 200 years.
There are two developments which are particularly significant and important. They have increased the danger of submarine attack to a very marked extent, far more than all the changes which took place between the wars. The first of these is what I prefer to call the "Snort," to give it a forthright British term, and the second is the development of the submarine with a high underwater speed. The "Snort," as I think most people know, is merely a tube which appears above the surface of the water and eatables fresh air to be taken in and foul air and exhaust gases to be expelled. As a consequence, the internal combustion engines, the diesels, can be used when the boat is submerged. The battery for complete submersion can be charged and, as a
result, the power of aircraft, so prominent against submarines during the last war, has decreased to a very marked extent.
A submarine which is exposing only a tube, the Snorkel—to use a German term which I do not like—is not easy to find by a flying boat using either visual assistance, sometimes at night by searchlight, or radar. It is a very difficult thing. There is only a tube and possibly a cloud of vapour to reveal the presence of the boat beneath. It was significant that at the very end of the war, when the "Snort" had been brought into use by German submarines, we saw them leaving the blue water. We did not find them nearly so thick in the Atlantic and deep waters, for they closed round the focal points quite close to our own shores from where they had earlier been driven. When they had these contrivances, they were able once again to make an appearance close to our shores.
I turn now to the submarines' great underwater speed. They are reported to have speeds up to 20 knots submerged, and I would remind the House of a very ominous occurrence. The day before the submarine war ceased, two merchant ships, each of 10,000 tons, were sunk within a mile of May island at the mouth of the Forth, by one of these fast, modem submarines. The change is tremendous, especially when we remember that the previous speed was about eight knots or nine knots. It presents very alarming possibilities for the future, because it would seem to me that if there are submarines of this underwater speed—and this is apart from the fact that they may render our patrol craft obsolete—it would be possible to organise wolf-pack attacks on convoys by plane, which would be a most unpleasant development.
Now I come to the question, How are we to deal with this situation? How are we to be prepared for the new situation at sea which results from these developments. I suggest that we must press on with new devices to meet new developments. There are, after all, two problems, which are really quite distinct. The first is to find the submarine. The second is to destroy it when found. Let us come to the second of these problems first, because it is much the less severe, much the less troublesome. There has been very considerable development in destroying submarines. During the last war the

technique was improved. In the work of the killer groups under that very remarkable man, Captain Walker—perhaps the name most honoured in all antisubmarine warfare—there were very remarkable achievements.
As everyone knows, probably the beam of the Asdic, the principal means of detecting submerged submarines, is not effective under or nearly under a ship. It will see the submarine ahead but not the submarine beneath the keel or nearly beneath the keel, and the more deep-diving a submarine is—and modern submarines can go much deeper than the older boats—the more difficult the problem of detection becomes. It is rather like shooting at pheasants, if the pheasant flies straight over you, Sir. If you shoot with one eye to make a deflection shot, so to speak, you are not shooting at the bird at all, because the bird is blacked out by the barrels. In the same way the anti-submarine craft could not see the submarine when it was under the ship, and so had to drop depth charges. Now, however, with the throwing ahead devices, the "Hedgehog" and the very important "Squid," we have got over that difficulty. Incidentally, submarines are much more apt to turn even than pheasants. So I think great progress has been made in that direction, though there is the difficulty, I gather, that the gear ships have to carry for anti-submarine work and for radar work has become so cumbersome and heavy that it is difficult to carry it all in a small ship.
There is no doubt that the first of the two problems I mentioned—finding the submarine—is really the more difficult of the two, and it is the hardest problem the Admiralty has to face. Aircraft are certainly less effective, but they still will have their uses, and I am a little worried to see that work on the three light fleet carriers, which I should have thought would have been most useful in this type of work—we have no escort carriers at present—has been suspended. I should have thought they would still have had considerable function in the anti-submarine field, which, it is agreed, is our most serious problem. I hope there will be a special anti-submarine aircraft department, and I rather gather from the speech of the Parliamentary Secretary that there is to be that development. We do not always have air-minded people


wholly sympathetic with sailors in the problems of the sea, and there is no doubt that we do want an entirely specialised type of aircraft for dealing with the submarine menace.
Has anything been done as regards using helicopters at sea? Helicopters could land on a small deck and could hover, and perhaps would turn out to be a useful form of convoy escort. Of course, the sonobuoy, in spite of having come in for some dubious criticism during another Debate, is not without its uses, but I wonder whether the Admiralty are considering the development of the idea of the use of submarines against submarines. I believe that in the United States specialised submarines have been built for that purpose. Of course, it is not a new idea to us. In the war before last—what, I think, it is fashionable to call the First World War—the "R" class submarines were built specially to hunt out submarines, and they had the distinction of being faster below surface than on top of it. It does seem that there are possibilities here in the use of submarines as submarine killers.
In anything I say today I am not making any criticism, express or implied, of our anti-submarine establishments, of which there are two. I think they do remarkably good work. I have myself considerable knowledge of H.M.S. "Sea Eagle," which is sited in my constituency. It has performed, to begin with, the miracle of establishing the most cordial possible relations between the Navy and the Air Force. The relations between the sea officers and the air officers here have always been good and cordial; and there has always been extraordinarily good cooperation. That, in itself, is a remarkable achievement.
However, I think they are at present under a very severe handicap. When I am in my constituency I see the submarines. They are "T" class. They are very good boats of their kind; but even with fast battery drive, are they adequate for work against the type of really new submarine that we are likely to be up against should there be another war? I think not. The future demands fast submarines. The First Lord says as much in the Explanatory Statement which he has issued with the Estimates. Where are the fast submarines? There is no sign or

symptom of them. In the Navy Estimates we are told that our present submarines are being "hotted-up" with fast battery drive. I do not think that is going to be adequate to the needs of training. Naturally, I have not discussed this, or even mentioned it, in any way with friends of mine at the anti-submarine school. I do not know how swiftly fast battery drive submarines can go, but it seems to me they will not be fast enough.
We ought really to learn from the past. I allude, of course, to our cricket matches with Australia, where the British team was at the great disadvantage that they had had no practice with fast bowling. To translate that experience in terms of war, it is not difficult to see that unless we have fast submarines, we cannot practise defeating fast submarines. For instance, we may practise how to detect and destroy a submarine going at nine knots or 10 knots, but our experience may likely give misleading lessons, and will not be effective applied to detecting and destroying a submarine going at 20 knots.
If I were to be asked—which is unlikely—what I thought the most pressing need the Navy has today, I should say it is the pressing need for really fast submarines—submarines with high submerged speeds—not primarily for the purposes of offence but for the purposes of defence, so that our anti-submarine forces could work with an up-to-date type of submarine and come to know what they would be up against in war, and could devise tactics and contrivances with which to meet the risk.
What do we need and what have we got? So far as I am able to judge the position, what we need are fast surface ships equipped with modern contrivances and with anything that can be devised to meet this underwater peril. No one is more conscious than I am of the financial position of this country, and to have to embark on a vast building programme to meet this danger should be, in my opinion, absolutely a last resort; but we do need fast killer ships. What have we? There are the fleet destroyers. We have very few cruisers, and the fleet destroyers would probably not be available except in very small numbers, because, after all, we must never forget that surface raiders are an ancillary to submarine warfare. They make it very


much more difficult, as we found in the last war. I do not think that we shall have much help from the fleet destroyers, although I think that the four-weapon class destroyers—although they are the most hideous ships I have ever seen—are probably the most effective antisubmarine vessels of today.
Let me turn to the frigates. The frigates may be divided into two classes. There are what I would call the true frigates built sometimes as sloops, sometimes as corvettes and sometimes as frigates, but all called frigates now, and they are called after birds, bays, loughs and rivers. My only criticism is that the geographical knowledge of the Admiralty shows a surprising lack in that they did not know that there were bays or loughs in Northern Ireland. Then there are the "Hunt" class frigates. They are called after various hunts in England, Scotland, Wales, and even Spain. The sporting knowledge of the Admiralty appears to be just as deficient as their geographical knowledge. The "Hunt" class frigates are destroyers which changed their name and are now called frigates. I do not put in the old corvettes which did such good work at the beginning of the last war, because I think that even the Parliamentary Secretary would admit that they are not going to be very much use in a future war against anything in the nature of the modern submarine.
How are we to meet the situation supposing we are faced with a substantial number of submarines of fast underwater speed? I do not really accuse the Parliamentary Secretary of complacency, but he did get a little bit near to it in describing the frigates, most of which cannot do more than 16 knots at the present time, as being useful vessels against the sort of submarine was we are likely to have to meet. No doubt if we were able to fight an anti-submarine war in the terms of the last submarine war, they would be most useful, but if we are facing an entirely new problem, I do not think that the class built as frigates would be of very much use. It is a different consideration with the old "Hunt" class destroyers. They are not quite fast enough and some of them are reported as being rather worn-out, but they certainly did an enormous amount of work during the last war.
I do not think that the position as regards our anti-submarine craft is one in which we can feel anything approaching complacency. I see that the Admiralty have taken two old fleet destroyers—the "Relentless" and the "Rocket"—as a sort of extremely new model sloop or frigate, but what surprises me is that they are getting rid of the other old fleet destroyers as fast as they can get anyone to take them. This is even more startling when one thinks of the Admiralty's policy with regard to merchant ships. The merchant ship owner is not allowed to sell his old ship in order to build a new one, and he cannot build a new one unless he does, because it may be needed in war. The Admiralty, who has a lot of old fleet destroyers which may be useful in war, are passing them on to Holland and Pakistan as fast as they can get rid of them. I think that is rather a dangerous policy.
I wonder whether anything has been evolved from experiments and trials with regard to the adaptation of ships which we now have. Fast diesels might produce the solution and give our ships a greater radius of action which the "Hunts" have not got. I wonder if researches into the potentialities of the gas-turbine are being continued. I know that they have been going on, but we did not hear anything, about them in the speech of the Parliamentary Secretary today. It would be rather interesting to hear whether they could be adapted to small craft which would give them the speed to catch a fast submarine.
I want to say a few words about minesweeping, because the mine—that most deadly weapon—has not been mentioned in debate up to now. We have only to look at the very large number of casualties which were caused by mines in both world wars at sea to see how important this is. It is a much simpler matter in one sense than dealing with the submarine. It involves, first, a means of sweeping that will deal with all the new fancy types of mines—the magnetic, the acoustic, and so on. They are much more difficult types than those in use in the old days. such as the moored contact mine.
Secondly, it seems to me to be largely a matter of organisation. The Admiralty should have earmarked a very large number of small craft, which would be required to do the sweeping if war were


to break out, and which could be quickly turned on to the job. Presumably, they would be trawlers for the most part, and the sweeping gear for all manner of mines should be readily at hand so that the whole organisation could be put into gear in a very short time, because nothing delays merchant traffic more effectively than channels fouled with mines. It delays the arrival of ships and it delays the turn-round. All I ask of the Parliamentary Secretary is that he should give us some assurance that mine-sweeping organisation is not being lost sight of, because it is vital.
I am in the position of having been successful in a legal lottery. The mover of an Amendment on these occasions is really the leader of a forlorn hope, because it is clear to him and to the House that if his Amendment is accepted it will lead to the most complete chaos. You, Sir, would not be able to leave the Chair, and perhaps even greater inconvenience would be caused to the Navy by the fact that the House could not vote the men or the money which it requires. I have brought up this subject in order that things which I think are most vital for the Navy today should be thoroughly investigated, and so that the Parliamentary Secretary may have an opportunity of telling us in more detail the measures which the Admiralty are taking to deal with them. Of course, he will refer to them within the proper limits of security, but I think that, subject to that, the House should be told as much as possible, because this is a matter of national insurance and is of the very greatest gravity.
In conclusion, I want to quote from the words of the First Lord, as he then was, summing-up the war at sea. Mr. A. V. Alexander, as he was at that time, now in another place, used these words:
It is highly significant that after the trouncing which the U-boats suffered in 1943, the enemy should consider it worth while to continue to devote so large a part of his resources to this form of warfare. It shows that he still considers it to be his best hope of averting defeat against a nation which lives by sea-borne supplies. This is a highly important fact which will, I trust, never be forgotten by future First Lords, future Boards of Admiralty, or future Governments, or by the people of this country."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th March, 1945; Vol. 408. c. 2058.]

7.11 p.m.

Mr. Maclay: I beg to second the Amendment so ably moved by the hon. Member for Londonderry (Sir R. Ross).
I think the whole House is grateful to the hon. Member for putting this Amendment on the Order Paper; and we are also extremely grateful to the laws of chance which, on this occasion, ordained that he had the opportunity to do so. He has covered some extremely important aspects of the whole question of under-water attack, and I do not think I shall be trespassing on the ground he has been over in what I have to say.
I always enter these discussions on Navy Estimates with some diffidence, because I do so as an amateur and from the merchant shipping angle. I must say, though, that diffidence has not prevented me from doing so on each successive occasion during the last five years. I have been encouraged in taking the risk of competing with experts by knowledge of the good relations which today exist betwen the Merchant Navy and the Royal Navy—the product of close and very gallant co-operation during the long years of dangerous war; a co-operation which has resulted in a high degree of mutual respect on both sides. I am also encouraged to enter these Debates because I know that today the shipping industry as a whole, and the Admiralty, and the Ministry of Transport where they are involved, enjoy a very useful and close relationship on all matters dealing with the defence of merchant shipping.
There is no need to remind this House at any time of the immense importance of the part played by the Merchant Navy in the two wars we have had to fight in this century. But I do think that from time to time it is necessary to recall the fantastic scale of loss suffered by merchant shipping in those two wars. At the outbreak of the 1914–18 war, the total merchant shipping of the world amounted to about 43 million gross tons. During that war, no less than 12½ million tons of Allied shipping were lost by enemy action—a very high proportion of the total available merchant fleet at the outbreak of the war. In 1939, the total of world merchant shipping had risen to 61 million gross tons. During the war, the losses of Allied shipping only—that is, British shipping, British Empire


the United States, of other Allied countries, and of those neutrals who were working in our cause—amounted to 21.1 million tons. That is a tremendous figure. It is also necessary to realise what a very large proportion of that loss was carried by the British Merchant Navy.
I apologise for giving all these figures, but I think it is good that they should be brought out from time to time. In the 1914–18 war, of the 12½ million tons lost, 7.7 million tons were British at British Empire owned. In the 1939–45 war, of the 21.1 million tons lost, no less than 11.4 million tons were British. In one month alone, November, 1942, almost half a million tons of British shipping was sunk. That was the worst month of the worst year of the war. That is a horrible memory for any of us who were working with statistics, or in any way connected with the problem of the availability of shipping to meet war needs.
It would be wrong to pass from these figures without recalling again and paying tribute to the memory of those members of the Merchant Navy who gave their lives in maintaining our vital lines of sea communication. The figures are really extraordinary. Out of an average seagoing force of about 180,000 officers and men, no fewer than 34,500 men were lost—very nearly one in five. That proportion is far in excess of the proportion in any other Service. I am subject to correction on this figure, and it is only to put these figures in proportion that I mention it, but I understand that for the Navy, with, possibly, an average force of about 500,000, the losses were 51,500. That shows the tremendous disparity in the losses of merchant seamen to the proportion of the total sea-going force. We owe it to the memory of these men, and to the vital importance of their task, to see that as long as there is risk of war every possible step, consistent with the nation's resources, is taken in time of peace to ensure that the most effective and modern measures are available for the defence of merchant shipping from the very outbreak of hostilities. That is the point which I mention with the greatest emphasis.
It may seem rather superfluous to talk like this this evening. We have had a most interesting and, if I may say so, excellent speech from the Parliamentary Secretary, who today gave us a lot of

information. In the Defence Debate last Thursday a great deal was said about under-water attack. I cannot help remembering, however, that in 1939, in spite of the lessons of the 1914–18 war, for one reason or another—I do not attempt to apportion the blame—we found ourselves hopelessly short of escort vessels. Those escort vessels, which were on the stocks, or in plan, were not suitable for the job they had to do; it cannot have been fully appreciated by the experts responsible in the years before 1939 just how the submarine menace would develop, and it was not until the middle of 1943 that we really began to be effective in our attack against submarines.
I have mentioned this before, but I must repeat it because it is so important to realise that the graph curve of sinkings only began to fall satisfactorily after there were enough escort vessels, not only to protect the convoys but to provide killer groups, to which reference has already been made. We must remember that lesson. I do not think there is a danger of forgetting this year or next year. There have been some excellent speeches on this subject, both last Thursday and today. There have been some very good maiden speeches, and I am delighted to find how many hon. Members are now acutely interested in this problem.
When I asked a question about the availability of escort ships some three years ago I got a very courteous reply from the Civil Lord, but it took 12 months to come; I only got it in the next Navy Estimates' Debate. Today, the hon. Member for Londonderry has mentioned the helicopter. I am very glad he did, because 12 months ago I asked a question about that which was not answered. I hope that the passage of 12 months, plus the hon. Member for Londonderry, will produce something for us about the helicopter tonight.
It is encouraging to realise that at this moment there is universal appreciation of the great importance of anti-submarine warfare and the absolute necessity of being ready to get our ships safely through. Do let us make certain that this is not forgotten. I am not frightened of its being forgotten this year or next year, but I am frightened of its being forgotten about 10, 15 or 20 years hence; that is what we have to watch, when those who had direct experience of this in the war


are perhaps no longer in the House of Commons, or at the Admiralty or the other Departments concerned.
I do not propose to attempt to deal with technical questions because I am incompetent to do so, and they have already been dealt with extremely well. What we need is a continuing assurance that every aspect of this problem is under earnest and active study. I will, however, submit one very amateur question to follow up the great emphasis which the hon. Member for Londonderry placed on the provision of fast submarines for practice purposes. It would comfort us a great deal if, without any breach of security, we could be told today that we have even one fast submarine suitable for practice purposes. It would be a great reassurance, and I cannot think that it would be a serious breach of security to give us that type of information.
The next point I would like to ask about is to what extent responsibility is under the control of the North Atlantic Defence Committee, not only for antisubmarine research and practice but for the whole convoy system in a possible future war? One remembers very clearly that the structure of convoys in the last war, in the North Atlantic particularly, was a composite one. British ships, and the Canadian and United States Navies were all involved. I did not quite understand from the Parliamentary Secretary's opening speech, though he did touch upon combined work, whether the whole question of convoy systems and of defence against underwater attack was a matter for bilateral or trilateral discussion among those nations, or whether they came under some sub-committee of the North Atlantic Defence Committee. It would be helpful to know whether a useful co-ordination is going on on this matter.
In the long run, during the last war extremely effective co-ordination was achieved, but I have memories, even from the sideline that I was on, of considerable difficulties in getting complete co-ordination, particularly in the North Atlantic. The subject becomes infinitely more complicated when we bring the air into it. Could we have information on that structure, also? How does Coastal Command link with the Naval Air Service? On the question of submarine detection I agree completely with the remark made

by the hon. and gallant Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey), in an interjection, that the real cure for the submarine menace must be to destroy them before they get near the convoys. That will be the responsibility of the air effort, to a very great extent.
I cannot believe that we can get really fast frigates to do the job without very skilled and careful air co-operation. It is always rather disturbing to come to this subject. We cannot expect representatives of the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Transport to attend all these Debates, but it would be most comforting if we could be informed that there is in existence effective liaison not only between Coastal Command and the Navy but between the British Forces and the North Atlantic defence Forces on this whole question of anti-submarine work, and that all branches of air co-operation are effectively linked to the structure.
I turn now to peace-time co-operation with the Merchant Navy but before I do so I would like to touch upon one very important part of the subject, the speed of merchant vessels. From time to time I think that people feel that shipowners are very slow in realising their responsibility in this matter. At the beginning of my speech I should have declared a certain interest, as I am a shipowner. In conformity with the usual rules of the House I should declare my interest—some of the older Members may have noticed it before. Experience of the war was that shortage of escort vessels not only imperilled the ships but, still worse, convoy sailing times had to be spread out widely. The work in which I was engaged brought me into very close touch with this matter. I knew only too well the problem of collecting ships, getting them loaded as fast as possible on the other side of the Atlantic, and then seeing them lie at the convoy assembly point for five, 10 or 12 days because the time between convoy railings was not short enough to keep them moving. It was very distressing. We need escort vessels not only for safety but, in larger numbers, to get the shortest possible sailing times. We want also the maximum number of fast convoys.
It must be realised that we cannot artificially increase the speed of merchant ships to provide a real answer to the submarine menace. It would be a help if we could deliberately speed up our


ships, but I think the Parliamentary Secretary would agree, from his experience in his former office, that there is a limit to what can reasonably be done about the speed of merchant ships. It is determined by the economic speed at which goods can be carried in any particular period of history. Fortunately, the tendency is always to greater speed, but it is surprising how slowly that speed rises. In the case of tramp ships carrying bulk cargoes the economic speed has risen in the last 50 years only from seven to about 10 or 11 knots, that is, coal and oil fired steamers, and possibly to 12½ knots in the case of diesel ships. The cargo liner is increasing its speed faster than that. It is not unusual for good cargo liners to make 15, 16 or 17 knots. The more we have of those vessels the simpler becomes the problem of convoys.
I would remind hon. Members that, if war breaks out, every available ship on which we can lay our hands will be raked in to do a job. We will always have some old, slow ships to reckon with. There must always be a timelag in increasing the average speed of merchant vessels. I do not feel that the deliberate raising of the speed of merchant ships solely for the purpose of Defence provides any satisfactory answer. We could never compete with the really fast submarine which is being evolved. But we can help, and the process is continuing.
In connection with organisation problems there is still in existence a division of the Admiralty which was an invaluable link between merchant shipping and the Navy in time of war. I hope that when the Minister replies he will tell us that it is Admiralty policy to keep the trade division in existence permanently in the Admiralty. At the present, a most excellent relationship exists between that department and the shipping industry. The House would be comforted to know that that division will continue even if it must be on a reduced basis. There is another body called the Shipping Defence Advisory Committee. It was brought into existence before the last war. It did very valuable work in the two years before 1939. Could we be assured that that body will also be permanent. It is most valuable that there should be regular consultations upon technical points of construction, where the Admiralty can tell shipowners what might be done to make their ships more readily

useful in time of war and the technical shipping staffs are telling the Admiralty what is practicable. I hope that we shall get an assurance that the Committee will continue.
Another very useful innovation, which, I think, arose since the war, is what I believe are known as "Trade Week" courses at the Royal Naval Staff College at Greenwich. One or two of these have been held, and shipowners and their staffs have been invited to attend. We hope that this will go on, because the work is very valuable. I should like to know if an approach has been made to the Admiralty, as it may have been, to see whether the facilities could be extended to Merchant Navy officers. It would be a very useful method of maintaining the very close link between the Merchant Navy and the Royal Navy which we must have in peace as well as in war.
Suggestions will come up from time to time for the improvement of facilities for merchant seamen and Merchant Navy officers to see something of the development of naval work when their ships are in port. It is a complicated job to work this out, but there is immense good will in the shipping industry towards something effective being done to continue, in peace time, the war-time collaboration between owners and the Admiralty, and between Merchant Navy officers and men and naval officers and ratings I feel certain that these matters will be considered sympathetically. It would be very helpful if we could know whether there is a real prospect of active encouragement being given by the Admiralty for any such schemes.
That is all I want to try to cover. A large number of questions are involved and I hope that the answers to some of them will be forthcoming tonight, some, perhaps, with the 12 months' lapse to which I have become accustomed. Before sitting down I apologise to the hon. and gallant Member for Hull, East for not, within the terms of the Amendment I am seconding, being able to pursue his very interesting remarks, which I am sorry I was discourteous enough to interrupt.

7.31 p.m.

Mr. Shackleton: I am sure the House is gratified at the performance of the hon. Baronet the Member for Londonderry (Sir R. Ross) who
represents H.M.S. "Sea Eagle." It is an establishment with which I was closely connected during the war when it was at "Maydown." I listened to his speech with great interest, and I was also interested in the speech of the hon. Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Maclay) if only because I should like to congratulate the Liberal National Party on the magnificent turn-out which they always have on these occasions to produce a House for their own Members.
I make no apology for intervening in the Debate as an airman. I am glad to see that there is another representative from Coastal Command in the House. I think it is time that the Air Force took a part in the naval Debates. It is not simply the case that we have suffered long from the threat, so often expressed, that the Navy would take over Coastal Command, nor do we wish to retaliate by suggesting that the Air Force should take over the Navy. The announcement today about the Royal Marines leaving their headquarters at Chatham prompts me to say that there would always be a home for them in the Royal Air Force Regiment, which, with its long tradition, would be glad to be associated with that fine corps, the Royal Marines.
I want to refer to one or two points, and in particular I want to take my text from the statement made by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty. He made a statement which, to me, was very significant when he said that the U-Boat menace in 1943 was broken by the escort groups. I do not want to take a purely Air Force partisan point of view, but I believe that statement to be symptomatic of a weakness in naval outlook, a weakness from which the Air Force may suffer also. The U-boat menace was broken by the Navy and by the Royal Air Force. The figures show that during the war 56 per cent. of all German U-boats were sunk by aircraft, 49 per cent. of them by land-based aircraft. That leads me not to suggest that the Air Force is the answer in the future, but to say that I believe that situation is infinitely more dangerous today because the Air Force has lost the extremely offensive power which it developed in the latter part of the war. In 1943 and 1944, and particularly in 1943, the great majority of U-boat kills were achieved by aircraft, and later on

an admirable co-operation was worked out between escort groups—particularly in the Bay of Biscay—and the killer groups which came down and co-operated with the Air Force. I believe that the problem is not yet solved. It is a very difficult one. I shall not be able to contribute anything very hopeful in what I have to say, but I think that we must look at the problem.
First of all—I am sure he will forgive me for saying this—I do not accept the figures given by the hon. Member for Londonderry about the strength of foreign submarine forces. I do not believe that we in this House know. None the less. one thing is certain, and that is that there have been, and there were at the very end of the war, radical developments in submarines which, if the war had gone on long enough, might have put us back into the position we were in in 1942. The actual number of new German U-boats at sea by the end of the war was negligible. There was not one of type 21. I believe there were one or two of type 23, which were small and relatively slow versions of the new type U-boat.

Sir R. Ross: If the hon. Member will read the end of "The Battle of the Atlantic," the official account, he will find it stated that it was one of the vessels with fast submerged speed which sank the two ships off May Island.

Mr. Shackleton: I do not want to make a point of it, but they were type 23. They were small ones and were not so fast. They belonged to the new type of fast battery vessel but were not the really dangerous ones, the type 21 vessels, which are very much faster. The type 21 is a long-range fast battery submarine.
I tend to agree with the account given by the Minister of the different types of submarines. There is what is called "the standard type." We have to expect that in future all standard types will be Snorkel-equipped, or "Snort" as the hon. Member for Londonderry prefers. We used all versions during the war. Whatever happens they will present a real problem from the point of view of sinking by the Air Force. During the latter part of the war we sank comparatively few except in special circumstances. The House may remember that the Germans threw their U-boats into the defence of the then Western Europe from the in


vasion which was coming across the Channel, and they were thus operating in narrow waters in the Channel and round the coast, and even in spite of Snorkel equipment it was possible to hunt them to exhaustion with our escort vessels and aircraft. There were a large number of kills of this type of U-boat.
However, during the main part of the U-boat war and during the attack on our Atlantic communications the best and most useful activity of the Air Force was in patrolling the lanes through which the U-boats had to passage, because the U-boats were compelled to come up to the surface at regular intervals in order to charge their batteries until such time as they were equipped with Snorkel. It cannot be too frequently emphasised that the submarine was not a true submarine in the early part of the war. It was a vessel which could submerge when necessary. The introduction of Snorkel and the new type of U-boat produced a genuine submarine.
The new type of submarine which may be a real menace is the high-speed battery type. It will have not only greater speed on passage but will be able to produce that necessary burst of comparatively higher speed during the period of attack. It will be able to produce this speed during a period when it is itself being attacked. I do not believe that we had in the Air Force at the end of the war or that we have now the weapons to deal with it. The most modernistic of all the types of U-boats which the Germans were developing, one with a special type of propulsion—I do not know how far we can go on talking about it—also suffers from real disadvantages because it means that in addition to its special closed cycle engine, it has to carry batteries and diesels as well to help it through on passage and it will thus be very much slower on passage. Therefore, for the present anyway, we have to think mainly about the fast battery type of submarine.
The instruments available to the Navy and the Air Force are basically the same as we had during the war. They are escort vessels and very long-range aircraft. I make no criticism of the Admiralty or the Air Force for not having large numbers of them, but I fear that we have only a small number of very long-range aircraft. I am pleased to see

that the Admiralty have put away their battleships and have treated them with dry air and are now concentrating on small vessels. It is just as necessary for a determined effort to be made by the Air Force to co-operate in solving this problem.
This brings me to a subject which has cropped up previously in Debates, the instrument known as the sonobuoy. We had this in the latter part of the war. It was difficult to use. The principle was that buoys with a radio transmitter were dropped. The hydrophone attached to the buoy picked up the sound of the submarine and it was heard in the aircraft—where one was also liable to hear the noise of fishes which barked or made a noise like a submarine and even fishes that made a noise like a submarine breaking up. And even when a submarine had been located satisfactorily, what was the aircraft to do about it?
The Parliamentary Secretary has spoken about homing torpedoes. We waited for that type of torpedo throughout the war, but we never saw it in satisfactory form. It may theoretically provide the answer but not, I believe, to the fast submarine. I am not enough of a technician to know how far a homing torpedo can operate, but if it is dependent on exceedingly delicate detection devices, the high speed will possibly neutralise its homing effectiveness.
I believe that the rôle of the aircraft and of the sonobuoy will be to provide barriers. Possibly there can be sonobuoy barriers which can be laid by ships that will report the presence of a submarine, but without escort groups and killer groups aircraft will not be able to do the job that they did in the last war. It hurts me to say that, because I believe that in the later stages of the war the Air Force was the decisive instrument in meeting the U-boat. We must put a tremendous amount of energy into solving this problem. There are some encouraging signs. The joint anti-U-boat school was one of the best pieces of air-naval co-operation to be found anywhere and I am sure it is still so today.
I think, though, that we have to see that the Navy and the Air Force are mixed up a great deal more than they have been in the past. I repeat what I said in the Debate on the Air Estimates,


that there should be more exchange between the two Services, just as was suggested for the Merchant Navy. There should be more opportunity on an Air Force station of seeing a naval officer or a seaman or somebody in dark blue and asking them questions in order to find out how their minds work. We lacked that during the last war.
I would like to see fewer large carriers and the entire strength of the Navy put into the smallest possible carriers on the principle that they will be less vulnerable. It is better to have a lot of penny packets that can put up aircraft than a few big ones which might be put out of action more easily. I am sure that the support groups with an improved type of killer craft are what the Navy should concentrate on today, since this is the main rôle of the Navy. I have made speeches in the past, criticising the Navy for hanging on to battleships. While I do not claim the credit for these having been put into reserve, I am glad this has been done because, unless this submarine problem is tackled, we may find ourselves in a most vulnerable position in the event of a war.
Now that there is a new Chief of Air Staff at the Air Ministry—Sir John Slessor, who was a brilliant Commander-in-Chief of Coastal Command—I would like to see a new effort made. I do not say this in criticism of his predecessor. There are consultations going on all the time to get the Air Force to take more part in this matter, but it is difficult to get the Air Ministry and the Air Force to think in terms of the sea. It would be no solution for the Navy to create its own purely Naval Air Force because, for tactical reasons, for reasons of reinforcement, and so on, there are grave objections. At the same time, the Air Force must be prepared to play a bigger part in this matter. It may even be necessary to see a maritime command set up in the Air Ministry.
The principle in the Air Force has always been to have theatre commanders such as Coastal Command or East Africa, while in the Air Ministry there have been merely directorates. That is different from the Admiralty system whereby the Admiralty keeps a much closer control over the tactics used and over the operations in any one area. I

am not suggesting that it is desirable for the Air Ministry to issue the detailed orders, but there should be something in the Air Ministry of a higher standing than we have at the moment in order to provide this greater emphasis and support for co-operation with the Navy in What may, in the event of a war, be one of our most serious threats.

7.47 p.m.

Major Cundiff: I am sure that hon. Members on both sides of the House welcome the opportunity to debate defence against under-water attack. It is a special privilege for those of us who have been intimately, but not always pleasantly, associated with this form of warfare. Of all the hazards which have faced this country in two world wars no single hazard has ever brought us nearer to complete disaster and defeat than the U-boat attacks on our merchant shipping and on our sea lines of communication. If, in our Debate today, we are to evaluate the density of this potential danger in a new war, we must appreciate the power and the offensive armament of the modern submarine. I should like to deal with this question in some detail, and if, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I appear to stray a little into technicalities, I hope you will not consider the subject matter of my speech to be irrelevant to our Debate.
May I begin by very briefly tracing the history and development of the submarine? By 1912 both we and the Germans had produced a reasonably sound hull. Submarines were not a popular service with the Germans, however, and further, they very rarely sat aboard their ships. In 1913 six U-boats were sent out into the North Sea and stayed there a week. During that period they weathered a north-westerly gale, and on their return to port the German Admiralty were quite satisfied with the sea-going qualities of their submarine hulls.
On 6th August, 1914, after war had broken out, 12 German U-boats left for a routine patrol. One of these was sunk by our light cruiser "Birmingham" and another was sunk when diving; we on our side suffered the loss of H.M.S. "Pathfinder," which was the very first warship to be sunk by a torpedo fired from a submarine. It was on 22nd


September, however, that something happened which really encouraged the German Admiralty to develop this new weapon. For three days the weather in the North Sea had been very bad. At that time we had three old cruisers on patrol—the "Aboukir," the "Hogue," and the "Cressy." Because of weather conditions, the flotilla screen had been withdrawn to Harwich. Those three old cruisers, manned mostly by Reservists, were sighted by a German U-boat, the U.9, which got into position and torpedoed the "Aboukir." Unfortunately, the other two cruisers which were left closed in on their stricken sister ship; the submarine once again got into position, with the result that the three cruisers were lost and out of 2,200 personnel, the total complement of the three ships, we lost about 1,400 men.
As the war progressed, the U-boats developed in power. We, on our side, developed the convoy system and depth charge attacks, and we had some success with our "Q" ships. Very much the same thing happened in the Second World War, except that we found a vastly improved U-boat. On the other hand, and to our credit, we had developed the Asdic apparatus, which detects and locates submarines.
My hon. Friend the Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Maclay), has mentioned the question of merchant ship losses. I hope he will forgive me if I add further to the information he has already given to the House. The First World War spread over a period of 51 months. Our actual losses in ships were 4,837 vessels, which equals an average of almost 95 ships per month, of an average tonnage of 2,300. In the Second World War, over a period of 68 months, we lost 2,775 vessels, or an average of 41 per month. The average tonnage per vessel lost was 5,250. On the other side of the balance sheet, in the First World War we sank 178 U-boats, which averaged 3½ per month. In the Second World War we sank 780 U-boats, or an average of about 11½ per month.
I should now like to give the House some information on the latest type of German submarine engine. At this point I must declare my interest in the manufacture of marine diesel engines. When I refer to the "latest type" I mean the latest type that was produced up to

1945. I think that this is very relevant because of all that has been said today about surface speeds. The latest type of engine is a six-cylinder, four-stroke unit, which is run at a conservative speed of 525 revolutions per minute. It is supercharged on the principle of the gas turbine, the supercharged unit running at a rate of 12,000 revolutions per minute. At that speed it delivers to the engine 5,500 cubic feet of air per minute. The weight of the engine is approximately 18 tons and its power output, at its normal revolutions, is 2,000 horse power. Two of these engines are normally fitted into a submarine. A submarine of 1,000 tons displacement, with 4,000 horse power, will, therefore, yield 4 horse power per ton displacement, which is a very generous power factor. I can assure the Parliamentary Secretary that with certain types of hulls very high surface speeds can be obtained.
Mention has already been made of the Snorkel apparatus. This is a device whereby the vessel can remain submerged, but is built to run on its main diesel engines. I do not think we have seen the last of the development of engine power. A good deal has been said today about boosted batteries. It may be that in future submarines will carry a certain amount of liquid air, which can be used to aspirate engines for very short bursts at maximum speed. This means that when a submarine is very much lower in the water than it would be when working with its Snorkel apparatus it would still have this very great burst of speed for a limited time, in order to escape from a dangerous situation.
The question of higher surface and submerged speeds must alter the whole picture of anti-submarine defence, and I ask the Government not to be too confident with the results obtained from the frigates which are at present in service with the Royal Navy. From the point of view of ocean escorts and ocean convoys, we must forget all about 25-knot frigates and think, instead, in terms of 35-knot vessels. No good purpose will be served by discussing further technicalities regarding new types of missiles and offensive armament. I understand that very great research is now being conducted in this sphere, and I plead with the Government to he most generous and to realise that whatever money is spent on anti-sub-


marine defence is very much in the national interest.
I wish to say something about escape apparatus and submarine salvage. During wartime we expect casualties and great grief is brought to many homes but, somehow, when something goes wrong in peace-time, it seems to be a double blow. We think now of the sinking of the "Thetis" in Liverpool Bay and, more recently, the tragedy of His Majesty's submarine "Truculent." When these accidents happen, responsible senior officers search their hearts and inquire if anything can be done, or if anything has been left undone.
With very great humility, I make two suggestions. I understand that the submarines at present in service are carrying sufficient escape apparatus for every member of the crew, but in an emergency, when an order is suddenly given to close watertight doors, men may find themselves isolated in particular compartments, where there is not enough escape apparatus available. I suggest that an excess quantity of apparatus should be carried. But it is no use carrying it if, when watertight doors are closed, there are no escape points by which the men can leave the vessel. Therefore, I also suggest that in future naval construction most serious consideration should be given to the question of more points of escape in the submarine hull.
Surely it is within the capability of designers and engineers to see that when a submarine hull is constructed it should, without the loss of very much speed and water friction, have incorporated either wings or ramps of some kind so that if by any chance that vessel should sink there is a possibility, if suitable vessels can be on the spot in sufficient time, that a quick hawser attachment can be effected and the vessel can be brought to the surface. I know this would involve very considerable expense and would mean that at least two salvage vessels would have to be more or less constantly "on tap" at each submarine school. I make this plea because officers and ratings in the submarine service are picked men. They have a very high sense of responsibility, and always show great devotion to duty. The least we can do is everything possible to safeguard and preserve their welfare.

8.5 p.m.

Commander Galbraith: I am certain the whole House joins with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Withington (Major Cundiff) in his concern at the great tragedy of submarine disasters in times of peace. This is something very close to the heart of every hon. Member and much sympathy goes out to all the relatives of those who have met their deaths in that way. I am certain my hon. and gallant Friend can rest assured that the Admiralty take every possible step to see that means of escape are available in those circumstances.
Like my hon. Friend the Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Maclay), I am sure hon. Members in all parts of the House are very grateful to the hon. Baronet the Member for Londonderry (Sir R. Ross) for using the opportunity afforded him by his success in the ballot to enable us to have what I would call this concentrated discussion on what is one of the most difficult and certainly one of the most vital problems of naval defence at present. I suggest that if we are to get the various parts of this problem into proper perspective, we have to consider from whence the attack is likely to come.
In opening this discussion my hon. Friend said that he would use Russia as the yardstick. I think there can be no further answer to the question than that. The naval Powers that remain after the recent war are few in number and all are our close and intimate friends and allies, with the one exception he mentioned. The nature and weight of attack which Russia could perhaps mount against us is bound to determine in what proportion we allocate the resources which are availlable to us to meet any such attack. The Parliamentary Secretary reminded us of something which I hope we in this House never forget for one moment—that the chief responsibility of the Navy is to maintain our lines of communication across the sea so that they are always available to our trade and commerce.
Tonight we are concerned in this Debate with underwater attack and I would remind the House that that type of attack can be made not only from ships on the surface or from ships under the sea, but also from the air If by any chance we should find Russia as our


aggressor, I think it is very doubtful that she would stage any attack by land planes, or yet by carrier-borne aircraft. The difficulties of her situation, unless she had entered into large areas of Europe she does not at the moment possess, would be very great. In so far as attack by land-based machines is concerned, they would have to fly over territory either in our possession, or in the possession of our allies, when it would be easy to intercept them. Attack by carrier-borne planes seems equally unlikely. We do not know in the first instance that Russia has any carriers which she could use for this purpose and there would be very great difficulty in their breaking out into the open sea.
Underwater attack could also be made by surface ships but here again we do not know whether Russia has any ships suitable for that purpose and there is the difficulty of breaking through and maintaining those ships if they got out on to the high seas. German experience in that matter suggests that the game would not be worth the candle. I mention these matters because we must keep them in mind. A serious attack might be staged at some future date both from the air and from surface craft. That leaves us to concentrate attention on the mine and on the submarine. No one has denied, or sought to deny, during the course of this Debate that attack by mine is a very serious menace, but it is one, fortunately, which for the most part can only occur in certain localities where there are narrow channels, in the vicinity of ports, or at focal points on the trade routes; where the depth of water is not too great and where there is a very considerable volume of shipping passing to and fro. It seems to me that the problem of the mine is not an insuperable problem. It is one that will no doubt be dealt with in the future, as it was indeed dealt with in the past, by calling on those same virtues of patience, perseverance, skill, endurance, energy and courage which were such predominating features of our mine-sweeping services during both the wars.
By far the most serious underwater attack is that delivered by the submarine using the torpedo as its weapon, and I was glad indeed to learn from the speech of the hon. Gentleman that a major por-

tion of our research is being directed to finding new means of defeating that particular form of attack. It is, of course, a type of attack with which the Royal Navy is very familiar and of which it has a very great deal of experience. It is also one to which it has, at least, found a partial solution in both the wars. That solution depended on the convoy system, escorted by ships equipped with anti-submarine weapons and detective apparatus and also having a speed sufficient to enable them to gain a position from which they could launch an attack against the submarine, with a reasonable prospect of success.
In addition, in the escort there were included escort carriers with their aircraft, which greatly increased the efficiency of the escort as a whole. Further, there were the anti-submarine patrols constantly flown over large areas of the surface of the sea by shore-based aircraft of Coastal Command. These patrols not only detected submarines when they were on the surface, but also brought them to action when opportunity offered, and on numerous occasions succeeded in destroying them. While each of these methods of detecting and bringing submarines to action is still of value, each one of them has lost, to a greater or lesser extent, a measure of its effectiveness in consequence of the developments that have taken place in submarines.
We have been told in the course of the Debate what these developments have been—the increase in speed and the fact that it is no longer essential for submarines to come to the surface at all. These developments have undoubtedly created for the Navy very great new problems. The power to remain submerged would seem greatly to reduce the chance of discovering, harassing and indeed destroying submarines while on passage from their base to their hunting grounds. That process, through its effect on the morale of the submarine's crew, had its bearing on the submarine's subsequent efficiency, which made a very large contribution to our success in the Battle of the Atlantic. I gladly pay that tribute in view of the observations of the hon. Member for Preston, South.
I do not know whether this may call for some reconsideration of the usefulness of Coastal Command's anti-sub-


marine measures, for seemingly the power of the submarine to remain submerged very greatly reduces the possibility, not only of detecting her by visual means, but also of detecting her by radar, and that may well be one of the causes submarines came close inshore towards the end of the war.
The greater submerged speed of a submarine undoubtedly facilitates her gaining a favourable position from which to deliver an attack, and makes it much more difficult for escort vessels or hunting groups to make and keep contact with her while attacking her in turn. I do not think it is too much to say that submarines with a speed of 17 knots, even if only for a limited period of time, far less a speed of 20 to 25 knots claimed in some quarters, renders our existing escort vessels and those of the hunting groups employed in the last war obsolete to a very large extent. The Parliamentary Secretary said he did not agree with that. He assumes that we still have to deal with the conventional type of submarine, and that assumption may or may not be justified, but, certainly, it is an assumption which cannot last for very much longer.
I do not deny that the old type of escort vessel may by chance be given the opportunity of delivering an attack, but if that attack is unsuccessful it would seem to me that she has not got the speed to permit her to follow it up and renew the attack. When one reflects on the number of attacks which on the average were required during the last war to secure a kill, it seems to me that existing antisubmarine vessels would have little chance of achieving that most desirable result against the modern type of submarine of which we have recently heard. It is probable that we must take into account not only developments in the submarine itself, but also developments in the weapon which she uses—the torpedo.
I have heard rumours about the very greatly increased efficiency of torpedoes and of the increased accuracy which they now possess, and, if these things are true, then taken together with the improvements which have taken place in the submarine, it makes her an even more formidable opponent than she has hitherto been. With reference to the hon. Gentleman's remarks about the homing torpedo, I do not think we should forget that that

type may be even more valuable to the submarine than it is to the hunting group. Remembering how very narrow was the margin of safety in 1917, and again in 1942–43, one realises that it is absolutely vital that the Navy should be equipped with every modern device which will enable it to meet and repel a submarine attack on the grand scale against our shipping.
What counter-measures are available to us? There are those who have advocated that the air can provide the answer to the submarine, and there was one hon. Member who made that statement in the Debate on the Air Estimates yesterday. If I remember rightly, that was a view which was very widely held in the United State before she entered the war on 7th December, 1941. It was a view which, because of the tremendous losses suffered by shipping in American waters in the early months of 1942, did not long prevail. Not only did these losses do much to dispel that view, but they induced the Americans to take up with great vigour the approved methods of convoy with surface anti-submarine escorts. Today, it would appear that the United States Navy is not very much impressed by the protection which can be given by the air against submarines. At least, that is the inference which I draw from the testimony given by the United States Deputy Chief of Naval Operations before the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives, which "The Times" of 17th March briefly summarised in these words:
The United States Navy is to make sharp reductions in its air strength in order to concentrate on counter-measures against submarines.
It does not, then, seem likely that the air can supply a complete answer, and it would appear that we are thrown back on the old methods of convoy, with surface escort, hunting groups and such cooperation from the air as in the new circumstances is justified by results. I am glad indeed that the Admiralty research people are busy on that problem. Surely, if these methods are to be effective against the new type of submarine, the vessels we employ for this purpose must be much faster than they are at present. It seems to me—I do not know myself, but perhaps the hon. Gentleman will tell us—that these faster ships are going to require either a new detective


device or new type of Asdic, because the present type seemingly cannot maintain contact with the submarine when the attacking ship is moving at these high speeds which now appear to be essential. I hope, if an instrument for this purpose has not yet been perfected, that those responsible for research are working on it, and are not giving all their attention to matters connected with atomic energy, which, so far as I can see, and so far as the Navy is concerned, are unlikely to be used to any great extent for some years, at least until there are large stocks of that energy accumulated by foreign Powers.
The hon. Member for Londonderry (Sir R. Ross) said that we needed faster killer ships. I wonder where those faster ships are going to come from. In his statement the First Lord spoke of two destroyers of war-time construction which were to be taken in hand in this financial year for conversion to anti-submarine frigates, and we understand that another three are to be taken in hand during the next financial year. Nothing has been said about the success of this conversion. Presumably, it has been a success, as otherwise we would not be going on with another three. Perhaps, the hon. Gentleman would tell us something about this when he replies.
I should like to know something further on the matter. How many of our 120-odd destroyers can we spare for this purpose; how long, in a case of emergency, is it going to take to convert them into antisubmarine craft, and how many fast frigates does the Admiralty think it necessary to provide for the protection of our trade against submarine attack? These are questions which immediately come to mind when one considers this matter, and which I hope the hon. Gentleman may see his way to answer. When one realises that not more than five of these converted vessels will be available by the end of this year, and that, apart from these, the First Lord expects to lay down only two new escorts, I submit to the House that there is some cause for a certain measure of uneasiness which is certainly not decreased by the Parliamentary Secretary's statement to us today that these new frigates and converted ships are necessary to hunt the fast battery drive submarines. We have always to keep in mind in these days that war comes very suddenly, and

immediately it comes the Navy has to go into action, and if it is not prepared to meet all contingencies then disaster may well overtake us. I would stress that in support of the remarks made by my hon. Friend the Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Maclay) in regard to the losses of men and tonnage which occurred in the last two wars.
My uneasiness is not diminished either by the knowledge that Russia now possesses the atom bomb, and that if it is her insane intention to provoke another war, a deficiency in that connection need no longer hold her back, or hold her back for very long. My uneasiness is also not diminished by the frequent references in the Press and in technical journals to the Russian submarine fleet. It is supposed in some quarters to be modern in construction. It is supposed to be hundreds strong, as we have been told in the course of the present Debate, and either to be in being at this moment or in the course of development.
Of course, we in this House simply do not know the truth of these matters; we cannot know them. It is possible that the Government may know them, but whether they are true or not, it is the duty of the Government to see that the Navy is equipped and capable of protecting in every circumstance the shipping of this country upon which the life of the nation depends. On the other hand, I feel it is the duty of hon. Members of this House to call attention to any seeming deficiencies in our defence and to require from the Government the most categorical assurances. In drawing the attention of the House to this vital matter, the hon. Baronet and those who have spoken in this Debate have played their part. May we find when the hon. Gentleman has concluded his reply, that the Government have also done their duty, and may we be able to agree with the hon. Gentleman—and that without any reservation whatsoever—that the Navy today is ready and capable of meeting every call that may be made upon it.

8.25 p.m.

Mr. Callaghan: The Member who stands at the Despatch Box to reply for the Government to an Amendment of this sort is always very conscious that there are others to follow, and he has to balance his time between the task of replying in a proper manner to the points raised and
in sitting down as quickly as he can so that those who wish to speak after him will not have to suffer the pangs of listening to him knowing that they have still a speech to get off their chests.
I labour under two other difficulties. I have not yet properly got my sea legs, and I am not sure that I could reply to all the questions asked if pressed to do so. We have had a very penetrating discussion, and one which would soon find its way through my defences if hon. Members really pushed their points. I am also up against the security difficulty, although I want to say at once that I do not wish to shelter my lack of knowledge behind that sort of thing, but it is a very real difficulty of which I am conscious. I would therefore like to say that I will have all the speeches which have been made examined and the points to which I do not reply now, I will, if I may, with hon. Members' permission, reply to by letter during the next few days.
I think that the discussion we have had has been extremely valuable. The hon. Member for Londonderry (Sir R. Ross) knew what he was doing. He focused his Amendment, instead of listening to the sort of thing the Whips would have him put down, on the real problem, and there is no doubt that what he said was extremely pertinent to the problems which the Navy is trying to solve at present. I thought that his speech and that of the hon. Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Maclay), as well as that of the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok (Commander Galbraith) really got down to the meat of the discussion.
May I make it quite clear, in case I was not clear before, what I wanted to say about our existing fleet of escort vessels? It has been said that they are largely obsolete, and that was the phrase to which I was directing my attention this afternoon. It is rather like my neighbour saying to me that my pair of shears for cutting my hedge are obsolete because nowadays the job is done with electric cutters. That may be true, but there are still far more shears than electric cutters. What I was trying to convey was that the existing fleet of escort vessels, of whatever description, can, in fact, probably cope with the sort of submarine fleet with which we might have to deal if trouble overtook us now. I agree with the hon.
and gallant Gentleman that that is the situation today and not the situation in which we may find ourselves in two, three, four or five years' time. To that extent, therefore, our existing fleet of escort vessels is an asset of diminishing value.
I wish only to re-emphasise that point because I do not disagree with anything which the hon. and gallant Gentleman said, but I think it would create a wrong impression if we were to write-off the very fine bunch of 120 escort vessels which we have and which would perform a very important function at present. I was asked particularly by the hon. Member for Londonderry, and also by the hon. Member for. Renfrew, West, about air-sea co-operation. We recognise the extreme importance of this. Indeed, at Londonderry the hon. Member has a living example of it. There is a force there which is under the combined directorship of a captain R.N. and a group-captain R.A.F., and that establishment is working in perfect harmony and co-operation at what we might call the operational training level.
At the top level, the most important piece of machinery for ensuring proper co-operation is the Joint Sea-Air Warfare Committee and its sub-committees. Naval strategy is the responsibility of the Admiralty, and air strategy the responsibility of the Air Council, but naval-air strategy is the responsibility of this joint committee, which operates directly under the Chiefs of Staff Committee. That is the sort of machinery that should exist for this purpose, and I am assured that it is working well and is likely to prove its worth. In addition, there is a naval staff representative who sits in the Air Ministry. His opposite sits in the Admiralty so that each may acquaint himself with what is going on and so that they keep one another and their respective Ministries in the picture.
The hon. Member for Londonderry asks whether naval policy is sympathetic to the idea of devoting naval aviation's time to anti-submarine warfare. I am told that we are, and that our present efforts are devoted in a large measure to this end. The new G.R.17 is one of the practical exemplifications of our interest in this particular matter. The hon. Member for Renfrew, West, asked about helicopters. I cannot go very far


in reply, and I am sorry to disappoint him. The naval staff are hopeful. Experimental work is going on and helicopters have not been forgotten. They have obvious uses for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communication, and perhaps for other purposes.
Then we come to the question of what submarines we have got, and whether we have fast submarines for anti-submarine work. We are converting some submarines to fast battery drive. That is being done for training purposes, but I do not deny that they would have an operational value; indeed, I am glad to think that they might have, if the need came. In addition, two new type submarines are about to be constructed. The design is complete and they will be laid down shortly. Primarily, they will be devoted to training in anti-submarine work. I fear that is as far as I can go on that subject today. The hon. Member for Renfrew, West, also asked about the Trade Division and the Shipping Defence Advisory Committee. There is no intention of abolishing this Division, and no prospect of that in mind. I cannot give an assurance for all time. New circumstances might arise to lead us to want to alter our minds, but I agree with him that they serve an extremely valuable and useful purpose.
I am told that minesweepers of various types are in commission, as, indeed, the explanatory Statement on the Navy Estimates shows. An experimental minesweeping flotilla is to be commissioned this year, principally for investigating methods of sweeping mines that do not respond to orthodox methods. Some hon. Members will know what is concealed behind that phrase. I am told that this flotilla is designed specifically for that purpose. New gear is in existence and sea trials are also to be carried out by an experimental flotilla. I think that is a thing to which a great deal of attention will have to be devoted in the coming years.
My hon. Friend the Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) and the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Manchester, Withington (Major Cundiff) were both well-informed upon a number of points, to which we must pay attention, as we shall. A most penetrating question was put by the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for

Glasgow, Pollok, who asked what force we consider essential adequately to safeguard our trade routes. I do not know it he thought that I was a "new boy" and that he could therefore bait that hook. I am sorry, but I cannot bite it tonight. I fear that I would be going far beyond my responsibilities if I were to do so. I should just like to say this, which is so obviously true. Clearly, the Navy is not getting enough money. No Service Department ever does get enough money to do the job as it would like to do it. If there were more money there would be more frigates and destroyers. On the other hand, the Services have to recognise that they can take only a limited proportion of the budget. Within that limit the Admiralty are devoting as high a proportion as they can to the various means of development that lie to their hands.
As Financial Secretary I understand that I have a responsibility, from about September to February, of having frequent meetings at which are examined all the Estimates before they come here. So perhaps next year I shall know a little more about them, assuming I am still here. In that connection it will be my duty, as delegated to me by the First Lord, to see that we get the maximum amount possible devoted to production—and moreover, just as important, that we get a proper balance between the various types of production. That is something that I have already asked questions about, and I trust that I shall be able to probe it a little more fully during the months that lie ahead. I hope I have answered the main questions which were put to me. I will answer the others, if I am permitted to do so, by means of correspondence later.

Sir R. Ross: As I am somewhat, though not entirely, reassured, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question again proposed.

8.37 p.m.

Commander Maitland: I should like to bring the Debate back to its main course. I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty will forgive me if I do not follow him in the speech which he has just made, but I should like to make certain references to the


speech he made at the beginning of this Debate. First, however, I want to refer to something which the hon. Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu) mentioned; and I believe other hon. Members referred to it as well. It is the question of the committee which is dealing with the planning of the internal arrangements of ships to make them more comfortable.
I do not think this is the first time that that this has been tried, and I warn the Parliamentary Secretary who is now in his virgin moments, that what he has to look out for is the first big refit that a ship has, because that is when the damage is done. That is when some new, clever and vital scientific machine is dumped into the middle of the one place where he does not want it—into the middle of the only comfortable mess deck on the ship, and nothing will induce the experts to take it away. I warn him not to put too much faith in this committee which is going to arrange everything beautifully in the beginning, but to energise it into keeping a watch on what happens when a ship goes in for its first big refit.
I should like to ask two questions which may have perfectly good answers, but which have been worrying me a little. I refer to the continuity of Admiralty policy as we have seen it between this year and last year. It worries me a little that we are alternating in the number of National Service men that we are taking in. I do not think we should ever adjust these numbers as a means of economy. For one reason—and I have had experience of this—the pressure on an already attenuated training service must be acute:
It must obviously be extremely difficult if we do not know from year to year how many men we have to train. I think we should have a settled policy in regard to the number of National Service men we are going to accept, both for the purposes of the training problem and also for the purposes of the Reserve which is the subject to which I shall mainly address my remarks tonight. I should like to mention the curious incident of H.M.S. "Duke of York." There may be a perfectly satisfactory answer, but last year the Parliamentary Secretary told us with great pleasure that she was being brought out of Reserve, whereas now apparently she

is being popped back into Reserve again. It does not seem to me that that represents real continuity of planning for the benefit of the Service.
I turn now to my principal subject, that of the Reserve. In his speech the Parliamentary Secretary said that the main reduction in expense which he was giving us this year was in manpower. The number of men being employed is to be reduced. That is a source of economy, but also, of course, it is a great source of anxiety and it places an even greater responsibility upon the Parliamentary Secretary to see that the Reserve is adequate. Obviously after any war the immediate questions which the Admiralty, the Government of the day and the technical officers of the Admiralty have to try to solve must inevitably be appallingly difficult and they have my sympathy in their efforts to solve them. We have had great economic difficulties and there have been immense scientific advances of which we cannot afford to take advantage. There are new strategic concepts of war which we cannot fully examine.
Examples of these are the great and grave problems which we heard about in the short Debate tonight on the submarine problem. Such matters must obviously have concentrated upon them a tremendous amount of thought by the Admiralty and the technical officers of His Majesty's Navy. At the same time, I believe it is vital that we do not lose sight of the essential facts. As the Parliamentary Secretary has said, the main objective of the Navy is keeping this country from starvation. That task will always remain and, as it is to remain, then the question of a Reserve of manpower to man the Navy quickly and efficiently is vital.
In the Debate last year the Parliamentary Secretary spoke with some gravity about the position of our Reserves. He said:
I now come to the Reserves. I have said in the past that we are satisfied with our recruiting for the Royal Navy, but we are by no means satisfied with the rate of entry into reserve."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1949; Vol. 462, c. 998.]
He went on to appeal to hon. Members to make it known to sailors—officers and men—who had served during the war that they should come forward and join the R.N.V.R. I should like to hear from


the Civil Lord, when he replies, how that appeal has gone. My impression is that the Parliamentary Secretary indicated that it was going very well, but we should like to be assured that it has gone as well as we expected since it was brought to the notice of the House and the country so gravely by the Parliamentary Secretary in the Debate last year. We should remember that this source of recruiting is only a temporary one, however. It comes from the "Z" class Reserve, from the unallocated wartime officers and men, and it is rapidly drying up.
I wonder whether the Admiralty are really satisfied that they are building up the R.N.V.R. to the right strength and whether it is fully realised by the country as well as by the Admiralty that the only source of officers and men for the R.N.V.R. will shortly be those men who have served as National Service men in the Royal Navy. That is why I attach such importance to getting correctly these figures of entry by way of National Service into the Royal Navy. It is a balancing factor, and we must get it right; it is not something to be juggled with to make Estimates fit. I hope I may be given an assurance on that matter.
In that connection I ask: Are we satisfied that the number of officers coming forward from the National Service men is sufficient? The Parliamentary Secretary referred to a figure of 25 per cent. I imagine his figure referred to commissions to Regular Service men from the lower deck. I think the figure of officers in the R.N.V.R. from the National Service men would be slightly lower. However, I think it is important we should know and understand what is the percentage of the officers coming forward, as these will be the only officers of the R.N.V.R. in future. It does give me some cause for anxiety.
Now I turn to what is by far the most important source of Reserves we have. I should not like anybody to think I wish to detract at all from the gallantry of the Volunteer Reserves of the Navy, but those of us who were in at the beginning of the last war know that we might easily have gone down if it had not been for the Royal Fleet Reserve. After all, when war comes and we have not had a war for a long time

—and I hope that when the next one comes there will not have been one for a very long time indeed—the only people who have experience, the only people who can take up their posts in the front line at once, are either pensioner Reserves or the men of the Royal Fleet Reserve. They are, as every sailor knows, the vital Reserves of the Royal Navy, and that is why I was disappointed to see that we had decided not to increase recruiting this year. Are we quite sure that this is not a false economy? Should that not be examined even further. These men are vital to the Navy.
One must always remember, when one is considering Reserves, that in a highly technical Service like the Royal Navy mere numbers on paper cannot represent the true strength, for all depends on the various categories of experts who are available. We may have on paper enormous numbers of Reserves, but if we have not sufficient men trained in submarine detection or in the use of radar, of what use will be the masses of men? It is for that reason that I suggest to the Admiralty that even now during this year they do allow men selectively to volunteer. They must know—it is not for me to know—in which categories of specialists they are short of men. Would it not be a good plan if, in those categories in which we are short, opportunities were given to men to volunteer in the Royal Fleet Reserve?
I come now to the R.N.R., which I do not think has been mentioned in the Debate. We have had a bit of difficulty with the Government, as the Civil Lord knows, about the R.N.R. We have asked a good many Questions about it, and we have always been blocked. We have not got very far. We gather—I should like to be assured about this—that the R.N.R. is getting going again. That is my impression from the White Paper which accompanies the Navy Estimates, but I should like to hear a little more about it. It is a matter which is of great interest to the House. We should like to be assured that the R.N.R. is now healthy and strong again and has every chance of going on in the same way it did before the war.
Last year we moved a special Motion about another section of the Reserves, the R.N.S.V.R. What are the numbers of


the R.N.S.V.R now? Are the Admiralty satisfied with those numbers? Last year we were anxious because many of these officers—and this is an officers' Reserve—wanted to form their own flying section, and the hon. Gentleman will remember that the Admiralty prevented them from doing so. I think that meant a loss of 100 men from the R.N.S.V.R. to the R.A.F.(V.)R. We should like to know whether there have been any second thoughts about that. Several of my hon. Friends have pointed out the shortage of pilots in the Navy today. Surely, no source should be neglected, and if there are men young and fit enough, willing and able voluntarily to become potential R.N.V.R. pilots, they should be allowed to do so. It seems to me that from the way in which this matter was handled last year, there has been perhaps neglect of this source of pilots. I would like the Civil Lord to tell us something further about that.
I think that the Parliamentary Secretary indicated that we had enough reserves to man the Reserve Fleet. That is a difficult one; because it depends rather on what kind of Reserve Fleet is to be manned. I do not think it can be satisfactorily answered just by a "yes." I should like to hear something more about that. As I have indicated, the potential efficiency of the Reserve obviously depends on the number of specialists in it. If the Admiralty are satisfied that there is a proper balance, then I have no more to say. It seems to me, however, as if we are a bit short, and that we should have a surplus to cover the various specialist ratings. I think that if we are to have a safe Reserve, the numbers must always appear more than would actually fill the bill.
There is also the vital question of speed of mobilisation. It is no good having a reserve of people on paper if we cannot get them to their posts quickly and efficiently. That, to my mind, is the first and most vital operation which this country has to face in any war. It is a thing about which we should be prepared now. We need to prepare for it a great deal better than we prepared for it in 1914 and again in 1939. I am not placing blame, but we have had experience, and we must make use of it. It is very easy to have a standing committee

of people responsible for mobilisation who do not perhaps pull all the weight they might. I believe that the study of mobilisation in detail and mobilisation at speed, knowing the men one wants and where one wants to get them, is absolutely vital. Twice we have been let off and have been able to mobilise at our own speed. That is something which we should not gamble on again. We have no right in any circumstances whatever to gamble on the fact that we may again have time to mobilise.
Finally, I should like to have an assurance from the Civil Lord that the whole operation of national mobilisation so far as the Navy is concerned is being given continuous attention by the highest officers and the highest politicians in the Admiralty today. If it is not, then all the Reserves and all the efficiency of the Reserve Fleet may come to nought in the first two weeks of war.

8.54 p.m.

Mr. Keenan: I hesitate to take part in a Debate on the Navy Estimates, but I was fortunate a few years ago in the ballot, and that put me in the position of interfering, as it were, in the affairs of the Navy. I have also the excuse that I represent a Liver pool division, and I should, therefore, know something about the Navy. I wish to follow up what I had the opportunity of saying two or three years ago, referring first to what I consider to be the substance of this Debate, and that is the Estimates themselves. I have listened to most of the Debate today, and I heard only one hon. Member who referred to the Estimates; the rest have ignored them. I ask the House to pay attention to these few observations on the figures, because although the Estimates have been reduced each year, the reduction has always seemed to be in the salaries and wages of the officers and men, although the administration costs seem to be as high. and in some cases even higher.
In 1946, the gross Estimate was £262 million, and the number of men serving was 492,000. This year, the Estimate is for £216 million, and the number of men serving is 143,000. In 1947–48, when the Estimate was £215 million, the number of men serving was only 192,665. In 1946, the salaries and wages to the Fleet were £87 million; in 1947–48, £42


million; in 1949–50, £36 million; and this year it is down to £35 million. That may be justified by the reduction in the number of serving men.
Let us now examine a Vote to which I have referred on previous occasions—a Vote which calls for some examination and adjustment. I refer to Vote 12, the Admiralty Office. In 1946, the cost of that office was £4,951,000, and the number employed in the Department was 14,555. Out of that Admiralty Office Vote the Lords of the Admiralty got £33,536 in 1946; this year they get £37,000. Let me anticipate the taunt "Jobs for the boys" by pointing out that the two poorest paid are those who apparently have to do the most for it: namely, the Civil Lord and the Parliamentary Secretary. The First Sea Lord has a salary of £5,000. There are Deputy Sea Lords. In 1946, the 12 of them got £27,000. In 1950–51 they are to get £18,000. I think there are only 11 of them now. I tried to get figures for non-Service personnel. I believe that last year the total number was 187,000 and that this year it is 172,000. The wages and salaries of officers and men came to £42 million in 1947–48, or 20 per cent. of the Estimate. In the following year the figure was rather below 20 per cent. In the coming year it will be 18 per cent.
When we compare other Departments with the Admiralty, it appears to me that two individuals are doing the one job and that there is a great deal of redundancy in the Admiralty. There are far too many posts that could be very well done without. It seems a good place for jobs for the boys to retire to. A nationalised body gets into an awful row if it is two-pence or three pence overspent, but it is a pity—and I am not a pacifist—that we cannot spend more on the Services which defend this country, although we should not waste the money. I do not find much criticism on this matter from the Opposition, possibly because far too many of their friends have benefited by this situation. I do not notice redundancy in regard to dockyard workers. If we look at the educational department at the Admiralty, we see how many officers are dealing with education. In my judgment there are far too many of them.
I want to speak about conditions in the Service. Much is said today about the failure to retain men who have served 12

years. When I first came to this House my attention was drawn to this matter by many of my constituents, and I had some concern with the Navy during the war. I realised then that those conditions of service, about which I have complained in previous Debates, tended to prevent anyone wishing to remain longer than 12 years. In fact, men were jolly glad when the 12 years were up. We must do something about this. I had hoped that after the promises which we got a few years' ago something would have been done. The remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu), who is more competent to give an opinion and who is in closer contact with the Navy than I am, clearly indicated that sufficient attention has not been given to accommodation and the other things about which we complained, and certainly not as much has been done as ought to have been done if we want to retain the men already in the Service.
I want to question the Civil Lord about this. The intake of National Service men is to be reduced to 2,000. Has the position improved? Have the numbers of volunteers in the Service improved so that there is now no need to call upon conscripts? There is no doubt that conscripted men do not seem to be of much value to the Service. At the end of 18 months, when they might be of some use, it is time for them to leave. It is much the same with the other Services, particularly the Army. We must make the Service such that we can not only get the volunteer into it, but keep him there, because it is a loss when these men go at the end of 12 years. Something more ought to be done than has been done.
The problem in regard to ship-repairing and shipbuilding, which has been raised, affects the Merseyside. When we raised the question of possible redundancy with the Admiralty years ago, it appeared to me that the Admiralty were so tied up with shipbuilding as well as with ship-repairing that the programme for the Navy would be linked up with the time when the shipping loss was replaced as a result of full employment in the shipyards. We are apparently approaching that time. We have been building at the rate of about one million tons a year. In 1946 we were short of about three million tons of merchant shipping. Apparently that amount has now been obtained


What are the Admiralty doing about this matter which the shipbuilding trades raised three years ago?
The ship-repairing position is also serious. We have now got to the stage when refits and overhauls are completed. This is happening in all the ship-repairing centres, including Merseyside. In spite of what was said by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Hull, East (Commander Pursey) we believe that we are a long way ahead of Hull so far as ship-repairing is concerned. As a matter of fact, during the war half the ships in commission were repaired on Merseyside because it was the only port open. The position is becoming serious, and if the Admiralty can do anything to stop the tendency to send ships to the Continent to be repaired, it will help the ship-repairing trades in our ports. We must keep our ship-building and ship-repairing trades in such a condition that if we ever have to face a position such as we had to face a few years ago, they will be able to cope with it.

9.11 p.m.

Captain Ryder: It is, I feel, a fortunate thing for this country that there is such a wide measure of agreement on its naval affairs, and it is no purpose of mine to introduce any note of political discord into the affairs of a Service which has always tried, and not without success, to rise above the ordinary political differences of the country. I was sorry to note, therefore, that there was one hon. Member who seemed to make a deliberate attempt to introduce a note of discord. The main purpose of this Debate, I feel, is to satisfy ourselves that the money allocated for the naval service is being wisely spent, and that the taxpayer should have some opportunity of hearing discussions on the various problems which make this heavy expenditure necessary.
I listened with great interest to the remarks of the hon. Member for Liverpool, Kirkdale (Mr. Keenan) when he attacked the staff of the Admiralty. That is a matter which should be reviewed and there is a certain measure of truth in which the hon. Member said, but I would like to claim that the Admiralty, in spite of an organisation so peculiar to itself and so difficult to understand, is probably the most efficient of all the Government

Departments. I feel that we are fortunate in having there a most efficient team of civil servants imbued with a great loyalty to the naval Service, who have never hesitated to fight their natural enemies on the other side of the Horse Guards Parade for everything which they felt essential for the Royal Navy. In the Treasury they are held in some respect because, after many years' experience, it has been found that their demands have been both moderate and necessary. It is not my purpose, therefore, to attack them now on the grounds of improvidence or wasteful expenditure, nor do I want to take advantage of this opportunity to get in any back-handed attack against my late lords and masters. If I may, and if I can, I want to try to bring to the notice of this House some of the difficult problems which face the Navy today.
As I have listened to most of this Debate, I have noted many points of special interest. First, there is the question of the provision of married quarters; this is a great problem which faces the Navy. There is no doubt that there is an increasing and natural demand for home life both on the part of the married officer and the married rating. The days of the old shellbacks, so dear to Captain Hornblower, with every finger a marlin-spike and queueing up for his tot of rum, and at least one wife, if not more, in every port, are of a past age. There is an increasing and growing urge for the married man to see more of his wife and family, and an even stronger demand on the part of his wife to see more of her husband. This problem is just beginning to grow, and it will become more and more important for the House to realise the extent of the problem that lies ahead.
On the other hand, it is all too easy to devote a disproportionate amount of navy expenditure to meeting this demand. It is very important, in the first instance, that the House should view with sympathy all measures which are being taken to alleviate existing difficulties, and I should like to say how very much I welcome the efforts which are being made to provide married quarters and passages abroad for the families of both officers and ratings.
The hon. Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu) referred to the question of accommodation on board
H.M. ships. It is easy enough to criticise the inadequate accommodation which now exists, particularly in the mess decks. This same problem was referred to also by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horncastle (Commander Maitland), who went on to describe an imaginary instrument invented by scientists and then dumped in the mess decks. I welcome what, I thought, was the realistic approach of the Parliamentary Secretary to the question of the provision of bunks and of more up-to-date lockers for naval ratings, which is a first step towards increasing accommodation on board ship. All these improvements, however, place a great premium upon the design of naval vessels. Quite clearly, any additional space which is allocated to the comfort and well-being of the crews is at the expense of the fighting efficiency of the ship. As a result, a great premium is placed upon the way in which these ships are designed.
That leads me to a matter which was mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas): that is, the position of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors. I should like to ask the Civil Lord, when he replies, if he will make a statement on the position of this small but very important and very loyal Corps, which plays such a vital role. I warn the Civil Lord that the members of the Corps nurse a deep sense of grievance at the way they are being treated. If it is not possible to meet their needs, can the hon. Gentleman at least let them have full reasons and the arguments on both sides of the case, so that they shall not feel that their matters are being cloaked by the usual excuse of secrecy?
I welcomed the discussion we had on the question of U-boat warfare. There is no doubt that this is the main task which confronts the Navy today. I do not wish to recapitulate the arguments set forth, but I would again stress that at the commencement of the previous two wars our adversaries started with only 24 U-boats in 1914 and only 57 in 1939, whereas now we are facing a potential menace numbering something approaching 300. The situation in the event of hostilities will not be merely that we shall find two, three or four U-boats picketing our trade routes, but we may well find numbers far in excess of that. We would do well to realise, also, that they can take up war stations in advance

of hostilities without us being any the wiser and, in the event of hostilities, we may have to move with great rapidity.
We must ask ourselves, therefore, what we could muster in such an eventuality. My rough calculation is that we have five carriers, 14 cruisers and 64 destroyers and frigates ready to put to sea. In addition, we appear to have 12 carriers, either refitting, building or laid-up—we are not sure how many of them can carry the latest aircraft—15 cruisers and 191 destroyers and frigates, which I group together because they are what we need for hunting submarines. I am glad to note that the battleship appears to have been put into the background, but we must still view the overall picture and ask ourselves whether this Fleet of ours really fits the special problems which face the Navy at sea today. Let us beware that this Service, which is so proud of its tradition, is not too much bound by the traditional outlook in a time of very great change.
On the question of naval aviation, the problem, as I see it, is that there is a tendency for aircraft to get larger, more expensive, heavier and more difficult to handle, requiring larger and more up-to-date carriers to take them to sea. That may be very necessary if we are to meet the enemy in air combat, but the question I raise is how about anti-submarine aircraft? We have been told of the G.R.17. Are we satisfied that we can produce this aircraft and take it to sea in sufficient numbers to cover the very extensive trade routes which must be patrolled? Are we not in the position of a man who has bought himself two Rolls-Royce limousines, each requiring a large garage and a skilled driver, when what he really needs is a large fleet of delivery vans or jeeps, which can be left in the open and driven by almost anyone after a short period of practice? Is our plan for providing anti-submarine aircraft a practical plan and have we under active consideration plans for using auxiliary aircraft carriers, or small aircraft carriers in increased numbers? I see we have only one auxiliary aircraft carrier, which has been relegated to the Festival of Britain. I sympathise with the commanding officer.
May I now turn t. the question of escort vessels? I thought that the most interesting and significant passage in the


White Paper was that which said that two escort vessels of new design were to be laid down. Here, again, I feel that there is a tendency in the realms of naval architecture to build vessels larger mad larger as each new class comes off the stocks. The cruiser of today is larger and more expensive than the battleship of 50 years ago, and the same applies to the destroyers, and, more recently, to the case of corvettes and motor torpedo boats. This process goes on until, eventually, there is a realisation, and a new class, like the "Hunt" class of destroyer, is produced at half the size.
I noticed that in this respect the Parliamentary Secretary referred to the building of cheaper ships. I hope he will not allow them to be called second-raters or even third-raters. I am sure that the ordinary sailor will resent being appointed to a third-rate ship, but, in principle, it seems to me that there is a great deal to be said for producing a very much simpler ship which can be produced in greater cumbers. I therefore ask whether these new escorts of ours are, in fact, to be of Rolls-Royce design or whether they are being designed to carry all the necessary instruments, both of detection and destruction, as well as being capable of being produced in very large numbers.
I have spoken on the subjects of naval aviation and escort vessels. May I now turn to my third point, which has been mentioned already by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horncastle, and which concerns the question of mobilisation? In the past, we have, by some happy and fortuitous arrangements with our Gracious Monarch, always managed to have a review of the Fleet just a few days before the outbreak of hostilities, but we cannot always be as fortunate in future. Should we not have in hand some far more effective and comprehensive plans for the rapid mobilisation of the large number of destroyers and escort vessels in particular? We have a "moth-ball fleet," as it is some-, what vulgarly termed in some countries, reasonably widely dispersed in the tidal estuaries round the United Kingdom, but we have, in fact, only three manning depots in the south of England.
In the event of a sudden emergency, it would be necessary, to take an extreme

case, to recall officers and ratings from the north of Scotland and order them to repair to their depot, which may be at Devonport, where they might then find a very harassed and overcrowded drafting officer trying to deal with a most fearful congestion. They might also find that they were then ordered back to the Firth of Clyde to man a ship up in the north. We have had this sort of thing happening in times past, but in future this country may be under a bombing attack, with great confusion and chaos on the railways to render things very much worse. Is this a wise and sensible arrangement? I am not proposing to offer any immediate specific plan, but may I ask the Parliamentary Secretary if the question of a depot in the north would not be worth consideration? We might, for instance, suggest something near Rosyth Dockyard. It is noticed already that H.M.S. "Cochrane" is being shut down, as well as the hospital at Port Edgar, and this is evidently raising some disquiet in Scotland. I would suggest that the question of another depot should be considered, and, possibly, the question of a depot to cover the densely populated areas in the vicinity of Liverpool as well. But these are only suggestions. My plea is that we should examine the whole question of the rapid mobilisation of our Reserve Fleet.
In conclusion, I wish to say that my impression on leaving the Royal Navy is that there is a tendency to think too much in terms of Fleets—the Home Fleet and the Mediterranean Fleet—when what we should really be doing is to organise ourselves more into hunting groups and escort groups. I stand to be corrected in that matter, but that is my impression, and I would be glad if the Parliamentary Secretary, who, I see, has returned, could bear that in mind because I think it has an important tendency in the whole development of the Navy. It is, perhaps, for that reason that we appear to be—we are, in fact—concentrating rather too much on having a few large and expensive aircraft carriers and a few complicated and expensive escorts when what we really need is numbers.

9.31 p.m.

Mr. Douglas Houghton: I will try not to keep the House very long. In any case, I have no desire to stand between hon. Members and my hon.


Friend the Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes), who appears to have brought with him more of the Library than usual with which to fortify himself in making a speech which we can now agree to take as read. I am glad that my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary has come back to his place because I want to say with what warm appreciation I listened to his two speeches today, especially the first one, when he gave us a lucid, optimistic, and breezy review of the work and cost of the Royal Navy. With the adroitness which comes from his early training as a tax-gatherer, he mentioned how much we had to pay when none of us were listening. He then took us along with him in a glowing account of what we were going to get for our money, and, by the time he sat down, we had forgotten that he had presented the bill.
The Parliamentary Secretary and I have in the past done much work together m the field of staff affairs in the public service. In his present post I want to invite him, the next time he can arrange for a day off from his Parliamentary duties, to take a peep into the Admiralty itself. I am sure that we were all impressed with what he managed to crowd into the one day that he spent with the Reserve Fleet, and I hope that when he manages another day he will look into questions affecting the staff of the Admiralty.
I do not propose to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Kirkdale (Mr. Keenan) in dropping a few depth charges in the still waters of the Admiralty Board Room. I frankly do not know whether the Admiralty is over-staffed or not. All I will say about that is that if it is, then suitable reductions should be made. In the present crisis of the country's affairs, we cannot afford to become a nation of ledger clerks and pen pushers, and none of us wishes to see, least of all those in the public service itself, an inflated public service and Government clerking becoming one of the main industries of Britain. But such civil servants as are essential to the work of the Admiralty should be properly treated and properly paid.
High tribute has been paid to the skill and genius of our technicians, of the uniformed officers and men in the Royal Navy who are engaged in experimental and research work, and who are, we hope,

contributing very largely indeed to those technical developments of naval warfare upon which we may have to rely if this country is involved in trouble in the future. I have read a sad thing this morning in the annual report of one of our reputable staff associations in the Civil Service—the Institution of Professional Civil Servants. After reviewing a number of negotiations which have been in progress for some long time between the staff association and the Admiralty, they say:
the above delays in the technical classes are typical of most negotiations with the Admiralty.
This is a serious criticism to make of one of our senior public Departments. It is. in contrast with what follows immediately afterwards in this report when they comment on the Air Ministry. There they say:
It is gratifying to report that, apart from. certain higher posts, assimilation into new grades has now been completed.
The criticism of the Admiralty stands, out in contrast with the appreciation expressed of the Air Ministry. That is not. a good thing for the Admiralty. Unhappily, as I well remember in the long experience I have had of Civil Service affairs, the Admiralty have always had a bad name for tardiness and shillyshallying in staff matters.
Here are three examples of the kind of thing I complain of. I hope the Civil Lord will deal with them when he comes to reply. I gave him notice that, if I caught Mr. Speaker's eye, I would refer to this matter. I hope he will be able to assure us that these and other long outstanding cases, will receive attention. If we look at these Estimates as regards civilian staffs, we shall see that in a number of cases the salaries are quoted as. consolidated salaries. In other cases. they are shown as basic pay to which an addition has been made as a legacy of the war bonus in some of the grades. That reveals that large sections of the Admiralty staff, especially in the professional, technical, and scientific classes, have still to have a revision of their pay and grading. This revision is now several years overdue.
In the case of the directing staff of the Directorate of Electrical Engineering, for instance, claims made several years ago were rejected by the Admiralty. Later.


they were the subject of independent investigation by an expert professional electrical engineer. Subsequently, offers were made which the Institution of Professional Civil Servants felt unable to accept. That was followed by arbitration as recently as 7th October, 1949, when increases, effective from 1st January, 1946, were awarded to these grades by the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal. This shows the long delay in getting this grading and salary question settled. Since October, although consequential changes must inevitably arise from the award of the Arbitration Tribunal, no proposals have been made by the Admiralty to adjust matters by grading these senior grades of this particular branch.
Hon. Members will see on page 195 of the Navy Estimates that some subordinate officers are shown as getting higher salaries than their seniors. This is because the subordinate officers have had their grading and pay reviewed by the Arbitration Tribunal while the senior officers have not yet had theirs reviewed by the Board of Admiralty.
In another section of the Admiralty, the Department of the Civil Engineer-in-Chief, there has been a delay of 3½ years in getting the re-grading of the higher posts in that branch. We have the extraordinary situation in which re-grading due to these officers in 1946 has not yet been completed; yet in the meantime the Chorley Committee has recommended further increases for men of their standing in the Civil Service which are in suspense. This is the subject of considerable discontent amongst officers of great technical and professional skill and experience, and upon whose work the Admiralty rely for the research and experiment which is so vital to the development of naval warfare.
My third example concerns the Masters and Engineers of Yardcraft upon which the Civil Lord, in reply to a Question on 7th December, 1949, said:
The reason for the delay is the necessity to consult other Departments. Y hope that these consultations may soon be sufficiently advanced to enable a further communication to be made to the associations concerned."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th December, 1949; Vol. 470, c. 1888.]
I regret to say, however, that nothing has come from the Admiralty since that hope

was expressed. I urge the Civil Lord and the Financial Secretary to interest themselves in what is going on in the Establishments Division of the Board of Admiralty, and to see whether these long delays can be remedied and a source of widespread discontent among senior and specialist officers removed.

9.42 p.m.

Mr. Douglas Marshall: I feel sure that the House will have been most interested in the points which were raised by the hon. Member for Sowerby (Mr. Houghton). I hope he will forgive me if I do not follow him, as he has already made himself very technically expert in this matter and I trust that we shall hear more on that subject from the Civil Lord.
At this late hour most things have really been said about the Navy Estimates. I want to confine myself to one or two points which I do not think have yet been made, and on which I would like to have answers from the Civil Lord. First, I wish to allude to a major point of principle which is referred to in the Navy Estimates Statement, 1950–51, with regard to the total sum which is voted. These words appear in the second paragraph:
… at the same time account has had to be taken of higher prices …
The point that worries me—and I am even more worried after the very frank statement of the Parliamentary Secretary—is whether account has been taken only of the higher prices now ruling, or whether account has also been taken of the higher prices that may, in fact, rule. I should not like to think that if by any chance we get a steep incline, our security would be damaged by not having taken account of what may happen.
Mention has already been made by my hon. Friend the Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Maclay) of the Trade Division of the Admiralty, and I was delighted to hear from the Parliamentary Secretary that he was himself so much in agreement with the points made. It is of the utmost importance that this Division is maintained as a separate Division, with the great liaison between the Trade Division and the Merchant Navy, in the full realisation that the moment war breaks out one of the chief, active parts that the Royal Navy plays is in the protection of our trade routes. Nothing is more important than close knowledge, under-
standing and respect between the Merchant Navy and the Royal Navy.
The next point I want to make—and I do not think it has been made today—concerns our fishery protection vessels. From time to time our fishing vessels have had troublesome moments. There was a case with regard to the Channel which I raised, and there have been other cases off the Norwegian coast, and it has appeared to me, in the years in which I have had the honour and privilege of being in this House, that we have never had sufficient fishery protection vessels. I should like to hear a little about the position at present, because if we search through the Estimates or the White Paper we find nothing about it.
Next, the small ships in the fishing industry are part of our security. They keep open our small ports and they are in reserve at all times when the country is in danger. It seems to me extraordinary in view of that fact, that when men are called up for National Service and apply to go to sea there are certain occasions upon which the Royal Navy does not accept them. I fully realise that the Royal Navy may wish to retain a position in which they can select exactly what they want. But I want them to realise the Reserve potential which exists here. To take a man from a fishing vessel and place him in a Service in which he does not desire to serve; to prevent him from gaining even more knowledge of the sea and from using the knowledge he has already gained; to prevent him from remaining within the sphere he loves, suggests to me that the Admiralty do not realise the true position. I ask them to reconsider that matter once again.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horncastle (Commander Maitland) dealt with the question of the Reserve generally so fully that I shall add nothing to what he said. I want to mention next the Royal dockyard at Devonport. When are we to know what the position is? I should like to read a few words written to me, which put the matter very clearly:
It is apparent that the plan or, at least, the original plan for the dockyard extension is almost dead.
What takes its place? We do not know. Does anyone know? When will the people concerned know? I think the hon. Lady the Member for Plymouth. Sutton

(Mrs. Middleton) will agree with me that delay in housing is occurring as a result of this position. I hope the Civil Lord will tell us what is to be done.
Next, the modernisation of the barracks at Plymouth. I notice that in the White Paper there occurs the word "shortly" Perhaps the Civil Lord can tell us what the word means in this connection. If he can I should be grateful. I want to draw attention to one other point. I have a letter here from a constituent, which reached me today, and he makes a remark which I think is worthy of a reply from the Civil Lord because the point at issue does not concern only the writer. He says:
I see that the Navy Estimates are to be debated in the House on Wednesday. Of course, I do not know the procedure but I wonder whether a statement is likely to be made by the Government or whether any information can be elicited from them as to their policy in regard to the naval officers with extended service commissions. As you know, there are many hundreds very anxiously waiting a decision as the period is rapidly drawing to an end.
That affects a great number of people and I hope the Civil Lord will reply to the point raised.
In conclusion, like my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder) I am always glad to see that Members' contributions are not so thrustful and controversial in our Debates on the Royal Navy, because of their knowledge that the Royal Navy has again and again saved this country and the freedom of the world

9.50 p.m.

Mrs. Middleton: I shall not follow the hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Marshall) in what he has said except to reinforce the reference which he made to Admiralty development in Devonport o the whole of the City of Plymouth will welcome any announcement that the Civil Lord feels able to make on that subject tonight. I want to speak about one or two other matters, though I shall not detain the House long.
I think that every woman Member of the House, at any rate, will have welcomed the recent Army announcement according to women who are serving in the Army rank comparable with male officers. I wish is had been the senior Service which had first taken the step, and I urge tonight that the Admiralty give


serious consideration to it, because some of us are rather tired of women being always regarded as the poor relations of the men. There may be many powerful arguments why women should not be admitted to the Armed Forces at all, but it seems to me that there is not one argument, when we accept women into the Services and make use of them, for giving them a status somewhat less—indeed, perhaps considerably less—than that of the men doing comparable work. I will not raise at this late hour the vexed question of pay and allowances; but this question of status is, I think, one to which a good deal of consideration should be given, and one on which an announcement ought shortly to be made.
I want to extend to the Civil Lord the thanks of those of us who represent dockyard towns, and, indeed, the thanks of the dockyard areas, for the way in which matters concerning the Royal Dockyards have been handled in the last four and a half years. We welcome very much in the dockyard towns the re-appointment of the Civil Lord to the post which he holds. We know that all the time he has served there he has had very great care both for the efficiency of the dockyards and for the welfare of the men who work there. I understand—I hope I am correctly informed—that there are no issues, except minor ones, today outstanding between the dockyards and the Admiralty Joint Industrial Council. If that is a fact it is a very great tribute indeed to my hon. Friend's work, and an example to other employers of labour of the way in which difficulties between them and their work-people should be handled.
On looking at the Estimates I notice, however, that there is to be a reduction in the effectives in the Royal Dockyards to the extent of about 2,000. I should like to ask the Civil Lord whether that reduction is a reduction through wastage in the normal way, or whether it is a reduction contemplated through discharges. In that connection I want to emphasise what was said earlier in the Debate today by my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot), about the need to utilise fully the equipment and the skills that exists in the Royal Dockyards.
This is an emergency service, and because it is an emergency service it must always, to some extent, be overmanned

in order to keep a proper balance between the various trades, in case of emergency. There is a great desire among the men who serve in the Royal Dockyards that their efforts and skill shall be fully used, primarily, of course, for the work for which the naval dockyards exist, namely, that of naval work, but supplementarily, to assist the nation as far as possible in its present difficulties, in civilian work wherever that can be undertaken.
It is for that reason that those of us who sit for dockyard towns have been urging for some time past that a kind of working party should be set up to inquire into the working of the Royal dockyards to see whether we are really getting full measure from the skill that exists there, from the equipment that exists there, and from the money which is voted by this House year by year on behalf of the maintenance of the dockyards. We want to see that the opportunities that exist there for assisting the nation are not missed, and that the capabilities of the men working there are fully utilised. Without any disrespect whatsoever to any gallant senior officer who may at any time have held the post of a dockyard superintendent, I do seriously ask the Admiralty whether the men who, up to the moment, have been in charge of the Royal dockyards have really had the right kind of experience for that job? In any case, should it be left to men in the last year or two of their naval careers to undertake work of this character, which is quite different, and, as I understand it, quite apart from, the jobs which they have been doing while they have been serving with the Royal Navy?
Is there not a case for examination, at any rate, on whether we ought not to appoint to that particular work younger men, more vigorous men, with much more of their careers before them than has been the case in the past; men who are specialising in this particular field of Admiralty service? I know that there are many people working in connection with the dockyards who hold this view. They have often expressed it to me in my constituency. Men asked me during the recent election campaign whether I, as a candidate for a dockyard town, was prepared to continue to press the Government, whatever the Government might be as the result of the election, for the setting up' of a working party of this kind, so that


we may see that the best is being made of the potential which we have there. If the present organisation which we have is the best such an inquiry would allay the doubts that at present exist. If it is not the best, I think that it is the duty of us all in this House who have the responsibility today for voting these Estimates to see that His Majesty's dockyards are used in the most efficient possible manner both on behalf of the Navy and also on behalf of the country as a whole.

9.59 p.m.

Mr. Parker: I also should like to congratulate the Parliamentary Secretary on his appointment to his new post. I well remember at an early period in the war, when he himself was wearing sailor's uniform, the enthusiastic campaign he carried on for reforming the cut of sailors' trousers, and particularly for the re-siting of the strategic buttons. I hope that he will not forget the need for further reform in the Royal Navy, and I should like to press for a particular reform tonight.
I wish to raise the question of the terms of recruitment of boys into the Royal Navy. On the Army Estimates, I raised the system of recruiting boys for that Service, and I fully realise that if any solution is to be found to this problem it must be one which covers all branches of the Services. It is a specially important problem with regard to the Navy, and I think that the Navy should give a lead in dealing with it. There are far more boys in the Navy than the other Services, and they form a much larger proportion of the total. In September last there were 7,870 boys under the age of 18 in the Navy. From the figures given today, that means that they will be about one-fifteenth of the strength of the Navy at the end of this year, assuming that the number of boys remains constant.
That is a high proportion of the total personnel in a Service. I am sure that the need for the Navy to have long-Service men is helped very much by having this boy service, and by having a large number of recruits coming in through that service first. There are, however, a certain number of youngsters signing on under the age of 18 who, on becoming adults, change their minds and no longer wish to serve in the Navy, and I think that provision ought to be made so that these youngsters can leave if they

change their minds upon becoming adults. This is important in all the Services, but particularly in the Navy.
The present method of boy recruitment to the Navy dates back to 1884. Let me here quote from an answer given by the Parliamentary Secretary at the end of last year:
All the boys signed on for 12 years' service from the age of 18, except for a few boy musicians who, having some knowledge of music and being over 16½ on entry, may elect to serve for seven years followed by five years in the Reserve, in addition to their boys service. Seamen and communication boys and boy buglers have the option, immediately before reaching the age of 18, of transferring, at the age of 18, to a Special Service engagement of seven years with the Fleet followed by five years in the Reserve."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd November, 1949; Vol. 470, c. 34.]
That means that a boy signing on at 14, 15, 16 or 17 not only has to serve the whole of his boyhood period but also another 12 years on top of that, which takes him to 30 years of age. True, in special categories it is possible for a break to be made after seven years in the Fleet, with five years in the Reserve, but in effect it means that youngsters, who do not really know their own minds, commit themselves, not only for their boyhood but for the greater part of their early manhood, to a job which they may like and enjoy very much, but which on the other hand may go very much against the grain if they change their minds on growing up. It is very wrong to take on boys before they are old enough to know the sort of future they want, and to commit them for that long time. It is reasonable to commit them for their boyhood, but an arrangement should be made whereby they can leave if they change their minds after becoming adults. I shall say a little more about that later on and make a positive suggestion for dealing with this problem.
In my own constituency not long ago I had to deal with what was not an unusual type of case. The parents of a young girl engaged to a boy of 19 in the Navy came to see me. This boy wanted to get out of the Navy; he had come to the conclusion that he wanted a civilian career; he had deserted, and the parents of this girl to whom he was engaged came to me to know what could be done about it. All I could advise was that he must go back, which he has done. But that does not solve the problem.
The history of the boy was roughly this. He came from a bad home, and he had been sent by the court to a special school for two years, up to the age of 16. Before leaving the special school he spoke to the headmaster about where he should go on being released. The headmaster asked whether he was thinking of going home, to which the boy replied "Yes, I am." The headmaster said: "I would advise you not to go home. You know the very bad conditions in your home; and you may also like to know that your father and mother are not married." The boy did not know of that before, and was naturally very upset about it. The headmaster then said: "If you do not want to go home, why not go into the Navy? There would be a good career for you." The boy signed on for the Navy, and a few years later, when he was more mature and thinking for himself, he changed his mind. That is the type of case that occurs at present, and we ought to make arrangements to ensure that it does not occur.
I suggest that a boy who signs up should stay in the Service for the whole of his boyhood; and it is reasonable, if he signs on as a boy, that he should stay in for at least three further years, taking him from 18 to 21. The year after he becomes 18, the question should be put to him whether he wants to stay in the Service for the full 12 years. That would be a reasonable way of seeing that the youngsters who have changed their minds upon growing up have an opportunity to leave the Service. I am certain that it would be in the better interests of the Service to allow this to happen. Neither the Navy nor any other Service will gain from having a number of people in its ranks who feel that they have been got into it unfairly. In the case of the Navy there may be probably only a small number of them, but the need to have people in for long-service should not overweigh the need to deal properly with them.
The Admiralty ought to look at this matter, having in mind the right of the adult to choose his job for himself. This elementary reform should be made and it is particularly important that it should be made by a Socialist Government. We in the Socialist Party stand for the ele-

mentary rights of the individual and for the rights of citizenship. We on these benches should apply these rights to the conditions under which boys are taken into the Services. The Admiralty should make a start in bringing about this change. They would not suffer in the number of personnel, and they would gain from the feeling of justice that would exist throughout the Navy. They would get rid of the discontent which is bound to spread from the Service to other adults outside, because of these people who feel that they have been tricked into joining the Service and who do not want to be in it. I ask the Parliamentary Secretary to remember his reforming zeal and to let it be exercised in this matter.

10.7 p.m.

Mr. Kenneth Robinson: I am glad of the opportunity of taking part in the Debate upon the Navy Estimates. It is an opportunity difficult to resist, as past experience shows, for those who spent their wartime service in the Navy. I am also glad to take part in a Naval Estimates Debate which has been opened so ably by another ex-R.N.V.R. officer. I wish to raise one or two points concerning personnel, and I do not wish to detain the House for very long. I strongly support the plea which has just been made by my hon. Friend the Member for Dagenham (Mr. Parker) for a reform it boys' service. I always thought during my time in the Navy that it was most unreasonable that boys should be tied down by a contract made when they were children, and which only became operative when they became men.
It is gratifying to know that, alone of the three Services, the Navy can substantially fulfil its personnel requirements by voluntary recruitment. I hope that that fact will not make my noble Friend the First Lord or the Board of Admiralty relax in any way the reforms which they have put into effect in the last few years, or fail to extend very much further the process of democratisation of the Navy on which the last Labour Government made so excellent a start. Perhaps I might now touch upon one or two points concerning the amenities of the Navy. In doing so I may tread upon ground already covered by my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W.
Mallalieu) earlier in the Debate. If I do so it is because my experience in the Navy and his are roughly parallel, and because our reactions to those experiences were not entirely dissimilar.
The question of overcrowding in mess-decks of ships is a very serious one. I realise that I saw it at its worst during the war when ships were piled high with gadgets for which they were never designed, gadgets which not only took up space but required even more men to man them. The situation was so appalling then that I cannot believe that it has been completely solved now. I read some two years ago, in the Debate on the Navy Estimates at that time, that in new construction the Admiralty would re-arrange the proportion of space given to officers and men. This is a very desirable and very belated reform and one which can hardly be carried too far. I was glad to hear from the Parliamentary Secretary that a committee on ship design policy has been set up. I hope it will give priority to seeing that we get a very much more equitable distribution of space as between men and officers.
A problem rather allied to that is the necessity for providing some space for quiet and privacy for naval ratings. This may be thought to be catering for a minority, but it is at any rate catering for a minority which will become ever larger. There are people who find that the turmoil and hurly-burly of mess-deck life at times becomes intolerable. It is proper that they should have somewhere to go to write their letters, to read or even just to think. I know that it is extremely difficult in small ships, but it can be done in big ships. We had it under war-time conditions in the battleship in which I served, and the experiment was most successful. I hope that it will be carried further and that it will certainly be developed in barracks.
Another question to which I wish to draw attention may appear trivial to some hon. Members, particularly if they have not had the advantage of serving on the lower deck. It is the method of paying the men. If this has been reformed since I was in the Navy I should be glad to be corrected by the Civil Lord, but so far as I know that old system still obtains. This business of queuing up long before payment begins, of taking off one's cap and putting it on the paymaster's table

is very irksome indeed to naval ratings. To the best of my recollection the other occasions on which one was ordered "Off caps" in the Navy were at divine service, sometimes at inspections, where the purpose, as far as I can see, was to make sure that the sailors had their hair cut short enough, and, of course, when one was hauled on to the quarter deck or in front of the captain as a defaulter.
It is this last association which sticks in the sailor's mind, and the result is that the payment of the men takes place in an atmosphere very far removed from that which should accompany a straightforward payment for services rendered. There is a feeling of humiliation about it, whatever the rights and wrongs of it may be and whatever traditional explanation may be given. I see no need whatever for this procedure, and I hope that a change will be made very soon. While on the subject of pay, I should like to add that in my experience the business of computing pay from week to week was unnecessarily complicated. One never knew how little or how much one would get, and on occasions when one got a "north-easter" there never seemed to be an adequate explanation for it. There is a lot of room for simplification here.
I want to say a word about democratisation. That is not a word I like, but it is a word which at least conveys to all hon. Members what I mean. Very much has already been done by my noble Friend and his predecessor in this direction, and also as a result of pressure from this side of the House, but the process needs to go still further. As hon. Members know, during the war the Royal Navy eventually had to come to the R.N.V.R. for over 80 per cent. of its officers. I remember well the Admiralty Fleet Order under which, as a very green sub-lieutenant, I was appointed to the flagship of the Home Fleet. To the best of my recollection, the A.F.O. indicated that in future capital ships and cruisers were to be manned primarily by R.N.V.R. officers "with a leavening of R.N. officers." We did not agree with the phraseology, but we got the idea. On the technical side, of course, we could not begin to compete with the professional officers. There was some pleasant fiction that an R.N.V.R. officer was somehow the equivalent of an R.N. officer of the same rank and seniority, but no one really believed that
and least of all the R.N.V.Rs. Some were extremely efficient and the rest of us got by as best we could, always, of course, with greatest assistance and encouragement from the straight stripes.
There was, however, one respect in which I always felt we had the advantage. Nearly all of us had been on the lower deck and we knew what the men on the lower deck felt and thought. We knew their worries and we knew what they thought of officers in general. We knew these things while the Regular officers could only guess at them, and they were apt sometimes to guess wrong. It was this first-hand experience which made us better officers than we would otherwise have been. So I express my opinion that every naval officer during his training should have the maximum opportunity of serving on the lower deck as a rating. Put a white band round his cap if you must, but let him share the discomforts, the entertainment and the boredom and the community life of the mess-deck. I am sure that he, too, will be a far better officer for that experience.
I also welcome the decision, which is now being implemented, to take 25 per cent. of all naval officers from the lower deck. I would like to see this percentage stepped up until the whole system of class selection for officers is a dead letter. It is only through the knowledge of every man on the lower deck that, if he has the ability and the desire to work for a commission, it is available it is only through the first-hand experience which officers gain from having served on the lower deck, that the serious and undesirable gulf which still separates officers from men in the Royal Navy will be bridged.

10.18 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I owe it as a duty to my constituents to say a few words about the Estimates. I notice that on the front Opposition Bench two of my constituents are sitting and I know that, however much the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok (Commander Galbraith) may disagree with me on matters of internal policy, he feels the utmost confidence that I am speaking for him when I address a few remarks to the House on matters affecting the Navy Estimates. I am glad also to see his son,

the hon. Member for Hillhead (Mr. T. G. D. Galbraith), sitting beside him on the Opposition Front Bench, because I realise that after this Debate is over they will once more give me the vote and confidence that they gave me at the last Election.
I have been wondering why in the front line—although I do not know whether that is the proper naval phrase—we have tonight missed the battleship. I have been wondering all day where the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition has been, and why he has not been taking his usual very keen interest in naval Debates. [An HON. MEMBER: "He has been placed in reserve."] I am wondering if the Leader of the Opposition is now regarded as being as obsolete as one of the big battleships which, in the Debate two years ago, he was asking the Government to continue.
The hon. Member for Sowerby (Mr. Houghton) expressed some alarm that I had brought so many books from the Library to this Debate, but last night there were so many references to the great amount of information that was to be obtained from the Library—for example, statistics about the naval strength of our potential enemy—that I have been in the Library and have made a little research. I have been looking up the speech which the Leader of the Opposition made two years ago, and I suggest that many of the things he said then are very relevant to the Debate today.
I listened with great interest to the younger school of naval strategists who have spoken today. One of them, the hon. and gallant Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder), who has won the Victoria Cross, expressed delight that we were no longer putting our strength and our money into battleships. I think everybody is agreed on that, since no one in the House today has done what the Leader of the Opposition did two years ago: that is, advise the Government to keep on with the big battleship. Nobody has denounced the Government for not keeping on the fighting strength of the country the great big battleships whose high-sounding names made such an appeal to the poetic imagination of the Leader of the Opposition.
There are, however, odd passages from the speech of the right hon. Gentleman
two years ago which are not obsolete. Here is one of them, a very important truth. In the Debate on the Navy Estimates on 8th March, 1948, the Leader of the Opposition said:
There is something to be said for telling the truth to Parliament.
That is what I have been trying to do during the various Debates. Referring to the policy of maintaining this iron curtain of security—which was not lifted very much last night, although I hope it is to be lifted a little tonight—the Leader of the Opposition said:
The whole of this policy of concealment is silly.
He went on to say:
This argument of secrecy is fraudulent, but it arises not from malice, but from stupidity.
I suggest that these aphorisms of the right hon. Gentleman apply to all the Debates on the Service Estimates, that we have not been given sufficient information that shows whether we are justified in voting, after what after all, is a very cursory discussion, these huge sums of national money which mount up to such a formidable total when the Chancellor comes to submit his Budget.
The hon. and gallant Member for Merton and Morden, to whose speech we listened with great interest, said that he was glad the battleship had been put into the background. That is a precisely different point of view from that put forward by his leader two years ago. The Leader of the Opposition said:
We should be very foolish to get rid of ships like the 'Nelson' and 'Valiant,' on which a lot of money has been spent. … I take it they are all to go … including the 'Renown.' That leaves no material reserve at all. The 'Queen Elizabeth,' the two 'Nelsons,' the 'Renown' and the 'Royal Sovereign' are all consigned to the scrap heap.
He went on to say:
There was not the least hurry to bring out this wholesale destruction of these historic units … The Government could have let that question rest.
—and he hoped some of them could be saved. He almost weeped romantic tears that these big battleships were being sent to what he called "the knacker's yard." If the Government had listened to the advice of the Leader of the Opposition two years ago, we would still have had a very heavy burden in these Estimates for battleships.

Captain Ryder: The question of battleships is, of course, a very controversial matter. I have merely mentioned my point of view. I am not saying it is necessarily the point of view held by everyone. It is well known that both sides should be ventilated.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I quite agree and I realise that the hon. and gallant Member was only expressing his own point of view. From the point of view of modern thought it is far more progressive than that of the Leader of the Opposition.

Commander Galbraith: If I remember, the argument of my right hon. Friend was that the Government had thrown away good cards which they might have retained in reserve at a cost, as we know, of £62,000 a year and it would have been well worth that sum to the country, which is quite a different argument.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: The hon. and gallant Gentleman uses the term "throwing away good cards." Surely we are not playing cards. I would point out to my constituent that he and I come from the same part of the country and we are not entitled to talk of spending millions of money in the same way as we play cards. I suggest that throughout this Debate—perhaps the hon. and gallant Member who is to wind up for the Opposition will correct me if I am wrong—it has been generally assumed that the days of the huge expensive battleship are over and that we are in for a conception of naval strategy based on the assumption that in the next war we are going to meet a gigantic submarine menace from a country which I will not transgress the Rules of Order by venturing to name. In case there is any doubt about his argument, the Leader of the Opposition said:
These battleships are symbols of power … There is an indefinite and unknowable value in old ships. No foreigner can tell what part they can play, what part they could play, after a year or 18 months"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1948, vol. 448, c. 821–829–830–832.]
He wanted the battleships to be continued of these reasons.
I suggest that the whole idea, the whole conception of naval strategy has altered fundamentally since two years ago but the bill we have been called upon to pay has not altered to a very great degree. Without the battleships, we are still spending the immense sum of £200


million on the Navy at a time when there is no great menace from what we used to describe in such Debates as a sea Power. Surely there ought to be some relationship between changed ideas of strategy and costs, but we are still spending this £200 million every year, and this sum is apparently going to be sacrosant. I do not believe there has been an argument produced in this Debate to justify this huge sum at a time when we are told we ought to build against submarines.
I ask the Parliamentary Secretary if the estimate that has been given of the Russian submarines is one that he can support from any information he has. I want to know, for example, if this is the information that has been given to the Admiralty by the Naval Attaché at Moscow. I wonder what the Naval Attache is doing in Moscow. Perhaps the Parliamentary Secretary will tell us. Do we still maintain a Naval Mission in Moscow, and at what expense? Moscow is a long way from the Black Sea. Moscow is a long way from the White Sea. Moscow is a long way from the Baltic. And we are told that facilities for the observation of military, naval and air missions are to be confined to a radius of 30 miles round Moscow. So I ask if we are still to have on our Admiralty list payment for keeping a Naval Mission at Moscow at a time when they are certainly not finding out any information about naval matters, but presumably spend their time playing patience.
I should like to ask a question hinted at by the hon. Member for Sowerby. Are we not carrying a very heavy burden of officialdom at the Admiralty? I want to quote here not my own critical opinion but again the opinion of the Leader of the Opposition. Two years ago, in a critical statement on the administration of the Admiralty, he told us:
… there are nearly three times as many officials, naval and civil, at the Admiralty and its ancillary establishments as there were on the outbreak of the war in 1939. Here are the figures: 4,950 before the outbreak of the war, and 12,650 today. All that these three times as many officials can produce is a pitiful admission—and an untruthful admission—that there is not one single battleship "operational" at the present time.' There are nearly 8,000 additional clerks and officials employed on managing the Navy compared with what there were at the outbreak of war.

I think we are entitled to ask if this state of top-heavy bureaucratic officialdom is continuing under this Government at a time when it was criticised as surplus by the Leader of the Opposition. The Leader of the Opposition continued:
But what has happened has been this enormous growth of civil officials of all kinds who are being superimposed and who make work for themselves and their descendants every day they sit in their office chairs. The whole presentation of Admiralty staff is a scandal, which any House of Commons worthy of its financial responsibilities should probe, scrub and cleanse."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th March, 1948; Vol. 448, c. 834–5.]
I want to know how much probing, how much scrubbing and how much cleansing the new broom at the Admiralty intends doing in his term of office. I want to ask him if this is not financial waste, and if he could honestly go into the sanctum of the Chancellor of the Exchequer a week before Budget day and swear that every item of expenditure for the Admiralty staff is justifiable in the interests of national economy.

Mr. Callaghan: Mr. Callaghan indicated assent.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: My hon. Friend nods his head. I am not quite sure that he would nod his head after he had been cross-examined by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In that Debate the Leader of the Opposition put his finger on the real reason why, in spite of changed circumstances, in spite of changed conceptions of naval warfare, this sum keeps going up, and is about the level of £220 million. These gentlemen, like all military, naval, air force and industrial vested interests, have to keep themselves in jobs, and in these days it is quite clear that they are having difficulty in reasoning in the old way, because the circumstances have changed.
It is true we have a potential menance from the Russian submarines, but we have also to consider factors which should be on our side. Surely, the United States of America in a future war will be on our side. I suggest also that the navies of France and other European nations that remain with navies would range on our side. There is an enormous superiority in naval forces that is likely to be ranged on our side against a possible aggressor. If that is so, I do ask if it should not be reflected in the financial bill which we are called on to pay.
Can we get any statement from the Admiralty on their view of the possible development of atomic warfare on naval operations? Surely we cannot disregard that? My hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation (Mr. Beswick) and the hon. and gallant Member for Chelsea (Commander Noble), went to Bikini and studied the development and effect of atomic energy on naval warfare. Surely something has happened in the meantime to change our conception of modern warfare. We should have some assurance from my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty that the Admiralty has changed its outlook since the battle of Trafalgar. I have my suspicions that it has not. I have my suspicions that those gentlemen, who are keeping themselves in jobs, are carrying on in the same old way.
In these days we cannot afford huge sums for unnecessary and luxurious armaments. That is not merely my own point of view; it is the point of view of a distinguished gentleman who has just been appointed to the higher administrative staff at Washington. It is the point of view of Lord Tedder, who said recently:
In point of fact, if great care and discrimination is not used it is quite conceivable that a country might spend so much on military establishment as to sap its economic health.
That is what is happening. These huge bills we are called on to pay are sapping this country's economic health. If the economic health of this country goes, we are faced with bankruptcy and economic chaos. So I say that we are entitled to protest against this huge burden of naval armaments. They represent conceptions of an outworn age. We should challenge them. I suggest that those of us who have done our best to put this point of view before the House in these Debates have performed a service to the country and to European civilisation.

10.41 p.m.

Commander Noble: May I first join in the welcome given to the Parliamentary Secretary on his return to our Navy Debates? He used to take an active part in them before he was transported elsewhere, and we are very glad to see him back here tonight. I think the House will agree that in the past these

Debates on the Navy Estimates have been rather closed shops, and that those who have taken part have been mainly ex-naval officers and Members having dockyard constituencies. I think that the House tonight will agree that we have had a rather broader Debate and will welcome many new speakers. I refer specially to the last speech. There are however many familiar faces of the old team, though on both sides of the House we miss many of those who used to take part. Hon. Members on both sides of the House will remember with affection the salvoes which used to be fired from just below the Gangway on this side of the House.
We have, of course, also some new faces on both sides, and I would particularly refer to the hon. and gallant Member for Gillingham (Squadron-Leader Burden) who made his maiden speech tonight and in doing so had an ordeal which was perhaps even more of an ordeal than one's maiden speech usually is. I do not know whether the House realises that the hon. and gallant Member went straight from this House to hospital to undergo a serious operation as the result of an accident which he had in the House the other day. I feel sure that the good wishes of all of us go with him for his speedy recovery and return to this House.
I would say that there have been four main themes running through this Debate. They were the need for economy; the problem of new construction; the difficulties of the manning position; and the shortage of reserves. During the last day or two I have been looking at some of the Debates we have had on this subject in the last few years. It has been borne home to me forcibly that many of the problems discussed in the last four years are still with us in one degree or another today. I am glad, however, that we have passed that extreme period of transition when we had so few ships at sea.
First I will deal with the need for economy. I was very interested when the Parliamentary Secretary in his first speech said that the Admiralty had now ceased to live on its fat. That, I think, was the expression he used. I hope that his noble Friend will pass on that information to some of his colleagues on the Government Front Bench, because I feel


that if he did that, at the end of the next financial year we might not have quite so large, or so many, Supplementary Estimates from other Departments. He said that by doing this—by making administrative and fairly minor economies—the Admiralty had managed to save something like £2,700,000 in the last year. I am sure that all of us are delighted; but we are a little inclined to ask why they were not able to do it before. We also hope very much that they will go on doing it.
Of the economies which the Parliamentary Secretary announced, I must say that from the sentimental point of view I was very sorry to hear some of them; especially of the removal of the Royal Marines from what one might, perhaps, call one of their ancestral depots, at Chatham, and the closing, or the possible closing, of the dockyard at Bermuda. In addition to sentiment about Bermuda, sentiment because I have spent happy years in that dockyard, there are also questions of strategy and, indeed, of the effect on the Bermuda economy. No doubt, before the final decision is taken, both these will be very fully taken into account. A delegation, we are told, is coming here from Bermuda to discuss relevant matters, and I hope that the Civil Lord will be able to tell us what discussions have taken place with the United States on this subject with regard to their maintaining these bases in the Mutual Defence Programme or in any other programme which may be relevant.
Before deciding on such economies as those of which we have been told today, I do hope that the Parliamentary Secretary and the Admiralty have looked nearer home and fully considered whether they cannot get more from the Admiralty itself. I know that I shall be supported in what I have to say on this subject by the hon. Member for Sowerby (Mr. Houghton), and the hon. Member for Kirkdale (Mr. Keenan), and even the hon. Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes). My hon. Friend the Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L Thomas), in his opening speech told us that the personnel in the Admiralty was now two-and-a-half times greater than it was in pre-war days, and I should like, for a few moments, to break down that figure so that the House can fully realise how

the administrative side of the Royal Navy has grown.
The figures which I shall quote are in relation to 1938 and 1939 compared with those in the Estimates for 1950 to 1951. The examples which I have chosen number about six, from a long list. First, the Secretary to the Admiralty's department has risen from 819 to 2,477; the Naval Staff has risen from 163 to 364; the Naval Store Department from 190 to 754; the Victualling Department from 61 to 199; the Record Office from 480 to 1,119, and finally, the office keepers have increased from 465 to 1,214. With regard to these last few items, I would ask, do we need keep twice as many records? Apparently we are doing so, because the staff has more than doubled over what it was before th,?, last war. Or again, do we need, for whatever duty they undertake, nearly three times as many office keepers? Have we three times as many offices? Will the Civil Lord tell us something of the need for this very large increase in the Admiralty?
The next point is the problem of new construction. That has been dealt with very fully by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Pollok (Commander Galbraith), and my hon. Friend the Member for Londonderry (Sir R. Ross), when speaking on the Amendment. I only point out at this stage that we should be quite certain that we get into production in plenty of time because we on this side of the House repeatedly have warned against a "No war for a number of years" policy; when the time comes for us to need the ships, time is seldom on our side. The ex-Minister of Defence. Lord Alexander, made a very important statement in a Debate on 1st March, 1948—[Interruption.] My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horncastle (Commander Maitland) seemed to be a little surprised when I said that the ex-Minister of Defence made an important statement; but he did.
He said:
It is well-known that the intricate apparatus of modern war demands many months—even years—to get production in quantity of an accepted prototype."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 1st March, 1948; Vol. 448, c. 59.]
Those words have a great bearing on what we have been discussing today because the House has been wholly agreed that the real problem for the


Navy in future is to deal with the new fast submarines. It has to be looked at from three points of view: the surface—the ships the carriers and carrier-borne aircraft; and of course, Coastal Command.
I do hope that we shall be quite certain that, having chosen the accepted prototype, we shall lose no time in getting it into production. I am sure that those who are engaged in research and other experimental work will agree with me, or will understand what I mean, when I say that they always hope that just round the next corner there will be some new discovery which will lead to a substantial improvement and modernising of the article or weapon on which they are working. I do impress upon the Admiralty that at some moment they have—to use rather horrible technical jargon—"a moment of periodic finality" when they say, here we must stop and go into production, otherwise we will not have what we want at the time we think we shall want it. That is a most important point, because to turn again to Lord Alexander's statement, we may not find, when the time comes, we have those years or many months that we require.
I turn now to manpower. My hon. Friend the Member for Hereford has dealt with the great difficulty the Navy is experiencing in getting men after their first period of 12 years to sign on for pensions, and I make no apology for dealing with it again because it is one of the fundamental problems the Navy has to face today. I have asked numerous questions on this in the past, culminating in one today at Question time, when the Parliamentary Secretary answered. It has become apparent that in 1948, only about 25 per cent. of those men were re-engaging. It got a little better perhaps in the middle of last year and went up to something like 30 per cent., but from the answer I received today it has gone down to 22 per cent. It is a very serious position when one considers that before the war 65 per cent. of these men used to re-engage.
This is borne out in Vote A of the Estimates before us today when we see that there is a decrease of 5,000 chief and petty officers, who, of course, as the House knows, in all Departments are the backbone of the Navy. We all know also

that the figures for men reaching this period of 12 years rise very sharply in the next two years because of the large recruitment in the years immediately before the war. Therefore, I do say that the crisis will come in the next two years and we may well find that ships will be immobilised and not be able to put to sea because of the shortages of trained ratings and senior ratings. That of course applies most particularly to the engine-room department.
Why will not these men re-engage? As my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Norwood (Brigadier Smyth) said the other day—and I particularly liked the phraseology he used—men in the Services are becoming more and more disinclined to become what he called "professional gypsies." Especially in the Navy, I think, that applies after the long periods of separation from their families which officers and men had to undergo during that recent war. When the 1945 pay code came before this House my hon. Friends and I criticised it because we thought that the Navy were having to undergo certain conditions because they suited the other two Services. That is really coming to a head now in this re-engagement problem. Is it really sense—personally I think it is crazy—to pay a man a bonus of £100 when he leaves the Navy at the end of 12 years, when what he is really wanted to do is to sign on for another 10 years? When one considers the expense that is caused and the time that is wasted in training another man to the standard that that man has reached after 12 years, it would really pay the Admiralty—and I ask them to consider this—to pay the man £100 to stay in after 12 years and at the end of a further 10 years to pay him another £100 as a bonus for that extra period.
I must say a few words about the pension. One can ask many men in the Navy today, and they will say they do not think it is worth while signing on for another 10 years for the pension that they will get at the end of that time. If a man leaves the Navy after 22 years at the age of 40, probably with a skilled trade behind him, he will get a job outside, and by the time he pays quite high P.A.Y.E. he will find his pension is only worth about £1 a week to him. He does not think it is worth while signing on for 10 years to get that sum.
There is a further suggestion. After a man has signed on let it be a categorical qualification that his next job is a home job, if possible shore-based, for two years. I suggest, as hon. Members on both sides of this House have suggested—I think the hon. Member for Devon-port (Mr. Foot) did so particularly—that perhaps some shortening of the period of foreign service might help. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder), the hon. Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. K. Robinson) and many other hon. Members in this and the other Service Debates have raised many points which are very pertinent to this matter.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hereford referred to the Re-engagement Committee of which we were told by the Parliamentary Secretary. It is a great pity that it was not set up before. We have been talking about this for the last two or three years. I think the Admiralty delayed too long in this matter, and that we cannot avoid the crisis that is to come in the next two years, but do let us build up again as quickly as we can after that crisis. The Parliamentary Secretary also told us that we were short of pilots in the Naval Air Arm. I believe that the limiting factor of the number of front line aircraft we can field—if that is the right expression in the Navy—is the number of pilots available. Exactly the same thing applies here. If we want pilots we must provide the right inducements and conditions.
Before I leave the manning side, I must say a few words about the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth and the new 16-year-old entry. I have been asking a lot of Questions on this subject in the last few years. In the reply to the first Question I asked, I was surprised to learn that out of 29 vacancies 4 were not filled. I thought that might be because it was the first time this scheme had been put into operation, and people did not really know about it. But last September when I asked a Question, I was told that 8 vacancies out of 29 had not been filled. I think that is serious. Nearly 25 per cent. of the vacancies were not filled. To give more background to the picture, of 242 boys who sat for the examination 219 failed either to reach the necessary educational standard or to pass the interview.
In the most recent examination—the entry that went in in January—we were told by the Parliamentary Secretary today that out of 185—the number presenting themselves has gone down—only 22 could be found to enter the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth at the age of 16. The Parliamentary Secretary did not tell us how many vacancies there were, and I hope the Civil Lord will tell us that when he winds up tonight. I think that is a most serious state of affairs, and I hope that we shall be told something more about it. Indeed, the officers who conducted these examinations during the last year or so have made some report on the situation as they found it, and I hope we shall be told something of what the Admiralty really feel about this new entry.
If this method of entry is proving unsatisfactory because vacancies cannot be filled, I do think the problem must be looked at very quickly because in this connection events are moving very fast. The 13½-year-old entry stopped last May and the first 16-year-old entries pass out next July, and after that, till 1953, the numbers gradually go down until the 4-year course at Dartmouth becomes a 2-year course, and the cadets are cut by 50 per cent. Obviously during that period the teaching staff and those with great experience in the work will gradually be becoming redundant until, presumably, in 1953 only half the number will be required. If the problem is looked at again perhaps some combination of the 13½ and 16 will be reverted to—or indeed go back to 13½. I do not know, but I do think the matter should be gone into very quickly and I hope we shall be told something about it tonight.
When this decision was first announced we on this side of the House did not criticise this new entry, but my hon. Friend the Member for Hereford took the precaution of getting an assurance from the First Lord that in the event of this not working out as the Admiralty had hoped, it would then be looked upon as experimental. He did get that assurance from the First Lord, and therefore I do ask tonight that we shall be told that this matter is being looked at and that we also get some report on how these boys are doing at Dartmouth.
I want to say a word about Reserves. That has been dealt with very fully by


my hon. Friend the Member for Horn-castle, but I want to make one point that I have made on a number of occasions during the last few years. We are told in the White Paper on Defence, para 12, that
the expansion of Naval forces that would be necessary in the event of war would be achieved by the bringing forward of ships at present in Reserve.
I was very glad to hear from the Parliamentary Secretary that these ships were in good condition and that they will be preserved in Reserve, but I must say that I do join issue with him on the question of whether we could man them with the Reserves available.
Last year, as is known, the Navy took 10,000 National Service men; this year they have gone back to what they did at the beginning and taken a token 2,000—while the Army, for example, is taking 117,000. Taking an extreme example, at the end of 15 years with an 18-month period of service, the Army will then have over 1,000,000 trained Reserves while the Navy will have only 20,000. I do not think that with the low recruitment to the R.N.V.R. and nearly all its potential recruits in the other Services, with the low state of our other Reserves, and with only getting so few National Servicemen, we really have got the Reserves that we want in time of war. I daresay the answer will be that there are still very many officers and men in the country who served in the last war—as I know, with distinction, who would return and do it again, but that is really a short-term answer; they are getting older every day, they are having no training and I do not know what the organisation is for calling them up. While on that subject may I ask the Civil Lord what progress has been made with the Emergency Reserve we were told of, in which men were paid a bonus of £5 and merely signed on, and their only duty was that they would be called up in the event of an emergency? Did he get a good response to that? I cannot find it referred to anywhere in the Estimates.
Finally, one word about the Sea Cadets. I am sorry to see that there are to be fewer. I fully understand that the policy is to have more cadets in closed units like schools and fewer in open units, but it does mean overall that there are to be fewer cadets. I hope there will

never be a case of a boy who wants to join the Sea Cadets finding that he cannot do so. In these days, with the present problem of juvenile delinquency, the training that these boys get is of the greatest value.
I fully realise that a great many questions have been asked in this Debate, and I have asked some myself at the very last moment, but I hope the Civil Lord will be able to answer some of them tonight, perhaps in his rôle of Queen Elizabeth, as was suggested by the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot). I ask the Government to give special consideration to the points we have raised, in all parts of the House, on the need for economy, the importance of new construction, manning, and reserves. We in this House always had a duty of vigilance in these matters, not only to the Navy but to the country, but now, in view of our commitments in Western Union, the Atlantic Pact, and in the Commonwealth, there is indeed a far greater responsibility.

11.8 p.m.

The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr.. Walter Edwards): It is really a great privilege to me to be entrusted with this task again this evening, for the fifth successive year. As on all previous occasions, I have listened with keen interest to as many of the speeches as I could, and I must say that the discussion has been on a high level and that the Admiralty will welcome many of the suggestions that have been made. I am bound to say, however, that particularly at this time of night, it will not be possible for me to answer every point that has been made. I have checked them rather quickly, and the number is nearly 30 different points—excluding the intervening Amendment.
I should like first to deal with some of the points made by the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas) relating to the First Lord's statement concerning personnel on the one hand and production on the other. As hon. Members will have seen from the Estimates, the personnel is coming down during this financial year and the cost of production is going up. The meaning behind that statement is that we have now to spend far more on production than we did in the last three or four years. As my hon. Friend said, the Navy from now onwards


has to buy everything it wants, and it has no fat to live on as its surpluses are being cleared up. I must also point out, as will be readily recognised, that it would not be much use having a terrific number of personnel if production did not march in step. It would be a waste, and we are trying to see that production is marching in step with the number of men we have.
The hon. Member for Hereford said a fair amount about what happened in 1947 with regard to the run-down of personnel, but I think he will agree that although there was a rather rapid run down over a period of six to seven months, it turned out to be in the best interests of the Navy, which has been able to recover itself from that time.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: I said that it was a risk all the same.

Mr. Edwards: Unfortunately one has to take risks occasionally, but this risk was taken with the advice of our naval advisers, and we thought that we were justified in taking it for that very short time.
Much has been said about the National Service intake for next year, which is coming down to 2,000, as it was two to three years ago. The question has been asked whether this is a final decision. I am afraid it is extremely difficult to be able to say that we can definitely bind the Admiralty to 2,000 for 1953, 1954, and 1955. This is one of many matters which have to be reviewed occasionally and we cannot say, at least tonight, whether we are going to exceed it at any time, or whether it will have to be reduced at any time.
The important question of re-engagement was raised by a number of hon. Members, and I want to refer to it in detail. The hon. and gallant Member for Chelsea (Commander Noble) referred to the "crazy action" of the Admiralty in giving a £100 bonus to men finishing 12 years' service. I can assure him that the men completing 12 years' service in the Navy, in comparison with the men who completed a similar period before the war, do not consider it crazy. That bounty is given in recognition of the service these men perform. No such recognition was given before the war.
No doubt it does create a difficulty from the Admiralty point of view over re-engagement, but even that would not justify us not showing in an appropriate manner due appreciation of the men who have given us 12 years' service. As the hon. and gallant gentleman said, it is a matter which has to be very carefully considered as quickly as possible, because of difficulties which may present themselves about 1953 unless we can get the problem solved, and we at the Admiralty are looking at it with the other Services very urgently. We hope, in the not too distant future, to be able to make a statement on the whole position of re-engagement.
Some hon. Gentlemen have been referring to the matter of married quarters as one of the reasons why men do not reengage. I am certain the House knows, because of the discussions that have taken place, that we now have married quarters we did not have before the war. Re-engagements were higher before the war than they are today; and I do not think there is really any connection between the number of married quarters we have and the number of re-engagements. The answer is the same as that which applied last year and the year before—that the men now have a far better opportunity of finding jobs than they had before the war. In my view, that is the main reason why men are not re-engaging. It' is not because they do not like the Service; it is not because conditions in the Service are worse today than they were before the war—I think we can say without the slightest fear of contradiction that conditions are better—but because there is full employment and the men can come out and get a job.
Another point was raised by the hon. Member for Hereford and by the hon. and gallant Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder), to whom I listened with great pleasure in the first speech he has made on Navy Estimates in this House. I want to assure the House that the question of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, has been gone into very fully, but I am afraid I have to say that there is little hope of being able to alter the present position. The conditions of service now are more or less based on relativity with other comparable classes of civil servants. The Royal Corps are better off in some respects


than the comparable classes of civil servants and it is now Admiralty policy to adhere to the present position, at least until such time as the scheme has been working long enough to enable us to say whether it needs revision or not. No doubt there is some dissatisfaction; we have heard it expressed in another place and in this House, but we feel this is the right and proper thing to do. I can hold out no hope for alteration at the present time.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: Would the hon. Gentleman answer my question: are they coming forward under the new scheme as the Admiralty hoped they would last year?

Mr. Edwards: We do not anticipate any appreciable difficulty in that way yet, but we shall be able to tell about that at a later date. At the present time we are not in extreme difficulty over it.
The question of the Admiralty stall was raised. I was interested in the figures given by the hon. and gallant Member for Chelsea, but I can again assure the House that these matters are not overlooked at the Admiralty. The House can safely believe me when I say that the Admiralty office staff has been under the closest possible scrutiny by the Finance Committee and all departments responsible for financing the Admiralty. We have decided that a committee—not wholly of departmental people—shall be set up to go into the whole work of the office. As no doubt the hon. and gallant Member for Chelsea realises, sometimes because of a change in the type of work that has to be done comparisons between the numbers employed in 1938–1939 and 1949–1950 are not infallible. There have been many changes in the Admiralty in that period resulting in many more people being employed. The House can rest assured that this is receiving our most careful consideration, and every step will be taken to reduce the numbers if this is at all possible. I might add that in spite of all the criticism we have had of the numbers working at the Admiralty, there has not been any mention of the fact that we have reduced the numbers by 1,800 in the last financial year.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: But it is still two and a half times what it was before the war.

Mr. Edwards: Yet it shows that something has been done.
Another interesting question was raised by the hon. Member for Hereford with regard to the Corfu Channel. The British Government was awarded compensation to the extent of £843,947, and the hon. Gentleman was concerned about what was happening in connection with the dependants. A total of about £50,000 is in respect of the dependants of the seamen of the "Saumarez" and "Volage," the two vessels affected at the time. The remainder was for damage to the two ships. Families are already in receipt of pensions, and any money which does come in will go not to the Admiralty Appropriations in Aid but direct to the Treasury.
A number of hon. Gentlemen spoke about the serious question of reserves. I would point out that my hon. Friend's statement with regard to the manning of the Reserve Fleet, should it be necessary, has been reiterated since doubt was cast on it, and we ought to accept it.

Commander Maitland: Can the hon. Gentleman say how long it would take?

Mr. Edwards: Not without notice. In any case it is going to be combined with the question of rapid mobilisation, about which questions were asked this afternoon. It is clearly in mind, but whether we should go so far as the hon. and gallant Gentleman recommended and have another base or manning port in Northern England or Scotland or anywhere else, I cannot answer tonight. It is not the present policy of the Admiralty.
We do understand the anxiety felt on the question of Reserves, particularly in naval circles, and naturally we are paying attention to it. We are satisfied with the present situation. As to the R.F.R. one comment was that it should be allowed to be high. One has to be guided by financial considerations to a large extent, however, and by the necessity of its being required this year or not. We are certainly not unhappy at the Admiralty about the R.F.R. It is something we could build up more rapidly than other Reserves by using people who are leaving after 12 years' service, and as there are many people leaving after 12 years' service it is easy to get people to sign on for that.
The question of the aviation side is causing us concern and we are giving it the most serious attention. I think I have now dealt with most of the points referred to by the hon. Gentleman. But there are others which I should like briefly to touch upon. One of them is the question of the dockyards, a subject upon which a number of speeches have been made. I am afraid I shall have to repeat what I said last year on the policy of the Admiralty in the administration and supervision of the Royal Dockyards. The hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mrs. Middleton) made what I think is almost an annual request for the whole administration of the dockyards to be looked into—I believe in the hope that it would be civilianised rather than navalised. At least, that was the impression I had.

Mrs. Middleton: My reason for raising the matter was to get efficiency. not civilianisation or navalisation; it is simply a matter of their rendering maximum service to the State.

Mr. Edwards: I know that the hon. Lady mentioned something about the people in charge of these dockyards not having, perhaps, had experience in industry. That, perhaps, was why I thought that her request had something to do with the management. Again, a request has been made for a working party to go into the dockyards. We are not satisfied that a working party is necessary, or that it would serve any useful purpose. Judging from the working of the dockyards since I last made a statement on the matter from this Box, I certainly see no reason to alter the statement which I then made.

Mr. Foot: Will the hon. Gentleman undertake to consult with the trade unions on this matter, and to ask their views on whether there should be a working party to make the kind of inquiry which has been asked for for the last three years by hon. Members representing dockyard constituencies in this House?

Mr. Edwards: No, Sir. I think that is putting it the wrong way round. If the trade unions want to consult us on the matter they should make the first move. Since I have been the Civil Lord the trade unions have not approached us on this matter. In any case, I have stated the line which we have to take.
Then there is the question of full employment in the yards—whatever may happen so far as the Navy Votes are concerned. The House will no doubt remember that just after the end of the war, to prevent a number of staff being discharged, a policy of repayment work—or commercial work—was adopted in some of the naval establishments. That went on until such time as the Admiralty was able to provide sufficient money in the Votes to keep the dockyards fully employed on naval work.
We are naturally very sympathetic to those workpeople who serve us in the dockyard districts, and who served us so well during the war. But I am bound to say that as we are getting further away from the war and further into commercial competition, it may not be so easy for a system of commercial work to be undertaken in the Royal Dockyards economically, or even in the best interests of the country. This question will have to be looked at carefully should the necessity arise for large-scale discharges in the dockyard areas, but it does not seems to arise this year.
Another point raised by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton, was the 2,000 smaller number on Vote 8 this year. I understand that some of that will represent wastage and some reductions in naval store establishments. The hon. and gallant Member for West Edinburgh (Lieut.-Commander Hutchison) was rather concerned about the wide gap between the naval side and the civilian side. It is perfectly true that there has been a great difference in the numbers, but so far as the civilians are concerned, here again, it is due to many improvements and changes in the Royal Navy. All the changes in the types of naval stores mean an increased number of people to be employed. In some cases, during and since the war, civilians have been undertaking duties sometimes performed in the past by naval ratings. We now have naval air stations which we did not have before the war, which again causes a further increase because of a large "overhead" of civilians. But this is all very carefully watched, and there is no waste if we can prevent it.

Lieut.-Commander Hutchison: The hon. Gentleman has mentioned that it was his intention to look into the staffing


of the Admiralty Office. Why should we not extend that inquiry to look into the whole matter of the civilian staffing question?

Mr. Edwards: That is something we can look at, but it is not so easy in the case of establishments spread all over the country as it is for the Admiralty itself.
Another question asked is who is to be in charge at Rosyth when the Flag Officer has to go. I understand that the Admiral-Superintendent at Rosyth will undertake the majority of these duties, and I imagine that that will give the hon. and gallant Gentleman some pleasure.

Lieut.-Commander Hutchison: Will he have jurisdiction over all Scottish waters?

Mr. Edwards: Yes, Sir.
On the question of ship repairing, however, I assure hon. Members that we have given the deepest possible attention to ship building and repairing, as a result of which we have set up the Shipping Advisory Committee comprising those interested in the building and repair and use of ships. As the need for ship repairing comes down, there is not, however, very much that the Admiralty can do for the people affected; but we are in the closest touch with the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Transport on these matters, and we certainly do all we possibly can.
Concerning the points made about the I.P.C.S., raised by the hon. Member for Sowerby, I agree that this matter might give a bad impression; no doubt some delays took place, as they may when one has to deal with Government Departments and staff organisations. But he knows that the Admiralty has to do a lot of negotiating before coming to an agreement with staff organisations. We did not unduly hold up these matters; they have been dealt with as matters of importance, and sufficient time must be given in such cases. I have had quite a lot to do with the question of masters and engineers in the yard craft service, and I must repeat that had it not been for disagreement between the I.P.C.S. and the two unions, agreement would have been quicker.
They just could not agree who was going to represent the men and even a Vol. 472

ballot of the men had to be taken whilst we were waiting to consider the whole question. I thought it would please the hon. Member if I told him we are hoping to have the replies in the near future.
With regard to the point about fishing vessels raised by the hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Marshall), I can assure him, as I have assured him before, that we have to pay the greatest regard to the fishing industry and have always appreciated the great asset it is to the defence of the country. The hon. Member raised two points. One was with regard to the number of fishing and fishery protection vessels we have and the other with regard to call-up of men for National Service. There are eight ships employed on protection duties with headquarters of the senior officers at Hull. This force is at least as large as pre-war, so that we have not reduced there. I suppose that will give some satisfaction to his constituent fishermen. On the question of being excused call-up, there is nothing I can add to the present position divulged today, particularly in view of the fact that it has already been stated that the number to be called up is coming down from 10,000 to 2,000 a year. That quite obviously would make a number of difficulties for us.
I think I have covered most of the points, but if there are any hon. Members who have spoken and feel there is something I have omitted, and would write a letter to me about it, I shall try to give them the fullest possible information. I again want to thank the House very much indeed for the kind reception the Estimates have received, except by the hon. Member for Ayrshire, South (Mr. Emrys Hughes), and for the kind way they have treated me since I have had the privilege of representing the Admiralty in the House.

Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.

Supply accordingly considered in Committee.

[Major MILNER in the Chair]

NAVY ESTIMATES, 1950–51

VOTE A. NUMBERS

Resolved:
That 143,000 Officers, Seamen, Boys and Royal Marines, borne on the books of His Majesty's Ships and at the Royal Marine Divisions, and members of the Women's Royal


Naval Service and the Naval Nursing Service, be employed for the Sea Service, for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1951.

VOTE 1. PAY, ETC., OF THE ROYAL NAVY AND ROYAL MARINES

Resolved:
That a sum, not exceeding £34,844,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of the pay, etc., of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1951.

VOTE 2. VICTUALLING AND CLOTHING FOR THE NAVY

Resolved:
That a sum, not exceeding £12,083,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of victualling and clothing for the Navy, including the cost of victualling establishments at home and abroad, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1951.

VOTE 4. CIVILIANS EMPLOYED ON FLEET SERVICES

Resolved:
That a sum, not exceeding £5,880,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of civilians employed on fleet services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1951.

VOTE 6. SCIENTIFIC SERVICES

Resolved:
That a sum, not exceeding £8,697,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of scientific services, including a Grant in Aid to the National Institute of Oceanography, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1951.

VOTE 10. WORKS, BUILDINGS AND REPAIRS AT HOME AND ABROAD

Resolved:
That a sum, not exceeding £8,310,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of works, buildings and repairs at home and abroad, including the cost of superintendence, purchase of sites, grants and other charges connected therewith, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1951.

VOTE 11. MISCELLANEOUS EFFECTIVE SERVICES

Resolved:
That a sum, not exceeding £4,963,900, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of various miscellaneous effective services, which will come in course of payment during

the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1951.

VOTE 13. NON-EFFECTIVE SERVICES

Resolved:
That a sum, not exceeding £15,185,000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of non-effective services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1951.

VOTE 15. ADDITIONAL MARRIED QUARTERS

Resolved:
That a sum, not exceeding £100, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the expense of certain additional married quarters at home, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1951.

NAVY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1949–50

Resolved:
That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1950, for expenditure beyond the sum already provided in the grants for Navy Services for the year.

Schedule


—
Sums not exceeding



Supply Grants
Appropriations in aid


Vote.
£
£


6. Scientific Services
500,000
—


8. Shipbuilding Repairs, Maintenance,&amp;c.—




Section I.—Personnel
10
250,000


Section II.—Matériel
1,000,000
1,000,000


Section III.—Contract work
250,000
750,000


9. Naval Armaments Cr.
500,000
—


10. Works, Buildings and Repairs at Home and Abroad … Cr.
800,000
—


11. Miscellaneous Effective Services Cr.
500,000
—


14. Merchant Shipbuilding,&amp;c.
50,000
—


Total Navy (Supplementary) 1949–50 £
10
2,000,000

Resolutions to be reported Tomorrow; Committee to sit again Tomorrow.

HOUSING, SHEFFIELD

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Popplewell.]

11.42 p.m.

Mr. Peter Roberts: Tonight I wish to raise the matter of certain housing conditions in Sheffield, and I particularly want to ask the Parliamentary Secretary to explain the reasons why Sheffield has not had its fair share of houses in the last four years, whether the responsibility is on his Department through not granting sufficient permits, or whether the responsibility is on the City Council in not pressing on with building projects.
I want to lay before the House certain tragic facts which I think will raise this matter above party strife. I wish to assure the House that I approach this matter in all sincerity to try in some way to ease some of the misery, desolation and hopelessness which there is in thousands of homes in Sheffield. May I first remind the Parliamentary Secretary of the position in Sheffield? We have a waiting list of 26,000 families which, if one takes two children to a family, is something like 100,000 men, women and children, some of whom are waiting in appalling conditions.
I should like to refer to the maiden speech of the hon. Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley), whom I am glad to see in his place, and on whose speech I should like to congratulate him. On 13th March—reported in column 819 of the OFFICIAL REPORT—he said that in the constituency there were very many distressing conditions. Families, he said, were living six in a room and there were streets of back-to-back houses, many of them condemned. Unfortunately, the same applies in parts of my division and other divisions in the City of Sheffield. Therefore, we have this waiting list of 26,000, and the deplorable fact is that new permanent houses are going up at the present rate of only just over 1,000 a year. Therefore, it looks as if there are certain people on these waiting lists who, at the present rate, will have to wait 25 years before they are likely to get a house.
The national arguments on this problem were put before the House in recent Debates. The big problems were not

answered by the Minister, such as the question of obtaining timber from dollar sources. Until this problem is tackled in the right way one cannot begin to see real speed in house building. I do not want to stress that point but to ask the Parliamentary Secretary certain questions upon the more local aspects over which he has more direct control.
The first question is, why has Sheffield not had its fair share of houses? The facts are these—and I will put them as fairly as I can. Nationally, in the four years before the war the number of permanent houses built by local authorities. and others was about 1,200,000. In the four years after the war the rate was. 600,000. For the moment I am not arguing the reasons for that, whether it may be manpower or whether it may be-timber; I am merely stating the fact that in the four years the number of houses, built was half what it was before the war.
Let us look at Sheffield. The City Surveyor's report for 1939 shows, as nearly as I can work it out, that in the four years before the war private enterprise and the local authority, more or less on a 50–50 basis—slightly more to private enterprise, 9,000 to 8,000—built 17,000 houses. If one takes half of that sum and applies it on a national average, that should give us 8,500 houses over the four years after the war. That, I suggest, is the national entitlement that Sheffield should have. Now we have not had that fair share, either on past performance or on the present availability of labour or manpower. The figure of 8,500 I refer to would exclude pre-fabricated houses and repaired houses. How many have we had? We have had, so far as I can work it out, 4,500—and these are figures given by the chairman of the Housing Committee, so far as I can follow them. It leaves the fact that Sheffield has been short of 4,000 houses in these four years. Those houses have been built, but they have not been built in Sheffield but somewhere else.
What we are entitled to ask is, Was it the Minister who said Sheffield should have a full entitlement and did not give permission, or was permission given and the council just did not have permits? If it is the former and the permission was not given, why were the needs of Sheffield overlooked? I can assure the Minister that the needs of Sheffield are


extremely great. He has only to see the productive effort of the city, the great increase in the value of the productive goods which is taking place, to note the fact that the city is increasing in population every day, that we have a waiting list of 26,000 and that many people are living in appalling overcrowded conditions.
None of these things could have entitled the Minister to take away from Sheffield half of what they were entitled to have. Therefore I ask of him quite earnestly, whose responsibility is it that these people are now waiting for 4,000 houses which they should have had in the last your years? It is no good the Minister saying that labour and material are not available, because they were available to build 4,000 houses. It is no good the Minister making cheap jibes about dentists trying to build houses with drills because Sheffield is in the centre of England and it is easy for contractors to get to Sheffield and to be able to build houses if they were given permission.
I wish to point out why I say that the need of Sheffield is so great, and why we should not only have had our entitlement of houses but possibly more. I want to refer to some of the more dreadful conditions for which the Minister and Parliamentary Secretary are responsible. Norton Camp is a cold, draughty, damp camp where there are no methods of heating water except boiling it in saucepans, where there is sickness, and in some cases death, owing to the unhealthy conditions. I have sent the hon. Gentleman a picture, which I see he has before him, which shows one of the best of the compartments in which people have been living sometimes for three or four years. I see in a letter to the Press from the Lord Mayor that these huts are managed by the local authority on behalf of the Minister of Health. Therefore they are the tenants of the Minister, and I should like the Parliamentary Secretary to know something about the conditions in which his tenants live.
I will quote only two cases to the hon. Gentleman. The first is that of Mr. and Mrs. Hall, who live in one damp room. Mr. Hall is bedridden and blind. The mother lives in the same room, and there is his daughter, his

son-in-law, and a grandchild aged four months. The place is so damp that this bedridden man has already had pneumonia twice. The other is the case of Mr. and Mrs. McCarthy, where a father, mother and four children live in one damp room. There are two other compartments which this family could use, but the doctor has told them that they should not be used because they are so damp. The father and one child already have chronic asthma from these conditions.
The Minister is the landlord of these people. No doubt these homes are some of those included in the million the Prime Minister talked about over the wireless. No doubt these children are some of the bonny babies which hon. Members opposite are so proud of. In fact, they are poor, pitiful creatures forced to live in these conditions. The crowning irony is this. When these people have been on the housing list three or four years and their turn comes, they are told by the Socialist council that they are considered to be adequately housed, and they will have to go back to the bottom of the list—to wait another 25 years, presumably, in these conditions, where when the rain comes and the wind blows the walls stream with water. The Minister is responsible for the childhood of these children. It is not their fault that they may be dirty and sick.
The council say they have spent something like £6,000 on this camp. I suggest that those figures are entirely misleading, and I hope the Parliamentary Secretary will not use them as an excuse tonight. I think those figures must include some of the building costs of the camp. If the money has been spent it has certainly been wasted, because there is no evidence of good conditions at this camp. The only evidence I have is that of one man, a coal heaver, who has nowhere to wash, who says that in the last four years they have spent only 4s. 6d. on his compartment. In the last day or two some repairs have been made, but that does not stop this camp being damp and unhealthy.
I ask the Minister to give instructions to his managers to repair this camp—until it is made healthy these people will not be adequately housed—and to reduce the rent from 8s. to 2s. a week. I ask for no priority for these people, but only that when their turn comes they shall be given their place in the list. If he will not


give this assurance, it will show that the Minister and his assistant are hypocrites and peddlers of empty phrases. All that the authorities in Sheffield have given is abuse to these poor people. I should certainly hope that the Parliamentary Secreretary will not follow that rather sordid method of attack, and I think I know him well enough to know he will not do that. These people are not squatters but tenants of the right hon. Gentleman and it is not their fault if they are living in conditions making it impossible to keep themselves clean. That is one particular case.
Alderman Smith, a Socialist alderman who cannot count, and does not know, apparently, the difference between prefabricated and permanent houses, when trying to excuse these conditions made this dreadful admission:
There are hundreds of families without the amenities necessary for normal existence living in far worse conditions than those in Norton Camp.
What an admission after 25 years of Socialist control of the Sheffield City Council. That comes from the chairman of the Housing Committee. I hope the Parliamentary Secretary will have seen from the speech I have quoted, from the complacent excuses of the chairman of the Housing Committee in Sheffield, from the facts I have given tonight, that there is a need in Sheffield, and I ask him whether he will look again at the entitlement of the city to the houses which are rightly hers. Why have we not that 4,000 houses? Local authorities' permits for this year are only 800 so far.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Mr. Blenkinsop): indicated dissent.

Mr. Roberts: The latest civic record shows that the number of permits at the moment is 800 for local authorities. There may be 200 or 300 for private enterprise but that only comes to 1,000, and our entitlement is 2,000. On behalf of those helpless and miserable people I ask for an assurance from the Parliamentary Secretary that as a landlord he will see that the conditions of his tenants are healthy and reasonable, and also state who is responsible for Sheffield being so far short of her entitlement of houses.

11.57 p.m.

Mr. John Hynd: I would not have intervened but for the

unfortunate and completely false impression given to the House of what is happening in the City of Sheffield, which has cause to be proud of its housing record. The hon. Gentleman has accused one of the Socialist members of the Council of giving wrong figures but he has certainly done so himself tonight. He knows full well that in the last four years, since the end of the war, the council has built no fewer than 5,408 houses, plus 194 rebuilt war-damaged houses. 734 under private enterprise—

Mr. Roberts: Does that include prefabricated houses?

Mr. Hynd: Certainly. Are they not homes too? Does the hon. Gentleman prefer that people should remain in places like Norton Camp rather than be housed in prefabricated houses, and is he aware that thousands in Sheffield would be only too glad if they could have one? I would remind him also of the houses which are condemned as unfit for human habitation. They were not built by the local authority, but by those people who are the political friends of the hon. Gentlemen opposite. Here are the figures when the Socialist council took over in 1926. There were 20,000 overcrowded houses, over 6,000 condemned as unfit for human habitation, and 16,000 back-to-back houses over 56 years old, many of them over 100 years old.
Why does the hon. Gentleman bring up Norton Camp now, after so many years in this House? Has he only now discovered the existence of these people in this camp? What has been happening to the three Conservative-Liberal councillors from Norton? I understand they have never raised it as a first-class issue before the council and now claim to back the hon. Member in this campaign. The record of housing in Sheffield since 1926, when the Labour council took over, is a record of which the city has cause to be proud, and hon. Members on this side of the House and on that know it. The only difference is that hon. Members on that side are only too willing to exploit this plight of these unfortunate victims of a Communist stunt, people who were rescued from the dilapidated gun sites by the city council and put in these brick-built dwellings, on which some £6,000 has been spent and which are let for a rent of 8s., of which 2s. 6d. is water


and rates, bringing to the City Council over the four years some £1,000.
The hon. Member knows that this is a situation which we have been fighting for many, many years. I should like to say a great deal more about this, about the responsibility of the three Conservative-Liberal councillors from Norton and about the hon. Member's political friends in Sheffield, but unfortunately time is short and I am satisfied that the Minister will be able finally and fully to deal with the points raised by the hon. Member.

12.2 a.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Mr. Blenkinsop): I cannot understand why the hon. Member for Heeley (Mr. P. Roberts) who raised this matter seemed to think it wrong for another hon. Member for Sheffield to intervene in what he apparently thinks should be his own "perquisite." Let me first deal with the question of the Norton Camp, which is managed by the Sheffield Corporation on behalf of the Ministry of Health. As I assume the hon. Member knows, the original tenants were brought from some appalling gun sites in other parts of the city. Since then partitioning was carried out on these comparatively—and I say comparatively—good huts which were available. Originally, in September, 1946, some 32 families were there. That was steadily reduced to 20 in March, 1949, and to the 13 families which are there now.
These are brick-built and 'asbestos-sheeted huts. There is a piped water supply and there is electricity through prepayment meters. There is no doubt that the sanitation is satisfactory; it has been examined only recently by our own inspectors. I am not in any way pretending they are satisfactory from the viewpoint of ordinary housing conditions, but compared with other camp sites, they are in comparatively good condition. Rent is being charged of some 8s. a week, which, for that type of property, and considering the charge is inclusive of rates, is satisfactory as compared with the rents charged for private property which I hope both hon. Members opposite as well as hon. Members on this side condemn. When considering the speed with which alternative accommodation is being provided for those who live in these huts,

we must bear in mind the people living in Sheffield in foul old private enterprise houses, which I hope we all condemn as being unsatisfactory.
Let me deal with the general position in Sheffield. In common with many other cities, Sheffield is faced with a serious housing condition; but because of the great progress made, particularly in the inter-war years, by the vigorous city council and the work done since the war, that position is perhaps not quite so serious as it is in other cities. I am in no way suggesting that there is not a most urgent need for new houses and nobody would be complacent at all in view of the position that exists in Sheffield, but it is not true to suggest that Sheffield has not had a fair share of allocations that are available.
The hon. Member suggested there is plenty of labour available. He must face the realities of this situation. In fact, on 13th March this year, for the whole of the building and civil engineering trades there were exactly 163 unemployed, including five bricklayers and six joiners. There are vacancies for 301. One of the reasons why the demand, very properly, is as great as it is in Sheffield is the reason mentioned so frequently by my right hon. Friend in this house, namely, that the needs of the people are becoming clearer. That is so because of the very good employment position in Sheffield today compared with that of the years before the war.

Mr. Roberts: The hon. Gentleman has not answered the question.

Mr. Blenkinsop: I know that the figures I am going to give are not figures which the hon. Gentleman wants to hear mentioned in this House. It is a fact that in 1938 there were 22,000 people unemployed in Sheffield, and that this year the number was 1,850. Those people who are employed today are for the first time able to make a claim for new housing. The tragedy of the past, when the hon. Gentleman's friends were in office—[Interruption.] I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman really wants to listen. Obviously he has no intention of doing anything more than advertising himself in the House this evening.

Mr. Roberts: Will the hon. Gentleman answer my questions?

Mr. Bleinkinsop: The reason why the waiting lists are so high as they are is that people for the first time have the income which enables them to claim houses. The tragedy of the past in Sheffield, as shown by survey after survey, was that although a good number of houses was built, later on, near the war years, many of the people who had gone into those houses could not afford to stay in them. Some 30 per cent. of those who had taken houses on new estates had to leave in a period of a few months. That was the tragedy of those years.

Mr. Roberts: What about the future?

Mr. Blenkinsop: The hon. Member has rightly asked what about the future, and housing allocations for the future. He mentioned a figure of allocation for the current year of 800. In quoting the original allocation figures the hon. Member must bear in mind the number of houses under construction in the previous year. It is also true that we have promised, and the council knows this, to make a further allocation of 400 houses in addition to the 800 already granted, provided that labour can be found to do the job. The council understands that. That is the difficulty which we face in Sheffield as in many other places.
The hon. Member must face the problem of whether he wants other work suspended so that more workers can be brought into housing, whether in fact, he wants direction of labour to enforce the removal of workers, from house repairs for example, to building work. Does he want that? He must deal with the practical issue—

Mr. Jennings: During the Debate on the Gracious Speech I made an appeal to the Government to

put this matter upon a non-party basis. I had no reply on that suggestion. I want to ask whether we are short of timber because the Government has missed the boat in Sweden?

Mr. Blenkinsop: The hon. Member must not take advantage of my giving way. Here we must face the fact that if labour is not available to build the houses no increased allocation by the Ministry of Health will provide more houses in Sheffield, and it is vital that those who criticise the allocations made should say from where they would take the labour. What the hon. Gentleman always refuses to do is to face these simple realities. In Sheffield, as elsewhere, we have to allocate the resources available. They are far smaller than we would wish, but it is no use pretending that we can allocate the whole of our resources to one item; housing is most urgent, but it is not the only call, and Sheffield would suffer more if we attempted to take away the resources so vitally needed for her other needs.

Mr. Mulley: May I say that if either of the hon. Members opposite wish to debate this in Sheffield, I should be pleased to see that it is arranged?

Mr. Jennings: Why will not the hon. Gentleman hold a public inquiry to consider housing conditions in Sheffield, and let us have the whole matter brought out into the light of day instead of merely having the blandishments of the Minister of Health?

Question put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Eleven Minutes past Twelve o'Clock a.m.